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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
Much of the economic literature on futures markets view 
the cash-futures price spread as the price for carrying a 
commodity from one period to another. Thus, the difference 
between the current cash price for grain and the price for 
delivery at some future date Is Interpreted as the market 
price of storage. When processing Is Involved, as for soybeans, 
the price spread between spot soybeans and forward soybean 
products is seen as the market price for the required storage 
and processing services [97]. In the case of cattle, spread 
between cash prices for feeders and feed and future prices for 
fed cattle represents the market price for feedlot services 
[96]. In each case, a product transformation (i.e., storage 
and/or processing services) is Involved and the price of these 
transformation services is the linkage leading to the simul­
taneous determination of spot and futures prices in the cash 
and futures markets. The existing theory of futures trading 
in relationship to cash markets has been Incomplete at both 
the individual decision maker level and at the aggregate 
market level. Within this context, this research will attempt 
to clarify the role of futures markets In production and market­
ing decisions under risk and establish a theoretical framework 
for derivation of cash and futures prices at the aggregate 
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market level. Specifically, interests will be limited to an 
evaluation of futures trading In commodities that are In 
some stage of product transformation; hence, such products 
will be defined to be not yet marketable. Live beef is such 
a commodity (e.g., feeder cattle are not marketable until 
all transformation services are completed). 
Conceptual Framework 
Futures trading has traditionally consisted of trading 
in commodities that could be marketed immediately, bur may be 
stored. More recently new commodities on the futures exchanges 
have not met all the traditional characteristics thought to 
be essential for a successful market. Many commodities now 
traded through futures are not storable. Futures trading in 
such products occurs prior to product maturity. These 
commodities are in the process of transformation where both 
quality and quantity changes are occurring. The input will 
result in an entirely different product after transformation. 
Storage may be thought of as one form of transformation 
where at that stage only the quality of the commodity is 
assumed changed. Within the following chapters analyses will 
attempt to incorporate this transformation concept into the 
theory of futures trading. The conceptual framework will be 
limited to considerations for trading in live beef futures. 
Yet much of the discussion will directly apply to other 
commodities listed on the exchanges. 
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The concept of time will be of utmost importance to the 
framework. This may best be explained with an example. Let 
feeder cattle be placed on a feedlot in some period. These 
inputs will require n periods (months) of transformation 
services before they are marketable as fed cattle. Simultan­
eously, there exists a futures market in live cattle with six 
possible contracts. At the point of initial inputs there 
exists some contract t periods (months) from maturity. The 
nearer the terminating date of a contract, the smaller t will 
be. Transformed goods must be marketed at t-n where n<t. 
Therefore, the theory of decision making must be applicable 
to the period t and the interpretation of aggregate market 
responses must be relevant to this point. Later considerations 
for movements in t will be presented. Hence two time concepts 
shall be noted. First, the cash and futures theory at some 
point t for all contracts must be deduced. Then concepts as 
t varies must be evaluated. 
Objectives 
Given the conceptual framework and the elements of time, 
then the following objectives can be specified: 
A) Develop a basic understanding of the organization 
and operation of the live beef futures market. 
B) Obtain information on the performance and character­
istics of live beef futures and on the current and 
past use of such futures. 
4 
C) Analyze the relationship between the existence of 
futures markets and the structure of the related 
industry and the degree to which the prevailing 
market structures Influence market responses. 
Futures markets are advanced and complex systems of 
trading in contracts for deferred delivery, and the degree 
of effective utilization of this marketing tool Is directly 
related to the extent of knowledge and understanding of these 
systems. Without this ingredient of understanding those who 
could most benefit through futures trading will most likely 
forego the opportunity. Hence one specific objective is to 
broaden the present knowledge and understanding of trading 
in live beef futures. Emphasis is placed on the theoretical 
and structural relationships between live beef futures and 
the live beef industry. Therefore, another objective is to 
establish germane models (which may or may not be operational) 
that can be utilized in the explanation of the trading 
activities among producers, processors, and futures traders. 
Given the development of theoretical models relating activities 
within the futures market and the beef industry, then these 
models are to be manipulated to show various theoretical 
impacts (empirical Impacts when the system can be made opera­
tional). In essence the objective is to vary a particular 
system through changes in input and/or status variables and 
determine the alternative changes in output variables. 
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The above objectives are addressed through the use of 
both "micro" and "macro" concepts. Micro Is with roferonco 
to the individual decision maker, while macro refers to the 
aggregate market behavior. The theoretical framework of 
individual decision making (micro) will explicitly show: 
(1) the alternative futures and cash market positions that 
can theoretically be established by producers and marketing 
firms, (2) the role of Income, cost, risk, and expectations 
in the decision processes of market participants, (3) optimal 
commitments in the futures and cash markets, and (4) hedging 
and speculative positions in the futures and cash market. 
Whereas, the macro framework reveals: (1) relationships in 
implicit forms necessary for input and futures market equilib­
rium, (2) conditions necessary for relating futures to the 
cash market via price spreads, (3) procedures for Intertemporal 
price discovery, (4) Implications from types of equilibriums 
derived under alternative circumstances. Specifically, the 
macro models establish the procedures for deriving simultan­
eously the market equilibrium input price (feeder cattle) and 
the futures price. Then the alternative price movements under 
change will be specified. Finally, the role of the prevailing 
market structure as it relates to the total macro discussion 
will be considered. The complete framework of equilibrium 
will be in static terms, yet movements of equilibrium coordin­
ates will be considered over each contract life (e.g., price 
movements over the trading period for a futures contract.) 
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A note on methodology 
The subject content of the forthcoming discussion will 
be primarily that of price theory and Its role in allocation 
and equilibrium. As will become evident in later chapters, 
much economic theory must be put aside in order that the 
core analysis be of manageable proportion. The depth and 
breadth of the economic theory of futures trading is vast, 
yet incomplete. Hence, the existing theory of futures will 
be altered and supplemented through the economic considerations 
to be presented [78, p. 12-31]. 
Three methods of Inquiry are available to economists: 
deductive method, statistical method, and historical method. 
The deduction approach will be emphasized where simple econ­
omic logic is applied to futures trading. Given a set of 
assumptions and the market participants to which they apply, 
then responses or conclusions can be deduced. Arguments then 
are addressed to both the assumptions and the conclusions 
deduced from the assumptions. Some applications of the statis­
tical method will be used in later discussion of price move­
ments . 
The Concept of Futures 
The creation of futures markets like that of the banking 
system, stock exchange, and other economic systems was the 
outgrowth from the existing needs of an economic community 
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functioning in an inadequate market structure. The specific 
needs of all participants in any economic system should 
facilitate adjustments leading to the satisfaction of such 
needs.^ 
Futures markets 
The nature of futures trading constitutes a part of the 
broad field of risk and uncertainty. The activities of futures 
trading consist with either assuming risk as speculators or in 
shifting risk as hedgers (e.g., such classifications will be 
shown to not necessarily be mutually exclusive). Risk can be 
thought of as the predictable changes that could either 
Increase or decrease the total satisfaction of a market parti­
cipant . 
Concepts of futures trading draw a parallel to that of the 
cash market for each specific commodity. Yet differences 
exist. With cash sales the receipts of goods change owner­
ship. Whereas, futures trading deals only with contracts or 
promises for deferred delivery or acceptance. The physical 
good does not immediately change ownership. Cash transactions 
are completed in the present time period, while futures con­
stitutes a binding commitment to fulfill the conditions of 
a contract at some indicated time in the future. 
^In the present state of the arts, needs may induce ad­
justments; but such needs are often not independent of the 
adjustment process, i.e., needs are often manipulated. 
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Elements of risk are present in every phase of economic 
activity and all participants must share in assuming it. Yet 
it varies widely In amount and incidence among groups [6l p.2]. 
Some groups are willing to accept greater risk while others 
are not. Therefore, the transactions between the spot and 
futures markets are Indicative of the process of finding an 
equilibrium point between risk-bearers and rlsk-averters. 
Ultimately, the legality of a futures market lies in the fact 
that the potentiality for shifting risk through this market 
exists. Without this risk shifting capacity a futures market 
would differ little from any organized gambling system. 
Historical progression 
Futures exchanges in the United States began with the 
Chicago Board of Trade organized in 1848 [4$ p. 11]. Develop­
ment of this and later exchanges in New York, New Orleans, 
Minneapolis, Kansas City, and others can be traced back to 
the westward development and specifically to the changing 
nature of agriculture in the midwest. 
Grains were the first commodities readily adaptable to 
futures trading. Progression from early methods of trading in 
the physical product to the transactions involving futures 
contracts directly resulted from the erratic pricing system. 
There existed a high degree of uncertainty involving receipts 
that satisfied time requirements, quality needs, and volumes. 
Rail and water transportation lacked the desired level of 
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dependability necessary for increasing demands. Such compli­
cations lead to both buyers and sellers frequently contracting 
forward in an effort to provide for their needs. These "to 
arrive" contracts (contracts to deliver physical goods at 
some date in the future) were the natural forerunner of the 
futures contract. Ultimately through a process of standard­
ization of the "to arrive" contracts, the futures emerged as 
a highly mobile tool for facilitating a more orderly market­
ing process. 
Growth of the futures from this early beginning has shown 
vast expansions. New commodities such as coffee, sugar, silk, 
eggs, potatoes, and products such as zinc, lumber and others 
have been added to the list of contracts traded. Of these, 
many have proven successful; some erratic; while others have 
been complete failures. 
Futures contracts 
Transactions within a futures market are for commodities 
meeting rigid requirements and subjected to strict control 
through governmental agencies. Those restrictions placed on 
the commodity traded are explicitly stated for the actual 
contract bought or sold. Ambiguity with the term contract may 
result when the reader considers a spot sell or spot contract, 
forward contract, and futures contract. Each contract 
specifies a certain binding condition to which both buyers 
and sellers are committed. The relationship among these 
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concepts of contracts are shown below: 
I. Cash Contract (1) Spot contract: used 
for Immediate delivery 
of the actual commod­
ity. 
spot 
contract 
(2) Forward contract: used 
for deferred delivery 
of the actual commodity 
II. Future contract 
(3) Futures contract: used time 
contract for speculative and 
hedging purposes. 
Cash and futures contracts differ in many other ways. 
Cash contracts are used to merchandise the given commodity, 
while futures enable hedging against or speculation on 
commodity price changes. Cash contracts are executed at 
exchange tables or privately; whereas, almost all futures 
transactions are executed in the exchange pit, see Figure 1.1. 
Futures trading are nearly always in round lots (an exception 
may be when 1/2 lots etc. are traded) and future months are 
specified for delivery. Cash contracts consist of trades in 
irregular amounts where the time used for delivery is 
variable. Futures contracts provide the sellers with options 
for determining delivery day within the specific month as 
well as some range for quality requirements. Cash contracts 
usually call for specific quality and quantity requirements 
and the optional period for delivery may or may not exist 
[62, p. 109]. From this point and throughout the remaining 
discussion the term contract will be reserved to refer only 
to futures trading. 
; ;C1! : 
1 Viaiiori' oaUery. 
2 Sia'vidtioal Boards. 
3 Ciiicii.^^o Board of Trade & New York Stock Ex-
cnansc Trani>-lux Tickers. 
4 K. Y. Mercantile Exchange Ticker. 
6 Trading Boards. 
6 Chicago Cash Markets Panels. 
7 Trading Pits. 
8 Trader's Desks. 
9 Market Information Center & Ticker Central. 
Figure 1.1. Trading floor—Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
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For adequate commitments in a contract, the market must 
possess a high degree of perfection, liquidity, and security. 
Liquidity guarantees instant convertibility of commitments, 
while security assures adequate fulfillment of contract obli­
gations. The hedger also requires the exclusion of all risks 
other than value risk from the futures market. 
These essentials for an active futures market are 
fulfilled through the futures contract. Through the standard­
izing of quantity and quality of commodities traded and the 
strict administrative control over the participants, the 
exchange has established a high degree of perfection and 
liquidity. The many specifications of the contract then leave 
only the contract price, number of contracts, and delivery 
months to be negotiated. 
The high degree of contract standardization must be 
somewhat offset to provide the flexibility necessary for 
the market to function during periods of economic and natural 
vagaritles. Flexibility exists in that a range for delivery 
and quality are left to the discretion of sellers. Blau has 
summarized this as, "the futures contract can thus be 
characterized as a compromise between the conflicting prln-
clplles of standardization and flexibility, both aiming at 
increasing the perfection and liquidity of the market in 
different ways"[7, pp. 3-4]. 
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Live beef futures 
Inauguration of cattle futures trading In Novejiiber, JvuWl, 
was characterized by much controversy over the economic 
usefulness of such activities. This contract grew out of a 
need within the beef industry, yet it lacks the full support 
of highly organized packinghouses. Ranchers^ feeders, and other 
groups expressed their reservations about this commodity. 
In essence trading in a new commodity that did not fit the 
initial concept of storability (and marketability) aroused 
much hostility. Much of the industry was hidebound by customs, 
traditions, and the past. Hence there always exist some lag 
responses to new marketing ideas. The fact that the live 
beef industry was the largest single source of income in the 
agricultural sector definitely influenced these initial reac­
tions. Fear of governmental Intervention via the futures 
market existed. Beef prices have continued to be established 
independently of direct governmental regulations. At the same 
time the beef industry had experienced a disastrous decline 
in prices, thus adding to the reservations about new marketing 
Innovations. Finally the prevailing market structure was such 
that a large group of sellers (producers) faced a small group 
of buyers (processors), hence further adding to the lack of 
enthusiasm [93, p. 19]. 
Introduction of any new commodity into the futures market 
requires adjustments conforming with the specific nature of 
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the good traded. The nature of beef futures necessitated 
many changes from the traditional concepts of futures trading. 
Trading in nonstorables and the difficulty with inconsistencies 
in grading compounded the problems with cattle futures. Many 
traders also felt that any futures should have the following 
attributes : 
a) accepted grade standard 
b) commodity must be homogenous 
c) minimum degree of perishability 
d) ability to make and/or accept delivery 
The beef futures like many nonstorable commodities with 
futures contracts necessitates adjustments in theory to 
account for such changes. Hence given this brief review of 
the concepts of futures, the forthcoming chapters will provide 
a general theory useful in explaining activities of these 
commodities in some stage ofproduct transformation. Chapter 
two will evaluate the situation of the decision maker and his 
cash and futures positions. Chapters three, four and five 
consider the aggregate futures market In relationship to the 
prevailing market structure. Finally chapter six looks 
directly at some pricing phenomena of the live beef futures. 
A Note on Futures Literature 
An extensive bibliography covering the most recent 
literature on futures trading has been included. For this 
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reason a comprehensive review of the literature will not be 
discussed. This literature can be classified in one of two 
ways: (1) a general discussion of all futures and (2) futures 
as applied to a particular commodity group. Studies relevant 
directly to the live beef futures are becoming increasingly 
more available. Most of these are applied problems such as 
in [2, 11, 32, 34, 38, 44, 53, 76, 120, 124], while others 
deal primarily with conceptual problems [33, 59, 93, 95, 96, 
106].  
Six studies have been singled out by this author as first 
priority readings for those with a working knowledge of 
futures [7, 107, 71, 115, 85, 101]. Blau reviews the general 
concept of futures trading and its relevance to an economic 
community [7]. Although this discussion needs some revision 
due to changes over time, it does provide an interpretation 
of the role of futures. Stein in a somewhat more technical 
and abstract discussion presents a theory of futures for the 
decision maker and considers some implications for trading 
positions at the aggregate market level [107]. Johnson 
geometrically Illustrates some aspects of futures trading by 
decision makers [71]. Telser: approaches the theory of futures 
trading through an intermediate level of mathematics. His 
assumptions and methodology are somewhat unique to the theory 
of futures [115]. These first four studies are similar in 
that each evaluates the futures with reference to storable 
16 
goods only. In McKlnnon's recent article aspects of futures 
relevant to products not yet marketable are considered. A 
theoretical model relating forward contracting to production 
risk is Illustrated [85]. Finally, Preston and Yamey discuss 
intertemporal price relationships with forward markets [101]. 
These references do not begin to cover all the aspects of 
futures trading, but they do provide a general review of the 
present state of the theory of futures markets. 
17 
CHAPTER 2: MICRO DECISION MAKING MODEL 
The introduction of a contract in live beef futures has 
provided a new marketing tool to the live beef industry. This 
tool can be effectively utilized by both processors and produ­
cers. It is then essential that a more comprehensive theory 
of futures trading, applicable to this commodity, be derived; 
thus establishing the theoretical role of beef futures in the 
marketing process. Existing futures theory lacks sufficient 
detail and applicability at the decision maker level. 
A micro model derived within this chapter attempts to 
Illustrate the decision process completed by each market 
participant establishing both cash and futures positions. 
Acting within the limits of the postulated assumptions of the 
model, the immediate consequences of alternative decision 
policies will be suggested. Each decision policy Is made 
within the time horizon of t months from contract maturity. 
Theoretical Framework 
It is assumed that there exist a finite number of 
decision makers operating in a purely competitive environment. 
Each market participant has chosen a given occupation and 
has made the necessary capital Investment for functioning in 
the cash market. For example, the decision maker may be a 
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feedlot operator who has previously all 
invet5tmonl« In ft^ediot llencf hi;. ilecUilon 
process now consists of making the appropriate decisions in 
period t (t>0) for the optimal number of feeder cattle to 
purchase and the optimal futures commitments. This commitment 
in futures would be expected to be terminated n periods from 
t where n is the time required for transformation of feeders 
into slaughter animals. In essence the present decision 
theory will encompass only the short run since the production 
capacity of feeders and processors is taken as fixed. 
Income and cost considerations 
Each market participant can establish one or any combina­
tion of the following market positions in period t (t>0) where 
X and Xp are the two choice variables representing the cash 
(spot) and futures markets, respectively, x is measured in 
live animal units of given weight and quality and Xp is 
expressed in equivalent live animal units. Thus the market 
positions can be summarized: 
' the holding of short futures commitments 
from period t>0 to t-n for contracts matur­
ing in period t=0, n<t, (the decision maker's 
Xp>0 / 
selling commitments in live beef futures 
expressed as a given number of steers), 
the holding of long futures commitments 
from period t>0 to t-n for contracts 
10 
Xp<0 
x>0 
maturing in period t = 0, n^t, (the decl;'.ioii 
maker's buying commitments in live beef 
futures expressed as a given number of 
slaughter steers), 
cash market purchases in period t>0 for 
commodity requiring n periods for product 
transformation (the number of feeder cattle 
purchased and placed in feedlot in period 
t>0), 
" cash market quantities contracted in period 
t>0 for delivery in period t-n or cash 
market purchases planned in period t>0 for 
period t-n (the number of slaughter steers 
contracted for deferred delivery or antici­
pated purchases of slaughter steers at t-n, 
n<t). 
Current and expected prices are expressed as follows; 
'existing cash (spot) price per unit of x 
(where x>0) in period t>0 (known price of 
feeder cattle per animal prior to feedlot 
transformation), 
""expected cash price per unit of transformed 
X for period t-n (expected price of slaughter 
steers per animal in period t>0 for delivery 
in period t-n, n<t). 
x<0 
P(t) 
EP(t-n)=• 
;'0 
[ cash market contracting price per unit of x 
P'(t) = (where x<0) in period t>0 for delivery in 
period t-n, n£t, 
Çexisting futures price per unit of Xp in 
F(t) = period t>0 for contract maturing in period 
t=0, 
» 
(expected futures price per unit of x^ in 
period t>0 for period t-n for contract 
maturing in period t=0. 
Each decision maker also incurs costs from his participa­
tion in the cash and futures markets. Feedlot operators and 
other cash market participants have transformation and market­
ing costs. Similarly, futures market participants must pay a 
commission charge for each futures commitment established. 
Define : 
C'^/x) = average cost of product transformation, 
C'j^^(x) = average cost of marketing, 
C'p(Xp) = average cost of futures commitments, and 
C'(x) = C'y(x) + C'j^(x). 
A set of expected net Income equations for decision makers 
can now be written. It has been assumed that a linear 
transformation cost function exists and that all other costs 
are linearlly related to the quantity variables. Costs 
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(C and C'p) and prices at period t are known, x and Xp are 
the choice variables, and prices for period t-n (P(t-n)), 
(P(t-n)) are unknown stochastic variables. In addition the 
decision makers know the probability distribution (density 
function) of the stochastic variables. 
E7r(x>0, Xp>0) = x[EP(t-n) - P(t) -C] 
+ Xp[F(t) - EP(t-n) - C'p] (2.1) 
Eïï(x>0, Xp<0) = xCEP(t-n) - P(t) - C] 
+ Xp[P(t) - EP(t-n) + C'p] (2.2) 
Eu(x<0, Xp<0) = x[EP(t-n) - P'(t) + C] 
•fXpCF(t) - EP(t-n) + C'p] (2.3) 
En(x<0, X >0) = x[EP(t-n) - P'(t) + C] 
+ Xp[P(t) - EP(t-n) - C'p] (2.4) 
Given the alternative market positions and the associated 
cost functions, then one of the four expected net Income 
equations will hold uniquely for a decision maker at period 
t>0 (e.g., some point prior to maturity). Equation 2.1 
represents a decision maker's expected net income with both 
cash and short futures market positions. Equation 2.2 holds 
for firms with cash and long futures positions. Equation 2.3 
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applies when forward contracting and/or anticipated purchases 
in the cash market exist in conjunction with a long futures 
position. Equation 2.4 Involves the same cash position but 
in conjunction with a short futures commitment. These 
equations will be utilized in a micro decision model, but 
only one equation will be applicable to a decision maker at 
a given point, i.e., the same decision maker cannot be both 
short (Xp>0) and long (Xp<0) at the same time. The allowable 
combinations of market positions follow from definitions and 
assumptions in the next section regarding risk and utility 
maps relating risk to expected net income. 
Decision making risk 
In this framework risk to the decison maker results in 
variations in realized net income when price expectations do 
not materialize. Risk aversion is assumed in the sense that 
each individual chooses those market positions which will 
minimize his risk for a given expected net income. Prices 
in future periods are assumed to be random variables where 
the mean and variance of the distribution is known. Risk is 
then defined as the variance of net income. 
McKinnon states the output at harvest time can be viewed 
at planting time as a random variable [85, p. 846]. Within 
the present framework this would imply that at period t the 
transformed x of period t-n would be viewed as a random 
variable. In contrast, the model has accounted for production 
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risks without assuming that the feeder's output of slaughter 
steers in period t-n is a random variable. 
Transformation risk in our framework may exist through 
changes in quality and weights of the initial cash stock 
(feeder cattle). It has been assumed (and quite realistically) 
that quality and weight risk are reflected directly in the 
prices received, i.e., the value of x changes directly when 
quality and weight differences occur. Price risks then absorb 
differences due to variations in quality and weights. This 
is why it was chosen to measure quantity variables in live 
animal units. 
It has been assumed that the remaining transformation 
risk is negligible, i.e., the same number of x units of input 
in period t yields the equivalent number of output units 
in t-n. Realistically, the physical number of input units 
may exceed output units due n additional 
n measures the proportion of x inputs that were lost in the 
transformation period, thus reducing the output in period t-n 
to x(l-n). The expected net income equation would then 
appear as Ett = Xp[P(t) - EF(t-n) - C'^] + x[EP(t-n) - P(t) 
- C] - x En EP(t-n). n has been ignored in the present 
framework, although its introduction would not drastically 
change the optimization format. All other transformation risks 
are assumed to be reflected in the price movements as explained. 
stochastic variable n could be introduced 2 where n 'v ID( y ,0 ). 
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Given the combinations of expected net Income and risk 
and the shape of the decision maker's preference function 
relating risk to expected net income, the format for determina­
tion of optimal market positions is set. The second moment 
about the mean of the probability distribution of net income 
has been utilized as a measure of risk. Alternative criteria 
for risk measurement exist, but none are without their limita­
tions. References [?]» [70], [85], [107], and [115] provide 
useful discussions of some risk measurement criteria. 
Optimal Market Positions for the Short Hedger 
It is assumed that a market participant makes his cash 
commodity decision and chooses his position in the futures 
market at period t>0 based upon his price expectations. The 
goal of the decision maker is to maximize expected net income. 
However, since expected prices may not materialize, risk 
prevails and must be considered when establishing cash and 
futures positions. Thus the forthcoming models will utilize 
a tradeoff approach between expected net income and risk as 
elements in the decision maker's utility function leading to 
the simultaneous determination of optimal cash and futures 
market commitments (see Figure 2.1b). 
If the variance of net income is taken as a measure of 
risk, a theoretical risk function for net income as defined 
in 2.1 can be written: 
Figure 2.1. Risk, Income, and trade-off maps when net 
Income Is Independent of hedging 
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Var ( T r )  %  & p  Ppp O p  (2.5) 
This function assumes that cash and futures prices are random 
2 2 
variables for period t-n and that CTp, CT^, and CTpp are known 
and constant for the given individual decision maker. The 
greater (smaller) the positive correlation between cash and 
futures prices the smaller (larger) risk will be. Risk also 
decreases as the variances of cash and futures prices decrease. 
Any improvement in the individual's ability to predict prices 
(e.g., improvements over price expectations of equation 2.1 
through 2.4) will change the risk function via changes in the 
mean square error for cash and futures prices. The simplifi­
cation and plotting of Equation 2.5 in Figure 2.1 is explained 
in Appendix A. 
This equation holds for any decision maker who establishes 
a short futures position against a current commitment in the 
cash market. It can be presented in an iso-variance map 
where each iso-variance curve includes all combinations of 
cash and futures positions yielding a constant risk value 
(Figure 2.1a). In Figure 2.1a the horizontal axis shows the 
cash commitment (x) while the vertical axis indicates the 
futures commitment (x^). Market positions can be purely 
speculative, purely hedging, or some combination of the two. 
All commitments established on the vertical axis only are 
purely short speculative positions; those on the horizontal 
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axltî involve no futures positions. Any point lying between 
the cash position axis and the 100 percent hedging line (the 
45° line in Figure 2.1a) represents a cash position with a 
short hedger where this hedge is less than the cash position. 
All points lying on the 45° line represent 100 percent hedges 
while points to the left of this line correspond to a combina­
tion of hedging and speculation. 
Curve VQ in Figure 2.1a gives the alternative values of 
X and Xp necessary for 2.5 to sum to VQ. In Figure 2.1a it 
2 2 is assumed that Op, and Op^ are such that a section of 
the iso-variances is concave downward (to the origin). Other­
wise, the decision maker could not minimize his variance for 
a given expected net income through some hedged position. 
Concave upward iso-variance curves imply that the minimum 
variance for a given net return can occur only with a zero 
hedge, i.e., all positions are established on only one axis 
of Figure 2.1a. The cases considered here will be those 
leading to use of the futures market (see Appendix B). 
To determine the optimal amount of hedge income equation 
2.1 must be considered. If the decision maker's expectations 
are such that [F(t) - EP(t-n) - C'p] = 0, then the expected 
net income equation is independent of the amount of futures 
commitments. In this case an iso-net income line (expected 
net income line) can be drawn parallel to the vertical axis 
as in Figure 2.1a. This individual will for each iso-net 
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incoiiie choose that level of short futures which will minimize 
his variance. Graphically, where an iso-net Income Ett^ is 
tangent to an iso-variance curve yields this minimum point. 
The combination of all possible tangency points of iso-net 
income and iso-variance gives the line ZZ and this tangency 
locus must be linear since all iso-variance curves are com­
pletely symmetrical. All points along ZZ can then be super­
imposed on a tradeoff map between expected net income and 
risk (Figure 2.1b). Tangency locus ZZ in the iso-variance 
map must always be linear as indicated. This does not 
necessarily hold for the same ZZ plotted over the tradeoff 
map. Z'Z' on the tradeoff map will be linear if the incre­
mental change In both iso-variance and iso-net income remains 
constant. If increases in iso-net income are accompanied by 
increasingly larger incremental changes in iso-varlances, 
then Z'Z' will be curvilinear upward. This is economically 
meaningful in that increases in net income opportunities 
must be accompanied by proportionally larger risk taking. 
The alternative of greater incremental increases in expected 
net Income over iso-variances is not meaningful to the above 
analysis. Therefore it will not be considered. Further, 
all examples to be presented will be graphically interpreted 
on the assumption of constant incremental changes in both the 
iso-variance and iso-net income contours. 
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Any combination along Z'Z' can be chosen, but the rational 
decision maker maximizes his utility under the constrained 
conditions. The market participant will choose that combina­
tion giving the expected net income and risk along Z'Z' 
that will place him on his highest indifference curve. Any 
point other than the tangency of Z'Z' and in Figure 2.1b 
must necessarily yield a lower degree of satisfaction since 
Z'Z' crosses only lower indifference curves when off the 
tangency point. In the example from Figures 2.1a and 2.1b, 
ETTg and give the constrained utility maximization. 
Referring back to the iso-variance map, the combination of 
EiTg and Vg indicates that x^ is the optimal short hedge and 
X* the optimal cash position. Optimization has resulted in 
a futures commitment where the cash market position was not ® 
completely hedged. For this case, optimal output is not 
influenced by the futures market. Moreover, the optimal 
futures position can never exceed the optimal cash position, 
i.e., hedging but not speculation is possible. As shown in 
Figure 2.1a, however, hedging at less than the 100 percent 
level may be optimal. If a 100 percent hedging rule were 
applied, the decision maker would either have to accept a 
higher level of risk to maintain the same expected income, or 
reduce his output and expected income to maintain the same 
level of risk. 
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Probably a more realistic alternative to the above model 
is when the expected net returns from futures activities are 
greater than zero, i.e., [P(t) - EP(t-n) - C'p]> 0. Now 
expected net income is not independent of the hedging level. 
Hedging will be utilized not only for its risk shifting 
capacity, but also for its profit potential. The iso-net 
Income lines may have a slope like that shown in Figure 2.2a. 
This slope will vary as the expected net return from futures 
changes. The greater (smaller) the increase in expected 
futures return, the smaller (larger) will be the slope of 
each iso-net income line. 
For the iso-net revenue contours to be linear as shown 
in the graphs, it must be assumed that all marginal costs 
are fixed for all values of x and x^ given the decision 
maker's transformation period. Equation 2.1 through 2.4 thus 
contain all fixed values once the decision maker establishes 
his expectations. With this assumption it can then be shown 
that the slope of the iso-net income lines is always constant 
for the given transformation period. Introduction of non­
linear transformation functions into the income equation 
could yield nonlinear iso-net income contours, i.e., the 
marginal productivity of transformation may not be constant 
and hence costs would change as cash market commitments vary. 
Tangency locus ZZ (Figure 2.2a) is again superimposed 
over the tradeoff map and the same tangency of Z'Z' and 
Figure 2.2. Risk, income, and trade-off maps when 
hedging is potentially profitable 
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exist (Figure 2.2b). The constrained utility maximization 
occurs with Eitg and This level of expected net income 
and risk is utilized to determine the optimal short futures 
* * 
position and the level of total stocks as shown by Xp and x 
in Figure 2.2a. Figures 2.2a and 2.2b lead to the conclusion 
that the decision maker establishes a short hedge position at 
a higher level than when expected net income is independent of 
hedging. Indeed, his price expectations may be such that he 
chooses his optimal positions to the left of the 100 percent 
hedging line. If this happens, and the futures market position 
were limited to 100 percent hedging, the firm would find it 
necessary to raise output to maintain its expected income and 
risk levels. A smaller increase would be needed to keep risk 
at the same level but a larger increment in output as well 
as a higher level of risk would be required to maintain expected 
Income. If output were held constant, risk would decrease but 
at the cost of a reduction in expected net income. 
A third and final example for short hedging can be 
considered to illustrate the use of the iso-variance and 
^Tangency locus ZZ coincided in Figures 2.1a and 2.2a 
only because of the way the expected net Income equations were 
drawn. In both cases, EÏÏ was tangent to iso-variance hence 
giving the same ZZ for both situations. Expected net income 
could have been such that E7rj_ was tangent to the iso-variance 
Vj. This could have given a different ZZ and a different 
tangency point on the tradeoff map. 
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tradeoff maps. In the two cases considered, the optimal 
situation dictated the levels of hedging and production. 
Since the decision maker is making his decision in period t 
for expected results in period t-n, n<t, time limitations and 
other limiting factors may prevent his obtaining and handling 
the optimal level of total production stocks x* shown in 
Figures 2.1a and 2.2a. For example, a livestock feeder may 
not have the feedlot capacity to handle the optimal production 
level. The problem is to determine the optimal hedge given 
his fixed (maximum) capacity. 
Due to the capacity limitation, the decision maker must 
operate within the output limit shown in Figure 2.3a as x. 
All possible combinations of expected net income and iso-
variance must be determined by moving along ZZ up to the 
limit of line xx and then up along xx. Net income-risk 
combinations along the xx consist of EII^ and where i i-
j except when the line xx intersects a tangency point between 
an iso-net income and iso-variance curve. Then i equals j 
as shown in the example (Figure 2.3a) where xx intersects 
En^ and V^. At no other point will i and j be equal along 
this line. The implication of this is that an iso-net income 
line must be evaluated at some point along the line which 
does not yield the minimum variance. Only when i equals j 
will the minimum iso-variance correspond with the Intersection 
of XX and the relevant iso-net income and iso-variance. 
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The various intersections of iso-net revenues and iso-
varlances along xx are then plotted on the tradeoff map of 
Figure 2.3b, giving the curve Z'Z". Z'Z' of Figure 2.3b 
shows those minimum risk values for all levels of expected 
net income. With fixed capacity the expected net income 
is attainable only with the higher risk V'g. The combination 
of risk and expected net Income that maximizes constrained 
utility occurs at the tangency Z'Z" and indifference curve I'^ 
with the coordinates EII'^ and V'^. This tangency can never 
occur on a higher indifference curve than given the present 
Z'Z' line, i.e., Z'Z" will always be either tangent or to the 
left of Z'Z'. The tangent coordinates (En'^,V'^) from Figure 
2.3b are then determined along the line xx of Figure 2.3a, 
thus giving the optimal short hedge Xp for the fixed capacity 
X. The desired hedging level can be determined for any 
capacity, but when this level is less than the optimal x 
there must be a loss in utility to the decision maker. 
Determination of the Optimal Market Position 
for the Long Hedger 
.A long hedge (buying futures) can occur only if a short 
cash position has been assumed or a long cash position is to 
be taken in period t-n, i.e., the market participant has 
established some deferred delivery contractual agreement at 
price P'(t) in period t>0 for delivery in t-n or he expects 
to purchase the commodity in period t-n. In most situations 
Figure 2.3. Risk, Income, and trade-off maps with 
limited feedlot capacity 
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of deferred delivery contracting with a long hedge, the 
decision maker does not have a cash position at the time hedging 
is undertaken. The Intent is usually to take a cash position 
in period t-n. This market position is somewhat atypical for 
primary producers who have a cash market commitment. If such 
a commitment exists the decision maker has established the 
price for the commodity which he owns in period t>0 for 
deferred delivery. This involves transforming the product 
over the period from t>0 to t-n and then making delivery. 
Given price expectations, the contractual agreement serves to 
lock in a particular price for his product. The only price 
risk then within the cash market is that the wrong decision 
was made. If the price of the contractual commitment for 
example happens to be less than cash prices in t-n, then the 
decision maker has given up net Income through the forward 
sale. 
Participation in the futures market by individuals owning 
stocks with a deferred delivery commitment cannot in the 
traditional sense be hedging. Nevertheless a long futures 
position taken by such a decision maker possibly could be a 
hedge against the opportunity cost arising from making the 
delivery commitment when in fact actual price would have 
indicated a long cash market position. 
The more meaningful evaluation of deferred delivery 
contracting and long hedging occurs for those market partici­
pants not directly involved in the production process at the 
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initial period t>0. Marketing agencies such as brokers, 
dealers, and processors, may fall into that group of traders 
utilizing a cash and long futures position. 
Two distinct situations could occur. First, there may 
be a group of buyers, e.g., livestock beef dealers, who con­
tract to deliver live beef at some future period t-n. When 
the initial contractual agreement is established such partici­
pants do not own stocks and they are uncertain as to the price 
they must pay for such stocks during the delivery period. 
Hence establishment of a long futures commitment can serve 
as a hedge against variations in cash prices at t=0. 
The second and possibly more frequent situation would be 
where a packer has contracted to deliver carcass beef at 
some future date and must have an ample supply of meat to 
meet his commitments. Therefore the packer must have a 
given supply of live beef during period t-n, but he is present­
ly operating in period t>0. Operating as a risk averter, the 
packer can establish a long futures commitment to offset an 
anticipated purchase of live beef during period t-n. Through 
these transactions the packer will establish the value of his 
processed product and at the same time possibly reduce his 
risk from changes in live animal prices. 
Equation 2.3 expresses the relevant net income for these 
situations. For the first situation P'(t) is the contracted 
price of live beef to be delivered in period t-n. All other 
Hi 
notation Is as previously defined. In the second situation 
P'(t) represents the contracted value of an animal unit after 
processing. Therefore in both cases the cash selling price of 
output has been established, but the purchase price of live 
animal Inputs is subject to variations. Given these alterna­
tives, income equation 2.3 along with the appropriate risk 
function can be utilized to determine the optimal market 
positions. Only the cash and futures prices of period t-n 
are unknown in equation 2.3; therefore the variance of 2.3 can 
be written as: 
Var(n) " x^Qp + Xpap - 2xXpPppGpOp. (2.6) 
Determination of the optimal market position follows in 
the same manner as did the procedure for determining cash 
and short hedging positions. The iso-varlance and iso-net 
income curve are drawn in Figure 2.4a. The third quadrant 
is the relevant one since x<0 and Xp<0 when a deferred 
delivery or anticipated cash market position exists and a 
long hedge is established. It is assumed that the iso-varlance 
for this section contains a concave section. The difference 
now is that the origin is in the upper right hand corner of 
Figure 2.4a. See the Appendix A for plotting of this 
quadrant also. 
Movements from V to and from EH and EII^ illustrate 
0 3 o 3 
increases in variances and net income respectively in Figure 
Figure 2.4. Risk, income, and trade-off maps for 
long hedges 
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2.^a. It is assumed that if a decision maker can establish a 
deferred-delivery sale in period t>0 (e.g., dealer sells 
slaughter steers for later delivery) or anticipates a cash 
purchase in period t-n (e.g., packer plans to buy slaughter 
steers in period t-n), then his optimal futures position must 
be considered simultaneously with his optimal cash market 
decision. For every possible expected net income level the 
decision maker will minimize his risk, i.e., he will choose 
that position where the iso-net Income is just tangent to 
an iso-variance. Again the mechanism for expressing utility 
for the decision maker is through the tradeoff map (Figure 
2.4b). 
The optimal position may correspond to a partial hedge, 
a 100 percent hedge, or 100 percent hedging along with some 
purely speculative trading. The same type of effects of non-
optimal 100 percent hedging on expected net Income, risk, and 
cash positions as explained in the prior section also exist 
in this case. 
The cash depicted in Figure 2.4a occurs when the decision 
maker expects the futures price in t-n to exceed the futures 
price and average cost of futures transactions in period t>0. 
Hence, given that [F(t) - EF(t-n) + C'p]<0, not only can long 
hedging shift some risk, it can prove profitable. As this 
difference approaches zero, the slope of the iso-net income 
lines approaches infinity, i.e., EII^ becomes parallel to the 
Xp axis. The tangency locus ZZ retains the same meaning as 
before. All possible combinations of risk to expected net 
Income giving the minimum variance are then plotted over the 
tradeoff map on Figure 2.4b. The tangency point between Z'Z' 
and an indifference curve gives that combination of risk and 
expected net Income leading to the optimal market position. 
The coordinates of this tangency (EII^, V^) of Figure 2.4b 
then indicate the optimal long futures x*p and cash commitment 
(or anticipated commitment) x* as in Figure 2.4a. Through the 
M * 
established position of x p and x the decision maker has 
minimized his risk for a given expected net income and maxi­
mized his utility given all other constraints. 
Transition from Hedging to Pure Speculation 
Price expectations could be such that futures positions 
other than a hedge or a hedge combined with speculation should 
be established. For example, in Equation 2.1 [EP(t-n) - P(t)-
C']>0 then a spot holding should occur. But if expected 
futures price movements give [EF(t-n) + C'p > P(t)] then the 
short futures position would not be potentially profitable. 
Similarly for the contracted (or anticipated) cash market 
position, if [EP(t-n) < F(t) + C'^] then the long position 
would not be profitable. Hence when price expectations are 
such that holding cash and long futures or forward cash and 
short futures provide profit expectations from both markets, 
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then the futures position Is defined as speculation. These 
two cases are represented by equations 2.2 and 2.4, 
This definition of speculation in conjunction with that 
considered earlier reveals two forms of speculation. First, 
speculation in the futures market occurs when futures commit­
ments (short or long) exceed the 100 percent hedging level. 
And second, speculation exists when the established futures 
commitment does not provide hedging possibilities in conjunc­
tion with the cash market position. Speculation has been 
defined only for those decision makers dealing in the cash 
market. Another group of individuals trading in futures only 
could be discussed where they are always speculators. For 
this group, the optimal position always lies on the vertical 
axis (either short or long) of the iso-varlance and Iso-net 
income map. 
Figure 2.5a Illustrates the transition from a hedging 
to a purely speculative futures position. The original short 
position for the expected net income occurred at the tangency 
T thus minimizing the risk for the given iso-net income. The 
slope of ETTg in Figure 2.5a is directly related to price 
expectation for the futures, i.e., [F(t) - EP(t-n) - C'p]>0. 
As this expectation changes, the slope of the relevant iso-net 
income also changes. At some point the decision maker may 
view the movement of futures prices to be such that [F(t) -
EF(t-n) - C' ]<0. Iso-net Income Ett ', follows directly from 
Figure 2.5. Transition from hedging to pure speculation 
48 
Short futures 
e 
100% hedging 
ETT, 
Cash position 
Speculation 
En-. 
En 
Long futures 
a. Iso-variance and iso-income map 
Risk 
Expected 
Net Income En. b. Trade-off map 
49 
this change in expectation. Although expected futures prices 
are now such that a loss is expected to occur with a short 
position, this point with a short contract will still be 
chosen (tangency T'). A short position is taken because the 
expected futures prices for period t-n does not exceed the 
present futures price by a significant enough amount to 
warrant accepting any additional risk from a speculative 
position. Therefore the decision maker will choose a short 
futures position which minimizes risk even though a small loss 
is expected from the short contract (selling futures). For 
example, futures have been sold for P(t) and are expected to 
be purchased for EF(t-n) when in fact [EP(t-n) + C'p > P(t)]. 
The decision maker can be said to be paying some premium for . 
minimizing risk. 
As the decision maker's expectations change, his market 
positions change accordingly. Given that the expected futures 
price for period t-n now exceeds futures at period t by a 
large enough amount, then the decision maker may become a 
market speculator. This would mean that in Figure 2.5a 
the iso-net income lines are tangent to the iso-variance only 
in the lower right quadrant. A cash position corresponds but 
the trader goes long (buys) in futures as well. The profit 
potential from speculating is now sufficiently large to 
warrant accepting any additional risk. The maximum indifference 
curve possible given the tangency locus of Figure 2.5b then 
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shows that combination of risk and expected net income 
(Eïï^, Vg) leading to the optimal speculative level x*p and 
cash position x*. Any hedging position would greatly reduce 
utility given the firm's set of expectations. 
Another speculative position is that of deferred-delivery 
contracts or anticipated cash purchases and short futures. 
The decision maker views cash price movements as yielding a 
profitable deferred delivery commitment (e.g., for dealers in 
live beef) or the decision maker must make purchases in period 
t-n to meet sale commitments. Yet he also views the expected 
futures prices to be such that a short position is profitable. 
In period t futures are sold and in t-n, n£t all commitments 
are terminated through offsetting purchases. Profit potentials 
from the short futures are expected to be large enough to 
warrant the speculative position. 
This speculative commitment is illustrated in Figures 
2.6a and 2.6b. Tangency locus ZZ of Figure 2.6a gives the 
maximum indifference curve at coordinates (Ett^, V^). From 
these points the optimal positions are chosen where x*^ is 
the optimal speculative contract and x* is the optimal con­
tractual or anticipated cash commitment. 
This model extends the analysis for the relation between 
market output decisions and futures positions beyond the 
existing available literature. Concepts of decision making 
are directly applicable to the livestock market, yet the 
Figure 2.6. Forward sales and speculation with short 
futures 
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same framework Is readily applied to other commodities. The 
implication of the micro model for aggregate market determina­
tion of price, output, and returns to all market participants 
remains to be explored. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE MACRO MODEL 
The decision maker (in the micro model) was assumed to 
have sufficient knowledge to establish both optimal futures 
and cash market positions. Optimal market positions were 
established by determining points in one of the four quadrants 
given that the relevant Iso-variances, iso-net incomes, and 
tradeoff maps existed (see the last chapter). Thus for the 
decision maker, the necessary elements were available to 
provide and determine his contribution to supply and demand 
for futures contracts. Further the optimal cash market 
positions encompassed the demands for Initial inputs and the 
demand and supply for input transformation services. Some 
techniques for aggregation over these individual commitments 
provide the mechanism for movement from the micro to a macro 
analysis of the two markets. Given that the theory of optimal 
hedging, optimal speculation, and optimal cash market positions 
are theoretically established for the assumed framework, then 
some aggregation process will lead to a macro model giving 
those levels of variables necessary for the existence of 
market equilibrium. Hence the procedure at hand is to look 
at each portion of the total futures and cash market relation­
ships at the aggregate level. Prom these aggregated relation­
ships some meaningful propositions can be derived that offer 
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clues to Intertemporal price discovery. As previously 
emphasizedJ the notation of the micro model is completely 
independent of the macro model. This has occurred to give 
emphasis to the concepts of individual versus aggregate trad­
ing responses. Specifically the micro theory used total live 
animal units as one choice variable. Whereas, in the macro 
model concepts are related through pounds of inputs and trans­
formation services. Hence it is cautioned that the concepts, 
not the notation, of Chapter two be related to the remaining 
chapters. 
The Transformation Function 
The Introduction of a transformation function is the first 
factor entering into the theory of futures-cash trading in 
nonstorable products. Nonstorables must go through a trans­
formation process5 whereas storables are changed through a 
storage function. The concepts of transformation versus stor­
age are similar in nature. Yet due to the difference in the 
physical requirements necessary for the completion of either 
process, it is convenient to separate them. Stored goods 
are actually transformed simply by the variable of time. But 
with reference to live beef, the transformation process must 
be implemented through physical inducements such as feeding, 
management services, and other facilities necessary for the 
continued growth of the live animal. Hence transformation 
within the present contexts refers to changes in both quality 
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and quantity. Whereas, a storage function would result primar­
ily in quality changes. 
If there exists a supply of some storable good, Z, then 
the amount of hedging is in terms of Z and is measured in the 
same units at the aggregate level. Some quantity of Z may be 
consumed this period, hence the amount of Z that must be 
stored is the difference between total supply and present 
consumption. This situation is illustrated below: 
Z = total supply of some storable good, 
C = present consumption of Z, 
K = Z-C = the quantity of Z that must be stored, 
(demand for storage) 
K = K^+KJJ = storage unhedged + storage hedged. 
If present consumption of Z is just equal to supply, then 
there is no supply of futures (from hedgers) nor demand for 
storage (e.g.. Kg = = K = 0). 
The theory of futures trading in nonstorable goods 
differs from the above situation. Once a product that is 
nonstorable reaches a level such as Z above, then it must be 
completely consumed in that period. For example, feeder 
cattle are fed out to a finished product. At this time the 
total supply must be consumed; hence the supply of futures 
and demand for storage must be zero. A very short interval 
of storage may occur, but the product changes so drastically 
in quality and quantity that it must be nonstorable. 
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Therefore the theory of futures trading In nonstorable 
products must be evaluated at some point before the nonstorable 
good reaches maturity (e.g., before It can be consumed or 
processed). It then must be that futures trading occurs 
while the product Is still In some stage of transformation 
via changes In both quality and quantity (e.g., recall that a 
storage function primarily reflects only quality changes). 
Trading in storables may also occur prior to complete trans­
formation of the product. For example corn production may be 
hedged and corn may be stored. Hence one primary difference 
between futures trading in storable versus nonstorable products 
lies in the ability of hedging beyond the date of product 
maturity in the first but not in the latter case. Define: 
X(t) = initial input of product to be transformed 
(feeder cattle or other nonstorable products 
measured in pounds), 
L(t) = the required transformation services (feedlot 
services for example, measured in pounds), 
T(X) = the final output measured in pounds, after 
transformation of all X, 
T(X(t)) • the final output measured in pounds, after 
transformation of X(t). 
The final output T(X) must be directly related to the initial 
levels of inputs X and the available supplies of transforma­
tion services. In addition the final output consists of 
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Inputs that require various degrees of transformation. For 
example the input of feeder cattle may be with 300 lb., 500 
lb., or other weights of feeders. Hence greater transforma­
tion services are required for lighter weights of inputs. 
Finally if total output of nonstorable products can be express­
ed in terms of initial inputs and transformation services, 
then one of the first essential steps for the theoretical 
analysis of futures trading is established. Define the 
functional relationship as shown: 
T(X(t)) = G(X(t), L(t)) Transformation function. 
It follows that for any one period t, inputs and transforma­
tions are in fixed proportion. Yet over time this proportion 
must be a variable. If the transformation function (used in 
the macro sense) is assumed linearly homogeneous (constant 
returns to scale), then the initial input can be separated 
from the transformation function above [l,p.335].^ Therefore 
^Assuir-: this transformation function in an aggregate 
sence appears as follows: 
T(X) = G(X,L) = X^'^L" 
= X Y = XL** 
T(X) = XG(L*) since G(L*) = L*". 
This is a very restrictive functional assumption. But given 
that only the implicit form G(X,L) is known, then this pro­
cedure allows for separating the initial input from the 
implicit function. All equilibriums, including those of X 
and L, will follow later in this chapter. 
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the transformation function expressed in the form to be 
utilized exists as in equation 3-1* If there Is only one 
possible time for implementing inputs to produce the final 
L 
T(X(t)) = X(t)[G(L*(t))] where L* = % (3.1) 
output, then equation 3.1 is expressed in the simple form of 
equation 3.2. In contrast, if the final output consists of 
T(X) = X G(L*) (3.2) 
numerous points of input, then the total output T(X) must be 
associated with all degrees of inputs and transformation. 
Hence T(X) can be derived by equation 3.3. This can be 
illustrated where the total supply of fed cattle in say 
n n 
T(X) = jT(X(t))dt = J X(t) G(L*(t))dt (3.3) 
o o 
February consists of feeder cattle placed on feedlots up to n 
months prior to February. Again the time t represents the 
time from maturity of input X (e.g., t units before consumption 
or processing of inputs). 
To simplify the analysis, equation 3.2 will be used as 
the transformation function linking the futures and cash 
markets for these products not yet marketable. This equation 
implicitly assumes that at the time of product inputs begin 
transformation the final output is known exactly. Some error 
term could be added to the transformation function, but it 
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will be Ignored here to reduce the complications that are 
later encountered. 
It was stated that Z (storable goods) can be hedged up 
to the difference between consumption and supply.^ For the 
nonstorable product hedging can account for the total supply 
of finished goods T(X) or any level less than T(X). But 
such hedges must occur at the time of initial input as was 
shown through the micro model. If T(X) is expressed in pounds, 
for example, then hedging supply can occur up to the maximum 
pounds of T(X). Define: 
T(X)y = units (supply of futures) of transformed goods 
hedged short, 
T(X)^ = units of transformed goods unhedged. 
The total supply of transformed goods to be forthcoming at 
maturity then consists of two components, i.e., that of hedged 
and unhedged commitments. Through equation 3.4 the relation­
ship is set forth to directly relate the futures market to the 
T(X) = T(X)y + T(X)% 
or (3.4) 
X G(L*) = T(X)y + T(X)j^. 
^Most storables must go through some transformation pro­
cess. For example, corn production may be considered analogous 
to beef production and hence the transformation function would 
be relevant to both. Yet at harvest time corn may be subject 
to a storage function, whereas nonstorables such as beef are 
not. Again the time framework would be t>0 , when corn produc­
tion began, through t-n when harvest occurs. Hence the present 
theory is applicable to commodities other than beef. 
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initial input market X. Any change in the input of X must 
always be accounted for by corresponding changes in the 
levels of hedged and unhedged stocks. Input market equilibrium 
can now be derived. 
Input Market Equilibrium 
The final level of output depends directly on the level 
of input X. Hence equilibirum within the input market exactly 
determined the final output of transformed inputs. This must 
be conditioned on the assumption that transformation services 
are not a limiting resource within the given transformation 
period. There is no scarcity of transformation resources or 
at least the limits to transformation capacity are far above 
that level needed for any given input equilibrium level. The 
supply of inputs can be expressed as a function of the input 
price existing and as well some exogenous variable. At the 
same time the supply of transformation services will be 
assumed independent of the transformation price (e.g., the 
assumption of no scarcity of transformation resources is 
consistent with this). Define: 
= input price of nonstorable product X, 
= cost of transformation services per unit of 
contribution,^ 
^It is recognized that P, probably should be discounted 
since transformations are not instantaneous. 
6 2  
a = some exogenous supply of Input variable. 
The supply of inputs vary directly with and a as in 
equation 3.5. Postulated responses for this implicit function 
X = X(P„,a) Supply of input 
*  ( 3 . 5 )  
and 
X = X Demand equals supply 
will be stated later. The inputs of equation 3.^1 must always 
be equal to that of 3-5 for input market equilibrium to exist. 
The demand for input X is implicit to the relationships of 
equations 3-6 and 3.7. 
At the same time the two components of the transformation 
function are related to the price sets through some implicit 
relationship. The responses within the micro model give clues 
as to the aggregate responses. Firms (market participants) 
supplying and demanding transformation services are related to 
observed prices and they also have expectations about forth­
coming prices. These positions of transformation unhedged 
are completely independent of the futures price P^, while 
hedging commitments are not. Both T(X)^ and T(X)^ vary with 
transformation cost P^ and some price expectation. Also they 
m u s t  b e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  i n p u t  c o s t  P ^ .  E q u a t i o n s  3 . 6  
and 3.7 expressed these implicit relationships. Short hedgers 
T ( X ) U  =  T U ( P X ,  P ^ . E )  ( 3 . 6 )  
T ( X ) H  =  T J J ( P ^ - P X ,  P ^ ,  e) ( 3 . 7 )  
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of futures are functionally related to the spread of observed 
futures and input prices. This follows directly for those 
conditions Illustrated in the micro model. Other exogenous 
variables could possibly be included, but the restrictive 
functions above will be sufficient for the present framework. 
The input market equilibrium then is derived as in 3.8. Define: 
= futures price of contract traded at time of 
initial inputs, 
e = market price expectations for transformed inputs, 
A = = futures-cash price spread. 
X(P^,a) G(L*) = + T^(A,P^,e) Input (3.8) 
Equilibrium 
Equation 3-8 must always be satisfied within the framework 
of price discovery. 
Futures Market Equilibrium 
Trading activities with the futures market are such that 
those supplying futures contracts will just equal the demand 
for futures. The micro model established the situations 
where futures may be supplied (short futures) or demanded 
(long futures). In other words the trading exchange always 
facilitates the adjustment where aggregate short positions 
just equal the long commitments. This must hold irregardless 
of the type of futures traded. Further for contracts in 
nonstorables such as livestock, futures commitments are 
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usually supplied by the same firms or participants that demand 
and supply transformation services, while the net long 
positions are either by speculators or processors (see micro 
model for further explanation). Define: 
= long futures positions by hedgers, 
Fg = net long futures positions by speculators (e.g., 
long minus short speculation), 
b = exogenous speculative variable. 
The futures market will be in equilibrium as long as equation 
3.9 holds. Each commitment Is expressed as an implicit func­
tion of prices. Long traders respond to present futures 
T H  =  F L  +  P G  ( 3 . 9 )  
TRCA, P^, e) = F^(P^, e) + Pg(P^, b) Supply=Demand for 
Futures (3.10) 
prices and some exogenous component b. 
Industry Equilibrium 
Industry equilibrium Implies that the spread between 
the futures price and the initial input price just reflects 
the cost of input transformation. This observation will be 
shown below. The concept of spread between futures and cash 
has usually been expressed as P^ - P^ for those products 
that are now marketable, where the product at the Initial 
point of storage differs from the final consumption only by 
the amount of storage. Futures trading for nonstorables 
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always begins prior to the complete product transformation 
of the inputs. At the start of the transformation process 
the futures price reflects prices in terms of finished 
(transformed) commodities, while the input cash price is 
in terms of inputs requiring transforming services. These 
prices must be weighted or expressed in equivalent units for 
meaningful conclusions to follow. There exist a cash price 
for the nonstorable commodity at maturity (e.g., there is 
always a vector of fed cattle prices), but the futures-cash 
spread at some point t>o cannot apply to this price since 
the finished commodity cannot be transformed through storage. 
The assumed framework functions around a perfectly 
competitive market structure. Given the existence of an open 
market and sufficient time for adjustment (e.g., no barriers 
to entry or exit) then market profits from product transforma­
tion should be zero (e.g., the total revenue from the trans­
formed goods will just equal the cost). This adjustment 
occurs within a long run equilibrium framework. Let some 
be the price of the transformed Inputs, then equation 3.11 can 
be determined. Entry and exit from the Industry should 
reduce or increase profits just to zero as with 3.11. At the 
T(X) - P^X - P^[T(X) - X] = 0 (3.11) 
time these inputs X are demanded, the final output price P^ 
is unknown. But suppliers of futures (e.g., the short 
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hedgers) sell futures up to the aggregate amount of T(X) 
for price P^. Substituting for P^ in equation 3.11 can 
be used for arriving at minimum pricing conditions for the 
short hedger. If 3.11 were consistently less than zero 
after this substitution, then the level of short hedging may 
decrease. If 3.11 after the substitution were consistently 
greater than zero then short hedging may increase since profits 
are greatex-. This increase or decrease in hedging will force 
3.12 to zero. Hence, from this conclusion the relationship 
of futures-cash spread can be related directly to the cost of 
transformation. Adding P^ to both sides of equation 3.12 
gives equation 3.13,the desired equation. The price spread 
PfT(X) - P^X - Pj^[T(X)-X] = 0 (3.12) 
P^ G(L*) - P^X-PlX[G(L*)-1] = 0 
-Px = -Pf G(L*) + Pj^[G(L*)-l] 
Pf-P^ = [Pf-P^] [1-G(L*)] (3.13) 
directly responds to the cost of input transformation Pj^. 
Equation 3.13 must also be evaluated at different times from 
maturity. As t approaches maturity or as X is completely 
transformed, the spread of equation 3.13 must approach zero. 
^The futures price P_ must be for the futures contract 
with maturity date nearest to that of input maturity date. 
If T(X) occurs in February, the P_ is in terms of February 
futures contracts. 
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At t = 0, X(0) requires no transformation. Express: 
lim X(t) G(L*(t)) = X(0), input = output 
t—» 0 
G(L*(0)) = 1, 
llm[Pf-Px] = (Pf-P^) [1 - lim G(L*(t))], 
t 0 t 0 
llm[Pf-Px] = [Pj.-PL]CO] = 0, 
t—» 0 
or 
lim [P^(t) - = 0. 
t-^ 0 
These limits show that when the X input requires no trans­
formation, then the futures-cash price spread should theo­
retically be zero. 
The futures and input prices may be such that P^ | P^. 
Hence the price spread of equation 3.13 may be positive, zero, 
or negative and still satisfy the relationship of 3.13. 
This will depend directly on the value of P^. Later delinea­
tion of axes for equilibrium analysis will follow from this 
observation. 
Initial Equilibrium 
The entire discussion can be presented geometrically if 
the appropriate market responses are postulated. Figures 3-la 
through h provide this graphic aid. An equilibrium in all 
sections of the framework is illustrated. 
6 8  
transformation ihort long n»t 
hedging hedging hedge 
T(X) 
D. 
futures equilibrium 
transformation 
services 
• X 
net speculation 
inpufs 
spread h f, 
* ft-P. 
Figure 3.1. Geometric framework for intertemporal futures and 
input price discovery 
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The first set of postulates are made in conjunction with 
the brief interpretation of Figure 3.1. It is postulated that; 
(1) STy . 
>0 ... Hedging Response Pig. 3.1b 
( 2 )  d F  
-gp— = P^f<0 ... Long Hedge Fig. 3.1c 
(3) 3Fg p 
g-p— = •*' Speculation Fig. 3.1h 
^^^ Iy " L* ... Transformation 
Services Fig. 3.le 
^ ~ G(L*) ... Transformation Fig. 3.1a 
> 0 ••• Supply of inputs Fig. 3.If 
X 
Starting with Fig. 3.1a, the output increases directly 
with Increases in Inputs via postulate (5). Short hedging 
increases with larger price spreads, but long hedges decrease 
as futures prices Increase (postulates (1) and (2) and 
Figures 3.1b and 3.1c). Net speculative activities vary 
inversely with futures prices as in postulate (3) and Figure 
3.1h. The ratio of transformation services to initial inputs 
(Figure 3.le) is constant at L*, while the supply of input 
(Figure 3.If) changes directly with input price via postulates 
(4) and (6). Finally, 3.11 illustrates the spread from 
equation 3-13. With these postulates and the market 
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structure framework established, the preparatory step for 
Intertemporal price discovery is set. 
Intertemporal Price Discovery 
At the times futures commitments and transformation 
commitments are established only two prices relevant to the 
assumed framework are directly observable, i.e., input and 
futures prices. In addition transformation costs exist but 
are assumed exogenously determined. Through equations 3.8, 
3.10, and 3.13 these prices can be determined simultaneously. 
For convenience, the values of A(price spread) and the futures 
price are used as the coordinates for price discovery at 
equilibrium.^ 
Input market price coordinates 
Taking equation 3.8 with P^ and e fixed (P^^, e^), then 
all possible combinations of price spreads and futures prices 
can be calculated that satisfies equation 3.1%. Differentiat­
ing equation 3.14 and solving for the relative response of 
the spread to changing futures prices gives the desired solu­
tion. Equation 3.16 reveals that as futures prices increase, 
the spread A must also increase if input market equilibrium is 
^The concept of economic equilibrium is used within the 
context of this study as a state of balance between opposing 
forces acting upon economic variables. An equilibrium model 
is then the end product from the construction of a system 
based on solutions derived from identifiable opposing forces 
[78, p. 18]. 
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T^(-A+P^,P^°,e°) + T%(A,P^°,e°) = X(-A+P^,a) G(L*) (3.14) 
= [1- #-] G(L*) 
f 
( 3 . 1 5 )  
—p g  >  0  
T / X + x^x (G(L*) 
9A^ X^x G(L*) -
(3.16) 
to be maintained. The input price P^ and futures P^ are 
related through A, but through the manipulative procedure the 
actual (P^,P^) relation was not revealed. Any increase in 
P^ will increase the desired level of short hedging. Hence, 
for equilibrium to again follow, the supply of inputs must 
increase, the level of unhedged stocks decrease, or some 
combination of both (see equation 3.4). Excess input demands 
raise P^; input supplies increase and unhedged stocks decrease. 
Since a change in P^ produced both desired effects (e.g., 
decreases and X increases), the needed change in P^ is 
somewhat dampened. Both P^ and P^ have increased, but the 
change in P^ will be less than that of P^ due to the twofold 
effect outlined. Therefore is positive. Contour T T of 
dPf 
Figure 3.2 gives all equilibrium coordinates (A,P^) necessary 
for input equilibrium. 
72 
Futures market price coordinates 
Equation 3.10 with and e° is differentiated in a 
manner similar to that completed above. 
= PLf + <3.17) 
Both net speculative and long hedges respond negatively to 
increasing futures prices. The demand for futures has been 
decreased. Yet the supply of futures is directly related to 
the futures-cash spread. For equilibrium to continue, the 
supply of futures must decrease via a decrease in price 
spread. As increases the spread A must decrease for futures 
market equilibrium to exist. Equation 3.18 must hold. The 
locus of all equilibrium coordinates for the futures are 
drawn in Figure 3-2 as line F F. 
Industry equilibrium price coordinates 
Differentiating equation 3.13 and solving for is 
sufficient for determining the final set of price coordinates. 
The difference between final transformation T(X) and initial 
inputs must be due to transformation services; G(L*)>1 since 
transformation services are positive. 
Ag = (Pf-P^) = [Pf-Pg][l-G(L*)] (3.19) 
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= 1 - G(L*) < 0 (3.20) 
9P^ 
Equation 3.20 Is then negative. As futures prices increase 
the spread must decrease if the futures-cash spread just 
reflects the cost of transformation. These coordinates lie 
along the line E E of Figure 3.2. 
X[G(L*) - 1] > 0 or G(L*) - 1 > 0 
G(L*) > 1. 
Equilibrium 
In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 a graphical representation of the 
existence of an equilibrium is derived. When there exist a 
set of coordinates (A,P^) where the input market is in equili­
brium, the futures market is in equilibrium, and the price 
spread just reflects the cost of transformation; then those 
coordinates will define an industry equilibrium point. Whereas, 
when only the input and futures market equilibriums are satis­
fied simultaneously, then a market equilibrium exist. Hence 
industry will denote a situation where equations 3.8, 3.10, and 
3.13 are simultaneously satisfied. If only 3.8 and 3.10 are 
satisfied, then market denotes the equilibrium coordinates. 
Given the transformation function G(L*) and cost 
then E E traces a path of coordinates that must exist for a 
industry equilibrium. The intersection of T T and F F must 
be on E E for industry equilibrium. The realized spread will 
Figure 3.2. Coordinates from equilibrium with slope EE 
> slope FF 
Figure 3.3. Coordinates for equilibrium with slope FF 
> slope EE 
TT = Input market equilibrium 
FF = Futures market equilibrium 
EE = A reflects transformation cost 
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L'prcdd = A 
sloDe = l-6<0 
TT = input market equilibrium 
FF = futures mnrkof equiliiDi ium 
EE = A reflects transformarion 
cost 
futures prices P 
f 
A 
0 
slope = l-G<0 
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not Just reflect the cost of transformation if market equilib­
rium is off E E (e.g., T T and P P intersect off locus E E). 
The next two chapters will delve into the implication of this 
condition as well as deriving some meaningful propositions 
through comparative static procedures. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRICE DISCOVERY THROUGH COMPARATIVE STATICS 
Comparative statics Is concerned with the comparison 
of different equilibrium states that are associated with 
different sets of values of parameters and exogenous variables. 
The system of equilibrium equations established coordinates 
between the price spread A and the futures price P^. As 
exogenous variables in the assumed framework change, there 
must be corresponding changes in equilibrium. This and the 
next chapter will evaluate two forms of equilibrium: market 
versus industry equilibrium. Presently, concern is with 
deriving some meaningful propositions regarding comparative 
statics and the existence of market equilibriums. Market 
equilibrium implies that both equations 3.8 and 3.10 are 
satisfied simultaneously. 
Comparative statics can be either qualitative or quanti­
tative In nature. In this chapter Interest is limited to 
the qualitative analysis where the direction of change is 
considered. It will follow that in the process of determining 
the qualitative character of a system, some quantative 
restrictions must be assumed. Also as was utilized in previous 
sections, all analysis is put in a continuous framework while 
In reality the framework is discrete in form (this enables 
the use of differentlable calculus). 
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Pour distinctive exogenous variables wore Includoil Iti 
the model: cost of transformai Ion, casii price expectations, 
degree of speculative Interest, and changing supply of inputs 
requiring transformation. Through independent changes in 
these four variables some meaningful insights about the func­
tioning of cash and futures trading in products requiring 
transformation can be gained. These four variables do not 
exhaust the complete listing of all exogenous elements entering 
the system, but they may be considered to be among the most 
significant ones and may be indicative of other forces. 
Other exogenous forces such as weather, politics, etc. may 
be thoughttto be influential. Such forces may result with some 
Impact on those exogenous variables included in this compara­
tive static model. The methodology for theoretical solutions 
through these four variables can be directly applied to any 
other variable entering the present framework. 
Rewriting the framework of relationships again may be 
useful prior to the comparative static conclusions (also see 
Chapter 3): 
T(X) = X G(L*) = T + Tu ... Transformation function, 
U n 
Tu = Ty(Px,P^,e) Unhedged stocks, 
T^ = Tjj(A,Pj^,e) Short hedgedstocks, 
~ Long hedges, 
Fg= Fg(P^,b) Net speculation, 
A = P~ - P Price spread. 
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Ag = [P^ - P^] = [P^ - P^] [1-G(L*)]..Industry equilibrium, 
Y = X(P^,a) Supply of inputs. 
Tu + TR = X G(L*) Input-transformation equilib­
rium, 
Ty = + Pg Futures equilibrium. 
The postulated responses assumed are: 
Px Pl 
T ^  < 0 ,  T ^  < 0  Unh e d g e d  r e s p o n s e s ,  
T y  > 0 ,  Ty L  < 0  H e d g e d  r e s p o n s e s ,  
P^f <0 Long hedge response, 
P g f <  0  S p e c u l a t i v e  r e s p o n s e ,  
p 
X ^ > 0 Supply of input response. 
With these definitions and assumptions some useful observations 
about futures trading in nonstorable goods such as livestock 
can be cited. Again nonstorable implies that such goods must 
be consumed or processed at maturity and cannot be prior to 
maturity. 
Changing Transformation Costs 
Increasing the cost of transformation directly alters 
the entire market equilibrium, and as well the industry equil­
ibrium function must change. Differentiating each equilibrium 
function and solving for the relative price changes provide 
80 
useful results. The differentiations of the input market, 
futures market, and industrial equilibrium relationships are 
shown in equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. 
_ 3A 
9P, 9P, 
+ T PL + 
u •H 
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9P, 
+ T^L = 9P f -
9P, 
9A 
9Pl G(L*) (4.1) 
+ = F^f + p^f 
9P, •H L 9P, 9P, 
( 4 . 2 )  
9.A 
3^ 
9P^ 
9P, -1 
[1-G(L*)] . (4.3) 
The direct effect of P^ and A can be determined if the futures 
price is temporarily held fixed at the initial level (e.g., 
P°). Hence the solutions for 9A in equations 4.1, 4.2, and 
^ 9PL 
4.3 are shown in equation 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. If P^ is fixed 
then f = 0. 
9PT  
9A^ -[T^L + t^L] 
[T^ - T^% + X^x G(L*)] 
= -[(-) + (-)] > 0 (4.4) 
+ 
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H 
( 4 . 5 )  
= [G-l] >0 
9PT 
Where is A with TT Shift 
Ap is A with FF Shift 
Ag is A with EE Shift ( 4 . 6 )  
Graphically these responses are shown with Figure 4.1 a,b,c 
where changing upward shifts TT to T'T', FF to F'F', and 
EE to E'E'. The futures-cash spread has increased in all 
cases, but what about the futures price? Will a final 
equilibrium (intersection T'T' and F'F') result at or 
must P^ also change? In this chapter concern is only with 
market equilibrium (e.g. Figures 4.1 a and b). It is again 
noted that TT Is the locus of cash market equilibrium coordi' 
nates., FF are equilibrium coordinates for the futures market, 
and EE are coordinates where the cost of transformation is 
just reflected by the price spread. 
Increases in the transformation cost per unit have the 
first and most direct impact on the transformation side of 
the markets. Total placements of inputs and transformation 
procedures are depressed since to produce the same final 
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L 
p; pf 
a Ù 
F 
P/ P, 
c. 
E  
Figure 4.1. Changes In transformation cost 
product now costs more. To the extent that hedged and unhedged 
transformation demands are reduced, then supplies of Initial 
Inputs X must decrease. For supplies to be reduced, must 
decrease. Hence the spread (P^ - P^) increases and T'T' 
results with the initial futures price, P° as in Figure 4.1a. 
Supplies of futures contracts have been dampened via the 
reduction in (e.g., there is a reduction in short hedging). 
Either or both long hedges and net speculative positions must 
decrease in response to changing T^. This occurs only with 
some change in the futures price P^. Changing transformation 
costs have indirectly influenced the long side of the futures 
market through an equilibrium adjustment between net long and 
net short positions. Given P^, the shift in futures 
exists with P'F', Figure 4.1b. Initially P^ was fixed while 
P^ Increased. If futures prices are constant then the long or 
demand for futures will not respond (under the assumed frame­
work), hence increases in the spread between cash and futures 
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must occur. Increases In P. dampens supplies of futures; 
T^, but A increase will offset this movement of futures if 
equilibrium continues. Through this rationale the shift to 
F'P' follows. 
Following some exogenous increase in transformation 
cost, it can be established that a new market equilibrium 
may exist with the initial futures price. Cost increases 
and the demand for transformation services decreases. But 
if the futures price remains at the initial level, the demand 
for futures cannot respond to decreased short hedging desires. 
If so, then all reductions in transformation must be with 
unhedged stocks (e.g., decreases and absorbs the full 
Impact of increasing transformation costs). Speculation and 
long hedging will change via the endogenous variable P^. It 
then follows that if market equilibrium occurs, the change in 
spread between input and futures markets are just equal for 
the given futures price as in equation 4.7 (e.g., equations 
4.4 and 4.5 have been equated). Ultimately, the exact 
response between P^ and P^ can be derived that will always be 
consistent with the new market equilibrium. Through equations 
4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 this response is derived. Figure 4.2 illus­
trates the situation where a new market equilibrium is consis­
tent with the initial futures price. Hence the following 
proposition can be stated. 
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-[T^ L + T^ L] . -TgL (4.7) 
[T^ - G(L») 
X ^ x  G ( L # )  
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Figure 4.2. Market equilibrium with and changing P^ 
Proposition 1_: Given an exogenous increase in transfor­
mation cost within the meaning of the assumed framework, then 
an equilibrium price spread change can exist at the initial 
futures price and still be consistent with both futures and 
input markets. 
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The major Implication of this is that increasing (or for 
that matter, decreasing) transformation costs are not necessar­
ily indicative of changes within the futures market. Unhedged 
activities can absorb the full impact of increasing transfor­
mation costs. 
In contrast to the above proposition where unhedged 
stocks absorb the impact of increasing service costs, hedged 
stock commitments now absorb some of the impact of increasing 
transformation cost. If this situation arises, responses have 
been such that short hedges may have been reduced. Thus both 
and decrease resulting in decreases in supply of Inputs 
via decreases in P^. If supplies of futures T^ decrease then 
the net long positions or demand for futures must adjust down­
ward. Finally, a new market equilibrium must be situated to 
the right of the initial futures price and above the Initial 
P P price spread. With these responses it follows that A^L > A^L 
or that the determinant of ^ in Appendix C.l must be less 
than zero. Equation 4.10 and 4.11 along with Figures 4.3 
suffice to explain this situation. Both TT and PF have shifted 
upward in Figure 4.3 and they Intersect above and to the 
right of the old equilibrium point A. This result leads to 
proposition 2. 
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( 4 . 1 1 )  
Figure 4.3. Market equilibrium with ^ ® 
BP^ 
3P. 
> 0  
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Proposition 2 :  Within the meaning of the framework of 
market equilibrium where both the futures-cash price spread 
and the futures price can change, then some exogenous Increase 
in transformation costs P^ will produce market adjustments 
where both the price spread A and the futures price P^ increase 
if in fact the ratio of unhedged to hedged responses to in­
crease costs exceed the response of price spread to changing 
aPf. 
input cost P (e.g., both 9A and are positive if equation 
9P, 9P, 
4.11 is satisfied). ^ ^ 
Proposition 2 can be very useful from both a qualitative 
and quantitlve analysis. It first emphasizes the role of 
market structure in the discovery of Intertemporal price 
movements. Possible movements in both markets can be extra­
polated. Also using this proposition may give some clues as 
9P^ 
to the proper operations of the market. Response cannot 
be directly calculated, but may be approximated by using 
discrete data. Similarly hedging to unhedging commitment 
responses may be estimated possibly by some form of linear 
analysis. Taking these estimates: 
«2 ~ i'' 
Go ~ iff 
^ 3P 
X 
88 
Gl 
Then if 1 + —g— > 3, futures prices and cash-futures spread 
^2 j 
should be increasing as increases, assuming other factors 
remain the same. If 1 + = 3o then the spread increases 
with larger and futures price should remain constant. In 
addition, if information is available, 3^ could be expressed 
in a dynamic sense, say 3^^t). The application of proposition 
2 is then directly applicable to any of the points of inputs 
necessary for the final output T(X). It is recalled that 
initially the assumption that inputs necessary for final out­
puts T(X) could occur at one input time only. 
Finally the alternative of a decrease in futures prices 
as cost of transformation per unit increases has yet to be 
considered. Reference to the previous graph reveals that if 
the intersection T'T' and P'P' exist to the left of the initial 
futures price, it must be that the response condition 
P T L ap 
1 + u is less than f . This follows in that with the 
T^L 
initial the A^L> (e. g . ,  the spread change due to 
changes in the input market exceeds that of the futures mar­
ket). This in turn implies directly that determinant |^| 
3P (see Appendix C.l) is greater than zero, hence f = 
9Pl 
1^1.ll < 0. Both the supply and demand for contracts in an 
lôçr 
equilibrium state must increase if P^ ultimately decreases. 
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But increasing reduced unhedging activities, thus leading 
to the observation that the ratio of unhedged to hedged trans­
formation services must decrease under these circumstances. 
Price discovery with moving market equilibriums via 
changing transformation cost has been discussed. The price 
spread will always respond positively with increasing trans­
formation costs, but the futures price movements must be 
determined in light of the elements of the market structure, 
specifically the responses of hedged and unhedged transforma­
tion services. Once the prices are discovered it is only 
one step back to determining equilibrium volume commitments. 
Changing Cash Price Expectations 
Generally all participants in the markets have some 
expectation about forthcoming prices. As was discussed in the 
micro model, the optimal decision for both markets (cash and 
futures) resulted directly from the individual expectations. 
The transformation of X results in the output where the final 
market price is unknown. Similarly the terminating price of 
futures is unknown. Each decision maker's set of considera­
tions leading to his expectations may be unique. Their 
aggregation over expectations may not be meaningful. Stein 
suggests an aggregative procedure weighting each expectation 
by some probability distribution [107, p. l6]. Telser 
associated an averaging technique of expectations of repre­
sentative of the Industry. He reasons that the firm's 
90 
expectations tend to be correct on the average. If firmii 
consistently miscalculated the price change the firms clearly 
make abnormal gains or constantly suffer losses. In the 
latter those firms are eliminated from the industry while 
consistent abnormal profits induce greater entry. Hence... 
"the persistence of firms in the industry, on the one hand, 
and the stability in the number of firms in the industry, on 
the other hand, create the presumption that, on the average, 
neither large losses nor large profits occur. Therefore 
on the average, the expected change in price equals the realized 
price change" [112, pp. 237-238]. Without providing an exact 
technique for arriving at the representative industrial cash-
price expectation, it has been assumed to be e, (e.g., e = 
the expected price of X G(L*)). As e changes how must the 
prices respond for the nonstorable market with futures trans­
actions? Considerations here are only for changes in the price 
expectations in the cash market. The same methodology is 
directly applicable to futures price expectations given the 
necessary postulated conditions. 
Given an increase in the expected price of the transformed 
product whose price is presently unknown, then both the input-
transformation and futures markets will be affected directly, 
as well as indirectly. Utilizing the previous technique where 
futures prices are constant, then any increase in expectations 
must produce downward shifts in the equilibrium locus TT, see 
Figure 4 . 4 .  Increases in e make both unhedged and hedged 
demand more profitable (subjectively in the eyes of the 
decision makers). Increase demand for inputs produce increases 
in the input price P^. Implicit to this is the assumption 
that the supply of transformation services are unlimited and 
can adjust to changing inputs without influencing the transfor­
mation cost There is no scarcity of transformation ser-
P 
vices. As rises, the supply of inputs increase since X x 
> 0. Therefore the spread must decrease at the given if 
the input market adjustment remains in equilibrium. TT will 
shift to T'T' in Figure 4.4. Also equation 4.12 substantiates 
this relationship. 
A 
Figure 4 . 4 .  Increased price expectations and the input 
market 
This may be rationalized for feeder cattle in that aggre­
gate feedlot facilities, storage, and other services usually 
consist of fixed facilities that do not readily vary. But the 
number of inputs into such facilities can vary up to its 
capacity. Feed cost may differ somewhat. 
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aA. .e _ + Tg] < 0 (4.12) 
[T* _ T^x + x^x G(L*)] 
Higher expectations regarding the price of the trans­
formed Inputs produce conflicting responses in the futures 
market. Long hedgers, who primarily are the purchasers of 
forthcoming transformed inputs, view the increase in e as 
rising cost for needed inventories. Yet short hedgers see 
this as opportunity for abnormally higher profits. Hence, 
an unusually high expected cash price produces adjustments 
which ultimately reduce the planned inventory pruchases and 
correspondingly long hedges are reduced (e.g., the demand for 
futures falls). This same high expected cash price strength­
ens the supply for futures, thus giving an excess supply of 
futures contracts where supplies increase and demands decrease. 
With a constant futures price, futures equilibrium can exist 
only if short hedging decreases via a decrease in the price 
spread. Therefore the shift of FP to P'F' occurs with the 
initial futures price. See Figure 4.5 and equation 4.13. 
The price spread must always decrease as expectations 
increase (e.g., the spread varies inversely with expectations), 
but conclusive statements about the final futures price must 
be evaluated under alternative circumstances. 
Can adjustments from one market equilibrium to another 
as expectations increase occur without changes in activities 
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Figure 4.5. Futures and increasing cash price 
expectations 
^^F = AP = ~ < 0 (4.13) 
H 
of speculators? Specifically when can market equilibrium be 
maintained without movements in the futures price? Market 
equilibrium with unchanged futures implies that some set of 
coordinates (A, P°) just satisfies both input and futures 
market equilibrium equations. Given the assumed framework 
where only expectations are exogenously varied, then the 
fixed futures directly implies no change in speculative 
commitments (e.g., Fg = Fg(P^,b). 
If contours T'T' and P'F' of the previous two figures 
just intersect at the price P° (the initial equil. price P^); 
then both the input and futures should respond equally to 
changing expectations, see Figure 4.6. In essence the shift 
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In the cash market equillbrim locus must equal tho lUiIl't. In 
futures locus (e.g., shifts in TT and FF). Futures price has 
not changed, then A® = A®. A® and A® follow in equation 4.14 
where equation 4.12 is equated to 4.13. 
A 
lO 
or 
Figure 4.6. Increasing expectation with stable futures 
price 
-[Tu + T§] = ~ '^ H (4.14) 
[T^ - + X^X G(L*)] 
-T® TJ = [P® - T®] [X^X G(L*) - T^X] + F® 
It was shown that when the input market is in equilibrium, 
[fx] = T^x and the [X^X G(L*) - X 9A . Substituting 
9P. 
this into equation 4.14 gives the alternative relationship 
of equation 4.15. In addition, speculative activities do 
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not vary since the final futures price remains unchanged 
(e.g., P°). 
. 9A _ -[P? + T®] 
Equation 4.15 sets forth the restriction that must exist 
if market equilibrium continues without changes in the futures 
price. The basic assumption here is that futures prices can 
vary inthe adjustment process as expectations change, but the 
final equilibrium point after such adjustments can occur with 
a zero net change in futures prices. The direct implication 
is that given the necessary responses by hedgers to changing 
expectations, then it may not be necessary for speculative 
adjustments to occur (e.g., speculation will change here only 
if the net change in futures price differs from zero). Finally 
4.15 can be expressed with the alternative form as in equation 
4.16 where the relationship between input price and futures 
price is derived. If 4.16 is satisfied then market equilibrium 
can exist following the adjustment process to greater cash 
price expectations. 
The above conditions are summarized with proposition 3» 
Proposition 3- If a zero net change in futures prices 
is associated with increasing price expectations, it then 
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follows that a new set of equilibrium coordinates consistent 
with market equilibrium exist if the restriction of equation 
4.16 is satisfied. 
Futures price may change as expected cash prices increase. 
The realized direction of this price shift depends on the 
relative responses of demand for hedged and unhedged trans­
formation services to these expectations. The final response 
of can be derived after some limits or conditions about 
market responses are determined. If market equilibrium adjust-
9 P 
ments result in decreases in futures prices(e.g., f < 0), 
then the response of Aj, in the futures market must exceed 
that of the input market at the original futures price. 
Equivalently, from Appendix C.2, matrix determinant | | > 0 
Indicates a final Intersection of T'T' and P'P' where both the 
price spread and futures price decrease. Graphically, this 
situation is illustrated in Figure 4.7. 
9 e 
T 
Figure 4.7» Increasing price expectations 
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Given [Mg ^| > 0, then the following restrictions are 
apparent within the response system. If |Mg ^|> 0 and jMgl < 0, 
SP IM I 
then the derivative f = ' 2.1' p.; hence equilibrium must 
9e ,M2,  
occur with lower futures prices. A solution from solving 
jMg il >0 follows in equations 4.17 and 4.l8. 
[T® + F®] 
— > — — (see Appendix C.2) (4.17) 
ap, [Tg _ ?%] 
2^ > [TH + =K > 0 (4.18) 
[T§ -
Finally the condition to assure that the futures price will 
fall given some price expectation increase can be expressed 
in terms of observed futures and initial input prices. 
Equation 4.l8 establishes that if the response of futures 
prices to input prices exceeds some positive constant K, 
then market equilibrium adjustments to expectations result 
with decreases in the price spread and futures price. Further 
it was shown that the spread must always fall regardless of 
the direction of movement of P^. This restriction can be 
defined: 
0 < K < 
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Propostlon Exogenous raises in the expected price of 
the transformed product may produce decreasing futures-input 
price spreads and a decreasing futures price as both markets 
adjust to new equilibrium points. If the relative response 
of futures price to input price is greater than some positive 
constant K, the above change in equilibrium coordinates (A, 
P^) will result. 
Greater price expectations can have the opposite effect 
to that of proposition 4. Equilibrium in the futures and 
input markets must exist with decreasing spreads(A) when 
expectations Increase, but the futures price may increase 
(e.g., 9?^ ^  Q). For this to hold |^| < 0 since jMgl < 0, 
9 6 
see Appendix C.2. Solving these matrices gives the necessary 
restrictions for increasing futures. Therefore, if 
ip® + p® ' 
% '#71= 
3P rp© . rpG 
_1 < H ^  u = K (4.20) 
'I -
the market structure is such that 9P^ is less than the constant 
K, then an increase in expected price will produce decreases 
in the price spread and increases in the futures price at the 
new equilibrium coordinates. Equilibrium coordinates at 
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point AJ Figure ^.7, now move to a new point H' where H' 
would be to the right of A. 
It has been shown that the theoretical role of price 
expectations can have significant influence within both the 
futures and input markets. Further if knowledge of the market 
structure is even partially known, then meaningful propositions 
can be derived. Specifically, in a period of general increases 
in prices of transformed goods, the futures-input price spread 
should always decrease and futures price will decrease if 
^ p g p 
f > K and Increase if f < K. As always comparative 
'Fx 
static conclusions must be limited to interpretation for those 
exogenous changes occurring with everything else fixed. 
Exogenous Chance in Speculation 
Speculative activities can increase due to exogenous 
forces, hence with the present framework such forces are 
directly evident through the function Fg. Increasing the net 
long futures commitments will necessitate adjustments in both 
futures and input markets. Therefore the intertemporal 
movements of A and must be evaluated under these assumed 
circumstances. 
Increased speculation in futures trading results with 
direct responses in the futures market and indirect effects 
on the input and transformation market. Futures demand 
respond as speculative interest Increase via the exogenous 
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variable b. For continued existence of an equilibrium In the 
futures market It follows that short hedging or supplies of 
contracts must increase accordingly. This can occur if the 
price spread A increases. Excessive demand pressures for 
speculative futures contracts will force the futures price 
upward if equilibrium is attained, thus Increasing A. With 
this shift in A, then a new futures equilibrium exists along 
the new locus of equilibrium points at F'F' (see Figure 4.8). 
Solutions from Appendix C.3 reveal that both the price spread 
and futures must increase. 
3A- pb 
> 0 at the Initial P^., where Fg > 0 (4.21) 
1^3.II > 0 . l"3-2| > 0 
^  IM3I l « 3 l  
(see Appendix C.3) (4.22) 
Pressures within the futures market via b will not 
directly influence the input market at the initial futures 
price. But in fact it was shown that P^ must increase, hence 
hedging short (supplying contracts) increases. Increased 
hedging requires adjustments in the input transformation 
market if equilibrium continues. As T„ increases there must 
n 
be a simultaneous rise in input transformation or a decrease 
in the level of unhedged stocks. Input price P^ will increase 
due to increased input demands, thus facilitating the equilib-
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rlum adjustment by Increasing the supply of inputs since 
P 
X X > 0. In addition the level of T will decrease since 
P 
< 0. From these responses toward equilibrium it must 
be that at least all added inputs and transformation services, 
resulting from the effect Of greater speculation, are completely 
hedged. Again the price spread has increased while both 
futures and input price rose. Hence the Increase in input 
price must be less than the futures price increase. Otherwise 
larger supplies of futures in response to increased speculation 
could not have occurred. Finally at the new market equilibrium 
the coordinates of Figure 4.8 have increased, but the rising 
spread is somewhat dampened in magnitude since input price 
also increased. 
Proposition 5: Within the assumed framework an exogenous 
increase in net speculative activities must result with in­
creases in both the price spread and futures price if a new 
market equilibrium exists. Further all additional inputs as 
a result of this change will be completely hedged. 
A 
Figure 4 . 8 .  Increases in speculation 
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Mxopienous Input, Supply Changes 
Exogenous shifts in the supply of Inputs requiring 
transformation services necessitates adjustments by those 
demanding transformation services. Let the exogenous supply 
variable "a" increase and > 0. Initially the excess 
supply of inputs dampens the input price. Hence both hedged 
and unhedged transformation procedures are now more profitable. 
T increases since < 0 and T„ changes with 9A . The 
u U, n n 
price spread A has increased at the initial futures price P^. 
Therefore TT must shift upward to T'T', Figure 4.9 and 
Appendix C.4. 
Short hedges have increased at the initial futures price. 
But long hedging and speculation will respond to greater 
supplies only through the indirect effect of "a" on i.e., 
3P f . Then it must be that locus PF will not change in re-
3a 
sponse to "a" unless P^ also varies. Finally short hedges 
Ty have increased and the spread A increases. Long commitments 
must increase via decreases in P^. This is expressed in the 
proposition below and with Figure m.9. 
Proposition 6_: Exogenous input supplies shift upward in 
the present framework and simultaneously the futures price 
decreases while the spread Increases. This will occur regard­
less of the magnitude of response to this exogenous variable 
(assuming sign of slopes remain the same). 
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Implicit to this proposition is the restriction tliat the 
relative response of futures to input prices must be such 
that 0 < f < 1. Both prices (P., P ) decrease, but futures 
âp; 
9P 
must decrease less since the spread must Increase. If f is 
again estimated by 8^ and 0 < 6^ < 1, then in a period of 
excess input supplies the predicted movement in both the 
futures market and the price spread can be stated. 
A 
Figure 4.9. Exogenous shifts in supplies of inputs 
Ultimately through this chapter a method of explaining 
the intertemporal relationship of prices and commitments to 
independent exogenous forces has been set forth. Market 
equilibriums can be established at numerous coordinates of 
observable prices (P^, P^), but they have been shown to be 
dependent on the postulated market structure. In all cases 
considered there did exist alternatives for reaching a market 
equilibrium. But in the process of evaluating the economic 
interrelationships of futures to nonstorable products, the 
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concepts of market equilibrium to Industry equilibrium (defined 
in next chapter) is of utmost importance. Specifically, 
movements in the price spread A have been derived without 
regard to the theory of Industrial equilibrium as discussed 
in chapter three. Intertemporal price discovery can be estab­
lished given the knowledge of the prevailing market structures. 
Yet these prices must be related to the concept of transforma­
tion cost. Therefore these comparative static conclusions 
will be evaluated with respect to the cost of transformation 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: FUTURES TRADING AND THE 
•EXISTENCE OP EQUILIBRIUMS 
The essence of the last two chapters is that an equilib­
rium can and has been derived. All possible combinations of 
coordinates A and satisfying market equilibrium were 
determined. These point sets (coordinates) are in fact in a 
linear space separated by the two linear lines, i.e., the 
price spread and futures axes. As was stated the price spread 
could be either positive or negative, but the futures price 
must always be positive. The concept of non-positive prices 
carry no meaning in the discovery of prices, output, and 
equilibrium analysis with futures trading. Hence, all inter­
sections of futures market equilibriums and input-transforma-
tion equilibriums are then limited to a linear space as in 
Figure 5.1 (e.g., the price spread axis and the futures price 
axis define two sets A and 3, Figure 5.1). In addition it 
was established that the price spread may be zero, hence 
market equilibrium could occur on the futures price axis. The 
contrary assumption holds for futures prices. It is assumed 
that futures prices will always be positive, thus implying 
that market equilibrium cannot exist on the price spread axis. 
It follows that the futures price axis is defined as a support­
ing plane to both equilibrium sets A and B since points in 
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either A or B (Figure 5.1) can be contained in the plane. 
But the bounding line, A axis, is a separating plane to both 
A and B since no point sets of A or B can be in common with 
A axis. Through the combined interpretations of the simple 
mathematics already used and the notion of linear spaces, 
some additional propositions regarding equilibriums between 
futures and input markets can be determined. 
A 
0 
S«t B 
Figure 5.1. The linear space for market equilibriums 
Sets A and B contain all feasible market equilibriums 
prior to and after the impact of changing exogenous forces. 
At each point in either of these sets there exists a unique 
set of coordinates (A, P^). Or expressed otherwise, the 
discovery of observable prices and P^ depend on finding 
those coordinates that are just consistent with the prevailing 
market structure and the values of included variables. 
Although the coordinates are unique, this does not imply 
that the combinations of variables necessary for a given 
coordinate is unique. For example some move to coordinates 
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(A', P^') could be through increasing price expectations, 
decreasing transformation costs, or numerous other combina­
tions of forces. 
In addition to market equilibrium coordinates, there is 
theoretically some price spread that just reflects the cost 
of transformation. Equation 3.13 derived that price spread 
which just reflects the cost of transformation. It then 
follows that all Ag are in fact some subset of sets A and B. 
In essence within the sets of market equilibrium coordinates 
there exists a set of price coordinates that will always 
exactly express the cost of input transformation. Define; 
Set A: market equilibrium set with A> 0, 
Set B: market equilibrium set with A<- 0 , 
Set E; industry equilibrium set witn A ^ 0, 
Set C: union of sets A and B. 
Set C 
Given the union of sets A and B and the interpretation of set 
E, then the major problem of this chapter Is to evaluate the 
implications and adjustments that follow when the realized 
point sets of C are not point sets of E. This point may 
need clarification. The set E defines all price coordinates 
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that satisfy the Industry equilibrium constraint of transfor­
mation cost, while set C contains all coordinates of (A, P^) 
for market equilibrium. Then If market equilibrium is real­
ized with coordinates nowhere in set E, the realized price 
spread may not reflect the cost of transformation. All market 
equilibrium point sets (coordinates) found also in set E will 
be defined as industrial equilibrium points. Whereas those 
point sets everywhere outside of E are not industrial equilib­
rium points. Industrial equilibriums imply market equilibriums, 
but not the converse. Some qualitative evaluations of the 
success of the futures market in relation to the cash market 
can follow from considerations of sets C and E. The reduction 
of the area of set C outside set E may be one element for 
successful futures operations. 
The procedure from here will be to first evaluate the 
possibilities of movement from one point in set E to another 
point In the same set i.e., moving from one Industrial equil­
ibrium to another. The alternative situation may exist with 
movements from points outside E but in set C to points within 
E, i.e., moving from market to Industry equilibriums. These 
movements result from changes in the exogenous forces pre­
sented in the last chapter. Specifically, exogenous changes 
were considered that Influenced only the input transformation 
market, others Just affected the futures market, and finally 
situations of simultaneous changes in coordinates of both 
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markets were stated. Again exerting the influence of the 
exogenous variable can yield meaningful propositions to the 
analysis. 
Industrial Equilibrium Movements 
Pour exogenous variables were considered under the com­
parative static manipulations. Using these variables to 
Induce market adjustment or rather these variables induce 
market adjustment, then if Initially in set E (Industry equil­
ibrium) when will the stated adjustments remain within the 
set E? For example can industry equilibrium and increasing 
input supplies be consistent? The existence of an initial 
industry equilibrium as derived in previous chapters occurred 
where the coordinates of locus TT, FF, and EE were consistent 
for each locus. Recalling that TT is a locus of coordinates 
satisfying input market equilibrium, FP is a locus of coordin­
ates satisfying futures market equilibrium, and EE is simply 
the set E. TT is then a subset of set C and so is FF. Inter­
section of TT and FF yields one point set of set C (e.g., a 
point of market equilibrium). It was established that after 
the influence of some exogenous variables either or both TT 
and FP shifted and new intersection points occurred. Some 
subset D is defined to include all points that may occur 
after the influence of an exogenous force at some initial 
stable equilibrium point. Set D is those coordinates of 
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equilibrium associated with some exogenous factor. Define: 
Set D; subset of G resulting from exogenous forces 
applied at some industrial equilibrium point. 
Exogenous shifts in input supplies 
Shifts in the amount of inputs X produced adjustments 
where TT must shift if the input market remained in equilibrium. 
But the futures market did not respond directly to shifts in 
the exogenous supply variable (see chapter four). If an in­
dustry equilibrium initially existed at some point A (see 
Figure 4.9), then it can be shown that this initial equilibrium 
may be unique when the only exogenous change is due to the 
variable "a". In other words there may be only one price 
spread and futures price that exactly reflects the cost of 
transformation and satisfies the market equilibrium condition. 
Three situations are to be considered. 
Set D defines all of those market equilibrium points 
resulting from an exogenous change in supplies. In Figure 5.2 
this set is limited to coordinates on the locus FF only (set 
is indicated by hash marks on FF). All new points occur with 
the intersection of T'T' with FF, Starting with the most 
restrictive situation where the coordinates (A, P^) satisfying 
the locus EE will always just satisfy locus FF (e.g., the 
line EE and FF are the same), then it follows that market 
adjustments in response to exogenous input changes will 
Ill 
always yield a new Industry equilibrium point. In Figure 5.2 
there are an finite number of market equilibrium points satis­
fying the conditions for industry equilibrium. The set D is 
a subset of set E. Hence with this market structure (where 
FP and EE correspond) a change in inputs through exogenous 
factors will only change the coordinates of a equilibrium; 
the conditions reflecting transformation costs are satisfied. 
The implication from this conclusion is that irregardless of 
the changes in the supply of inputs there will not exist an 
incentive for changing participation by new firms within the 
input or futures markets. In those situations where realized 
spreads differ substantially from the cost of transformation, 
then some incentive for additional entry to or exit from the 
markets exist. The incentive for entry and exit is a direct 
function of whether equation 3.13, chapter three,is satisfied. 
c-c T à 
0 
E=F 
Figure 5.2. Exogenous inputs and equilibrium where EE=FF 
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In many situations coordinates (A, P^) satisfying FF will 
differ from those of EE. This implies that the slope of FP 
will differ from the slope of EE (e.g., Ag^), but it 
has been established that both slopes are negative (see 
chapter three). Initially equilibrium exists in Figures 5.3 
and 5.4 at some point A. It then follows that an exogenous 
supply shift cannot result in a new industry equilibrium if all 
other exogenous factors are constant. For the market structure 
where Ag^ > A^^ (e.g., slope of EE exceeds that of FF) any 
exogenous supply increase will result in an actual futures-
cash price spread that is less than the cost of transformation 
relationship. In Figure 5-3 the newly established market 
equilibrium falls below the line EE. Hence the spread fails 
to reflect the cost of transformation by the amount shown in 
the shadowed area. The alternative market structure where 
> Ag^ yields price spreads greater than transformation 
cost as in Figure 5.4. Industry and market equilibriums are 
consistent only at the initial starting point A. Any change 
in supplies produces equilibriums where the realized price 
spread either exceeds or is less than the cost of input trans­
formation. In terms of linear spaces, sets E and D have only 
one point in common. Any exogenous supply increase results 
in movement from this common point to some point only in 
set D. This is shown where: 
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Set C 
Set E SetD 
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Proposition Within the meaning of the assumed frame­
work of sets C, Dj and E it follows that exogenously changing 
input supplies can result in movements from one to another 
industry equilibrium if the market structure is such that 
those coordinates (A, P^) satisfying equilibrium in the futures 
market will Just reflect the cost of input transformation. 
Otherwise the movement will be from the industry equilibrium 
to simply a market equilibrium. 
Some useful observations can be gained from this proposi­
tion. Livestock producers can and do make up much of the 
market for transformation services and futures trading in live 
beef. If producers as a whole anticipate increasing input 
supplies; they can, given this as.sumed framework, draw some 
meaningful conclusions about forthcoming price spreads. When 
the prevailing market structure is such that input adjustments 
cause movement from industry equilibrium, then entry and exit 
occur. In the situation of Figure 5-^j the realized price 
spread exceeds the cost of transformation. Hence greater 
market entry may occur since buying inputs X, selling futures. 
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and transforming these inputs is definitely profitable. When 
some exogenous input change has occurred, some meaningful 
evaluation of futures for forward pricing can be determined 
(this is shown later). 
Exogenous changes in expectations 
Exogenous changes in the expected price of the transformed 
input at maturity was shown to have a simultaneous influence 
on both the futures and cash markets. When expectations in­
creased the price spread decreased. But the response of the 
futures price depended on the exact response of some elements 
of the market structure. Specifically, new market equilibriums 
occurred as expectations increased and the futures price 
increased if < < , (see Proposition 4), or decreased when 
3 P 
f > K. These alternatives again define some linear space 
'fx 
where new market equilibriums are possible. Those market 
equilibrium points resulting from cash price expectation 
changes are defined in some set D. Hence set D now includes 
all coordinates of A and satisfying market equilibrium 
after adjustments due to changing expectations. 
If initially at some industry equilibrium point A in 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6, under what circumstances will adjustments 
be limited to movements within the set E (set E contains 
industry equilibrium coordinates)? In other words, will 
Figure 5.3. Market and industrial equilibriums and input 
changes where slope EE > slope FP 
Figure 5.4. Market and industrial equilibriums and input 
changes where slope FF > slope EE 
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changing expectations be consistent with a industrial equilib­
rium? Again it can be shown that these movements depend 
directly on responses within the market structure. 
First consider the situation of Figure 5-5. Market 
responses are such that all coordinates satisfying EE are not 
consistent with FP. Let the slope of line EE exceed that of 
FF. Set D then contains all points of intersection of TT 
and FF as adjustments to expectations are made. Given this 
market structure it follows that there may be numerous points 
of market equilibrium that intersect just on the line EE. The 
set D and set E intersect. Movements from the initial point A 
to a new point is feasible. In Figure 3-5 both points A and 
B are in sets E and D. If expectations have Increased then 
it is necessary for futures prices to increase if the movement 
from points A to B occurred. In contrast, a decrease in 
expectations must result with decreasing futures price if a 
industry equilibrium continues to exist. This simply holds 
due to the fact that the slope of EE is negative. Define: 
Reference to Figure 5-5 
Slopes EE > PP. 
Figure 5.5. Market and industrial equilibriums and exogenous 
Increases in price expectations where slope EE > 
slope FF 
Figure 5-6. Market and industrial equilibriums and exogenous 
increases in price expectations where slope FF > 
slope EE 
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The intersection of set E and D defines all points of industry 
equilibrium that may occur as expectations change. Within the 
intersection the necessary movements of futures prices must 
have occurred. 
With Figure 5.6 the slope of the futures market exceeds 
that of EE. As expectations increase the spread decreases and 
futures price movements are indefinite. Set D now consists of 
those intersecting points with this different slope assumption. 
Yet irregardless of the new market equilibriums , there 
P P 
cannot be a new industry equilibrium when A f> (slope FF 
F ^ 
greater than slope EE). Set D and set E have only the initial 
point set A in common. Within this assumed framework changing 
price expectations are not sufficient for continued industrial 
equilibrium. The price spread after adjustments to price 
expectations will not reflect the cost of Input transformation. 
This situation is defined where: 
Reference to Figure 5.6, 
Slope FF > Slope EE. 
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Proposition Within the meaning of the assumed frame­
work, exogenous changes In expected output prices can result 
In movements from one Industry equilibrium to another If the 
prevailing market structure Is such that the slope of EE 
exceeds that of FF (e.g., set D and set E have more than one 
point set In the Intersecting set). Otherwise there Is only 
one unique Industrial equilibrium point. 
These conclusions again can be very useful. If the 
market structure is even partially understood, then the Impact 
of a general Increase in expected prices can be deduced. 
Taking the latter case where Is known (Figure 5.6), 
then adjustments to greater expectations produce price spreads 
that are less than necessary to cover transformation costs 
(e.g., market equilibrium of set D is everywhere below the locus 
EE except at point A). The realized spread will always be 
below that spread necessary to Just reflect the cost of input 
transformation. This difference may produce exits from the 
futures market. The alternative where realized spread exceed 
transformation cost (the case of decreasing expectations in 
Figure 5.6) may result In greater futures participation, 
especially by shorter hedgers, since the profitability for 
Increasing Inputs, selling futures, and transforming Inputs is 
greatly increased with little additional risk. Exit may not 
be as straight forward since futures commitments depend on the 
level of risk aversion in conjunction with relative prices. 
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Aggregate exits may occur, but they will not fall below the 
aggregate subjective level necessary for risk aversion. 
The case of Figure 5.5 also provides Insights for market 
participants. The area of Industrial equilibrium is much 
greater than the case of Figure 5.6. Hence the degree of 
entry and exit may be lessened. In a perlodof changing expec­
tations the use of futures for forward pricing may be greatly 
Increased since the number of Industry equilibrium points have 
increased i.e., the futures and input price spread tend to 
remain related to transformation cost. The impact of changing 
expectation for this situation (Figure 5.5) Is somewhat 
dampened to the extent the industry equilibrium continues to 
exist. 
Exogenous speculative Interest 
The fact that those coordinates satisfying futures market 
equilibrium must shift with changing speculative interest was 
previously set forth. In addition the input market did not 
shift (see chapter four). The set D now is defined as all 
those market equilibriums where the shifting FF just Intersect 
the locus TT. As FF shifted upward due to Increased specula­
tive activities both the price spread and futures price increas­
ed. The converse holds for decreasing speculative interest. 
Starting at some equilibrium point A, then any change in 
speculation cannot result with a new industry equilibrium. 
Reference to Figures 5.7 and 5.8 substantiates this observation. 
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Increased speculation produces market equilibriums along the 
path of TT= But the set E has only one coordinate in common 
with TT (e.g., EE and TT intersect only at point A). Further 
all coordinates or point sets, of set E are on the line EE, 
thus implying that EE does not shift as speculative interests 
change. It then must be that the set D and set E have only 
one point in common. Hence any change In speculative activities 
can only result in movements away from a industrial equilibrium 
if initially at industry equilibrium. Define the set relation­
ship as: 
This failure to meet the necessary equilibrium requirements 
produces a price spread that differs from that necessary to 
reflect the cost of transformation. Again the incentive for 
entry or exit of new participants has been established via 
changing speculation. Comparative statics and linear spaces 
have been sufficient to arrive at both market and Industry 
equilibriums, but the actual mechanisms for entry and exit 
have not been derived. The present framework then is useful 
up to the point of providing incentive for other exogenous 
Reference to Figures 5.7 
and 5.8. 
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changes not directly Included In the model. Finally this 
situation as referred to In Figures 5-7 and 5-8 Is expressed 
through proposition 9. 
Proposition Within the meaning of the assumed 
framework it follows that exogenous changes in speculative 
activities in the futures market cannot result in movements 
from one industrial equilibrium to another. 
Exogenous change in cost of transformation 
In all previous situations the set E and the locus 
EE had all coordinates in common. But with exogenous changes 
in the cost of input transformation this no longer holds. 
The set E contains numerous point sets not on the initial 
locus EE (e.g., it was shown that EE will shift as the 
cost of transformation changes, see chapter three). Further 
it was shown that both input market equilibrium locus TT 
and futures locus FP shifted directly with changing P^. 
The intersection of these market shifts are then contained 
in the set D. 
All three equilibrium conditions shift in the same 
direction as cost are exogenously changed. It then is evident 
that there are numerous points that could satisfy an industrial 
equilibrium. In essence the intersection of sets E and D 
Figure 5.7. Market and industrial equilibriums and 
increases in speculation where slope EE 
slope FF 
Figure 5-8. Market and Industrial equilibriums and 
increases in speculation where slope FF 
slope EE 
126 
future-cash 
spread = A 
TT = input market equilibrium 
FF = futures market equilibrium 
EE = A reflects transformation 
cost 
slope= l~G < 0 
futures price = R f 
A  
Î 
A  
0 
slope : 1"6<0 
127 
have many common point sets. In Figures 5-9 and 5.10 the 
Initial point A exists. But as cost increases the input locus 
TT shifts to some T'T', futures shift to F'F', and EE shifts 
to E'E', thus giving a new point B. Of course point B may 
not occur if a specific response in EE or other loci do not 
occur. This is summarized in proposition 10. 
Proposition 10 : Within the meaning of the assumed 
framework, an exogenous change in transformation cost can 
result in new industry equilibrium where the price spread 
continues to reflect the cost of transformation. This does 
not guarantee that it will occur. 
In essence there exists some degree of price 
adjustments to changing costs that will not necessitate 
either entry or exit of new firms into the market. Prices 
can adjust and Industrial equilibrium continue even in a 
closed market since there are numerous points of "industry 
equilibrium. No incentives for added entries or exits have 
been derived. But if the market equilibriums and EE are 
not consistent then the incentive for entry and exit again 
occurs. Define: 
Reference to Figures 5-9 
and 5.10. 
Set C 
Figure 5.9. Market and industrial equilibriums and 
increases in transformation cost where 
slope EE > slope FF 
Figure 5.10. Market and industrial equilibriums and 
increases in transformation cost where 
slope FF > slope EE 
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If movements from point set A to point set B exist, then in­
dustrial equilibrium continues. But if from A to some point 
set X» then market equilibrium and industry equilibrium are 
no longer consistent. 
In each of the four situations derived from exogenous 
forces the case is summarized with set E, set D, and their 
Intersection. Movements within the coordinates of the inter­
section always provide a price spread consistent with trans­
formation cost. Movements to coordinates outside of this 
intersection yields spreads that are considered somewhat 
indicative of changes in market participation via entries 
and exits. From these conclusions some implications of futures 
for forward pricing will be deduced. 
Equilibrium and Forward Pricing 
Through the tools of simple mathematics and linear 
spaces, many observations and propositions related to futures 
trading In products requiring transformation services were 
sighted. It was established that under specific exogenous 
forces the possibilities for continued industry equilibrium 
were slight, yet with alternative 'exogenous forces the same 
equilibrium may have a greater chance for continued existence. 
Hence to draw the conclusion that one particular futures will 
under all circumstances maintain a industry equilibrium must 
be an overstatement of the facts. The history or historical 
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occurrence of exogenous forces must be considered. Further 
all forces (exogenous variables) have been evaluated with the 
assumption that all others were fixed. In reality there may 
be a continuous and simultaneous adjustment to many exogenous 
effects; although, it may be that particular markets such as 
livestock have a greater frequency of occurrence of some exo­
genous force such as changing input supplies. Again to keep 
the discussion within a framework adaptable to the tools being 
used, only one exogenous change is assumed to occur at a time. 
Initially through the mathematics of comparative statics 
both futures and input prices were discoverd. Then given exo-
genously induced changes, the relative response of these 
prices were determined via (A, P^). With each exogenous event 
there resulted a set D that contained all coordinates of (à, 
P^) consistent with market equilibrium. In addition a set E 
and its Intersection with set D led to some useful interpre­
tations. It is now only one step further to evaluate the role 
of futures prices for nonstorables and forward pricing. 
Forward pricing Implies the ability to establish the 
selling prices of goods that are to be delivered at a later 
date. Such prices are often pegged by governmental agencies 
through commodity price floors and other techniques. Futures 
prices may serve as forward prices. For example, trading in 
live beef futures ^ today may be indicative of the cash market 
price at some future data. Using futures for forward pricing 
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may be considered in two ways: 1) if futures prices are 
related to the costs of transformation as previously discussed 
then they may be useful forward prices, 2) futures as histori­
cally related to the final output price may give guidelines 
to decision making. The first of these alternatives will be 
considered in the remainder of this chapter, and the latter 
will be considered in the next chapter. 
Forward price evaluation 
The premise of this section is simply that if the proba­
bility of the occurrence of an industry equilibrium can be 
estimated, then futures for forward pricing can be evaluated. 
To do this the entire set of exogenous forces must be included. 
Pour considerations of exogenous changes were previously 
presented. As stated these may be indicative of many other 
forces not discussed. If there exists a finite number of such 
exogenous forces entering the system, then they can be expressed 
in a linear space notation. Define: 
Set J: a set of all possible exogenous variables 
that could influence the framework assumed. 
Set J has j point sets (exogenous variables) and for each j 
there exists a set Dj that expresses market equilibrium 
coordinates. Some j implies a set Dj. The set D was used 
earlier in this chapter without adding the subscript. It is 
now added since .all exogenous effects are being considered 
simultaneously. There exists a frequency distribution of these 
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exogenous events. For example trading In live beef futures 
and in feeder inputs are subjected to many exogenous changes; 
but through historical occurrences, the frequency of each 
event may be determined. Hence define Prob (j) as the prob­
ability of event j. The equality of equation 5.1 then holds 
(e.g., sets D. and E. occur with j, hence they have the same 
probability of occurrence). 
Prob (j) = Prob (Cy) = Prob (Ej) (5.1) 
Each set D. consists of C, . point sets where each C. . 
J J 1J 
Is a coordinate of (A, P^) that satisfies a market equilibrium. 
For example it was shown that changing expectations produced 
new market equilibrium points. Hence expectations are one 
point set of set J and all results from market adjustments 
are point sets C.. of set D.. Each C.. follows some frequency 
J J 1J 
distribution f(C^j), (e.g., some adjustments may be more likely 
than other ones). Set Dj and Ej intersected as shown in 
Figures 5.2 through 5.10. Hence some point sets C.. are 
1 J 
common to both Dj and E^. Assume the first m^ of the n^ 
point sets are in both set D. and E.. Define: 
J J 
? J  F ( C ^ J )  D C ^ J  = 1  1  =  1 , 2 ,  . . . ,  M ^ ,  M J  +  1 ,  . . .  ,  
1=1 
< J f(C^j) d C^.. - 1 Probability of intersection 
1=1 
of set Dj and set E^. 
13^ 
If again the initial point of industry equilibrium is some 
point A (see Figures 5.2 through 5.8), then what is the prob­
ability of moving to some new equilibrium point B, see Figure 
5.11. There are m^ points in the intersection, thus there 
exists Mj-l alternatives from A (let A = satisfying 
industry equilibrium. The probability of moving from point A 
to another point within the intersection follows in equation 
5.2. 
m..- n^  
P r o b  ( A — B )  =  \  f ( C ^ j )  d C ^ j  <  1  
- Ï  
(see Figure 5.11) (5.2) 
Set C 
Set 
Figure 5.11. Sets D and E. 
<j J 
Through equations 5.1 and 5.2 the desired form is derived 
where the probability of some exogenous event exists and the 
probability of a Industry equilibrium given each event is 
expressible. These probabilities are not independent in 
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that Prob(A—• B) will occur is the product of the probability 
that the one of them will occur and the probability that the 
other will occur given that the first has occurred, occurs, 
or will occur. See equation 5.3, where the probability of 
both events (exogenous force j and movement to another equili­
brium) is derived. Summing over all possible exogenous events 
then establishes the probability of getting a new industrial 
equilibrium point. Equation 5.4 then provides a probability 
over all exogenous events that indicates the likelihood of a 
Prob(industry equilibrium) = Z Prob(D.) Prob(A—B) (5.4) 
4 <J 
movement from one point A to another point B. A simple exam­
ple may aid for interpretation. Assumed j=l,2,3 and the 
probabilities are assigned as in Table 5.1. In this discrete 
case the probability of arriving at a new industrial equilibrium 
point is .58. In other words, .58 shows the probability of 
moving from one industry equillbrum point to another when the 
probability of occurrence of each exogenous force is considered. 
The essence of equation 5.4 is that there is some probabil­
ity that the futures-input price spread will Just reflect the 
cost of transforming the inputs X. If this probability is 
sufficiently large (e.g., if the probability exceeds some 
subjective minimum level) then utilizing futures prices as 
j j 
'j J (5.3) 
m.gn 
Prob(Dj) Prob ( A-^ B) = Prob(Dj) 
2 
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Table 5.1. Example of movement from one point A to another 
point B 
j P(Dj) P ( A-^  B ) P(D^.ft(A—b-B)) 
1 • 3 .2 . 06 
2 .3 .4 .12 
3 .4 1.0 .40 
.58 
forward prices is acceptable, in other words, the premise is 
that futures must exactly reflect the cost of transformation 
if it serves for forward pricing. If the probability falls 
below some minimum level, then futures cash price spreads 
will be sufficiently different from transformation costs too 
great of a percentage of the time. Thus futures prices 
will not be used for forward pricing. This is summarized 
with the proposition 11. 
Proposition 11; Within the meaning of the assumed 
framework, if the probability of a new industrial equilibrium 
exceeds some minimum level, then futures prices may be used 
for forward pricing. 
Proposition 11 is very restrictive in that an industry 
equilibrium must exist with some probability if forward 
pricing via futures is used. A somewhat lesser restriction 
can be stated, but in the process more information must be 
known. Specifically, earlier in the chapter it was shown 
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that any set D (set ) consists of coordinates where both 
increases and decreases in the exogenous variable occurred. 
If in fact set D can be subdivided into three subsets where 
one Includes those industry equilibrium points, next are those 
coordinates where the spread A exceeds the transformation 
cost relationships of equation 3.13, and finally coordinates 
exist where A is less than the transformation cost relation­
ship. If the probability of the first two subsets above can 
be determined, then a less restrictive alternative to proposi­
tion 11 exists. The probability of the price spread that 
equals or exceeds transformation cost must be determined. 
Some set Dj contains n^ point sets as assumed earlier 
and mj of these point sets are industry equilibrium points 
(e.g.. Intersection of set Dj and Ej). Now assumed that 
through qj point sets have coordinates such that the A(price 
spread) is above the transformation cost relationship. Define: 
mj qj-ny n^ 
1 Mj + l qij+l 
Hence the probability that the new market equilibrium coordin­
ates will either equal or exceed the transformation cost is 
derived in equation 5.5. Stated otherwise, it is the probabil­
ity of moving from an Industry equilibrium coordinate to some 
coordinate where A at least reflects the transformation 
cost (e.g., Define: 
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[Pf - - G] 
[Pf. - Px]<[Pf - P^ ] [1 - G] 
[PF. - PX]>[PF - P^] [1 - G] 
q .<n. 
Prob(A-*x) = r 
J f(C^j) dC^j (5.5 
Then In a similar manner as shown with equation 5.3, the 
probability of some exogenous event j occurring and of move­
ments to new coordinates to satisfy the transformation cost 
condition can be calculated. 
Summing over all possible exogenous events of set J then 
provides the probability of arriving at a set of coordinates 
(A,p^) where the price spread is at least as great as necessary 
for the transformation cost constraints (see Equation 5.7). 
Recalling thatAg = [P^ - P^lEl - G(L*)] is the relationship 
between spread and costs of transformation. This situation 
Prob(D.) Prob(A—*x) " Prob 
Prob (A satisfying transf. cost relationship) = Z Prob(D.) 
j ^ 
Prob(A«-«» x) (5.7) 
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can be expressed by example with Table 5.2where P(A-«»x) Is 
substituted for P(A-» B) of Table 5.1. For these assumed 
frequencies It follows that the probability of getting a 
price spread A that is equal to or greater than the transfor­
mation cost relationship Is .73 (e.g., this desired A will 
occur 73 percent of the time). If this calculated probability 
is above some subjective minimum, then the futures price may 
be used as a forward price. 
Table 5.2. Example of movement from point A to another point x 
j P(D.) P(A—«»X) P(DJN(A->' X) ) 
1 .3 .5 .15 
2 .3 .6 . 18 
3 .4 1.0 . 40 
.73 
What are the consequences of equations 5.^ and 5.7? A 
spread that will at least cover the cost of transformation 
(within the meaning of the cost-spread relationship) will 
occur with some probability. Then the futures may be used as 
a forward price. In other words, selling futures for P^, 
buying the inputs and transforming them will be profitable. 
In addition forward contracting outside of an organized market 
can occur, but the price derived in the organized futures 
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exchange serves as the guideline for the forward price. 
Producers could contract with packing plants for delivery at 
a later date. Then with the restrictive model developed here, 
the probability of success from using futures prices for guide­
lines to forward pricing can be calculated. The success lies 
in that a forward price for the transformed input assures those 
providing transformation services a fixed return. Of course 
the probabilities of equations 5-4 and 5.7 do not assure that 
the new coordinates (A,P^) will result with A> [P^-Pj^] [ 1-G]. 
If A<[P^-P^][1-G(L*)] and P^ is used for forward pricing such 
commitments in the macro sense will produce losses. 
Ultimately, it has been established that futures prices 
can be used as guidelines for forward pricing. There exist 
many exogenous events that may occur and they must be used in 
the evaluation of a futures price movements. Finally if the 
probability of arriving at some new spread (A), given the 
possibilities of all exogenous events, exceeds some minimum 
level; then the futures price in such nonstorable products 
may be utilized for forward pricing. 
Proposition 12: Within the meaning of the assumed 
framework, the success of futures for forward pricing depends 
directly on the probability of arriving at a spread and futures 
price coordinate (A,P^) that equals or exceeds the transforma­
tion cost relationship (e.g., A>[P^-P^][1-G(L*)]. 
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Finally through this chapter and the preceding ones,  
a framework for the existence and uniqueness of equilibriums 
has been established. Both the market and industry equilib­
riums are essential concepts to the understanding of price 
responses and market positions. Hence in the next chapter 
some discussion of price and quantity movements will be 
considered that are directly relevant to these theoretical 
discussions. 
1H2 
CHAPTER 6: LIVE BEEP FUTURES PRICE MOVEMENTS 
Within the contexts of the last few chapters some theo­
retical considerations were presented for relating futures 
markets to trading in commodities that required further pro­
duct transformation. In essence, the commodity was not yet 
marketable but was still related to a futures market. The 
case for live beef futures was shown to be such a product. 
The micro framework set forth the optimal levels of market 
commitments for both a cash and futures position. The 
aggregate effect of all traders in a micro sense lead to a 
format for price discovery in a macro sense. Specifically, 
chapter two specified the optimal levels of inputs and futures 
commitments. Through chapters three and four a method for 
price discovery was illustrated, while chapter five considered 
the implications of derived prices in relationship to market 
and industrial equilibriums. 
Drawing from these theoretical considerations, some 
empirical movements in prices can be interpreted. All previous 
analyses of futures and cash prices were discussed in a frame­
work where the input (the initial placing of feeder cattle on 
feedlots) always required t units of time for complete product 
transformation (see chapter three). If t=6, then the analysis 
consisted of all cash and futures prices that were consistent 
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with the fact that inputs require six months of transforming 
services. Futures prices must also be evaluated in a different 
time series format. To this extent interest is with the price 
movements over the life of each contract. Considerations of 
both forms of prices will follow in this chapter. 
Figure 6.1 provides a graphical summary of the past 
theoretical discussion and establishes a pictorial reference 
for some empirically observed price movements. The structural 
relationship between price discovery and the futures contract 
life is related in this figure. The lower portion of 6.1 
illustrates the time trend of futures prices. Each futures 
contract is traded up to n months prior to the terminating 
date of the contract. There exist a series of futures prices 
in this contract that may vary systematically over the contract 
life.^ As shown on the horizontal axis of 6.1, the contract 
life is measured in months from the maturity date up to one 
month prior to contract maturity. The point of interest in 
this respect is to test if there is some systematic price 
trend over each contract life. In addition, observations 
relating price movements in the last 20 trading days will 
also be of interest. 
The upper portion of Figure 6.1 relates the previous 
discussion of market equilibrium to that of each futures 
iThere are presently six contracts traded in live beef 
futures: February, April, June, August, October and December. 
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contract. Recalling that TT is the input market equilibrium 
and PP is the futures market equilibrium locus, it then 
follows that the derived futures price of the upper graph 
(Figure 6.1) corresponds to some point in the time series 
over each contract life. In the case illustrated here the 
derived (futures price) from some intersection of T'T' and 
F'P' is put in the proper perspective to the futures contract 
trend path (this situation is only hypothetical). This is 
shown where an arrow is drawn from the price axis of the upper 
graph to some price (the circled point) in the lower graph. 
Hence each futures price of a contract exists as a result 
from trading activities as illustrated with the upper graph. 
Utilization of this figure will enhance in the presentation 
of some observed price movements. Therefore theprocedure at 
hand is to look at observed activities within the live beef 
futures as they are related to the upper and lower portions 
of Figure 6.1. 
Market Equilibrium 
The economic role of the futures-cash price spread has 
been established and the various movements in both the spread 
and futures prices were explained by shifts in TT and PP. 
Hence there may exist some systematic trend in these market 
equilibriums (intersection of TT and FF). 
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Path of market equilibrium 
Figures 4.2 through 4.9 delineated shifts in TT and FF 
that may occur as activities within the futures and cash markets 
change. It was shown that under some circumstances both A 
and vary directly, while under other situations they vary 
inversely. These responses depend directly on the structures 
of both markets. A path of these shifts can be estimated for 
live beef futures.^ 
Price spread A and futures price P^ must be made opera­
tional. Define: 
t 
j 
A(t) 
the Chicago futures price (price on the 15th 
of each month) for live beef futures in that 
contract t months from maturity and the jth 
observation in the time series, 
the Jth price (average monthly price) of feeder 
steers 550-750 lbs. at Kansas City plus $1.00 
for difference in basing point with respect 
to Chicago, 
months from futures contract maturity, 
time series measured in months beginning with 
January, 1966, and ending with December, 1968, 
p,(t)j - p^(t)j. 
^The path is calculated only for t=6. Prices of feeder 
steers at weights other than those defined were not available. 
The scheme for selecting the futures price Is presented in 
Appendix D.1. 
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For example, P^(6)^, Is that live beef futures price In the 
contract that is nearest to 6 months from maturity on January 
1966. While would be the price recorded as the 49th 
observation In the series. Hence prices are recorded among 
all contracts according to the criteria of time from maturity. 
Later movements over each contract as t varies will be con­
sidered. All prices were deflated by the consumer price 
index for meats, thus removing any inflationary trend occurring 
in the time series. Finally, subtracting the feeder price 
from the futures price yields a measurable form of the price 
spread. I.e., A(t)j is that price spread as recorded in the 
jth observation of the time series. Thus each observed A(t)j 
and P^(t)j in the series represents a set of coordinates 
(A,P^) where a market equilibrium has occurred. These are 
the same coordinates utilized throughout chapters four and 
five where subscripts were omitted at times for reading conven­
ience . 
The path of market equilibrium consists of relating the 
price spread to the futures price over this series. The 
hypothesized relationship is shown in equation 6.1. After 
testing alternative functional forms, the double-log^ appeared 
A = (j)(P|.) (6.1) 
to be acceptable. Ignoring the time series j notation for the 
moment, then the relationship between A and P^ can be estimated. 
Table 6.1. Estimates of relationship for path of market equilibrium corresponding 
to Figure 6.1, before and after correction for autocorrelation 
Function Depend. Intercept Coeff. 1^ t test Coeff. 2^ t test R D.W.^ 
Double-log A'(t). ^ - 5 . 0 1 2 6  +2.2820 5 . 8 0 4 0  .6461 .3560 
® J 
Double-log A'(t) .-rA'(t) . , - .4691 1.5151 4.604l .5616 1.5913 
^ J J J-
^Definie: Coefficient 1 = P^(t)^. 
Coefficient 2 = [P^(t)^-rP^(t)^_^], where r ^ .8220. 
^The coefficient of autocorrelation,r Is approximated from the Durban Watson 
statistic via 
r = j-1 - D.W. J 
°A'(t), = [A(t) . + 10]. 
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Log CA + 10) = -5.0126 + 2.282 Log P f 
p 2 . 2 8 2  
o r A =  r  f  T  -  1 0  ( 6 . 2 )  
[ e5.0126] 
The spread A Is related to the futures'price as shown in 
equation 6.2.^ This equation corresponds to the path of 
market equilibrium shown in the upper part of Figure 6.1. 
The slope relationship between and P^ is directly calculable 
from the path of market equilibrium, equation 6.3- The value 
of 9P^ can be shown given the coordinates (A, P^) are known. 
3Pf 
f _ 1, , -,o, . , 1-^ (6.3) [1 - 2.282 A + lol'l J 
Within the chapter on price discovery through comparative 
statics, it was established that the final movements In the 
spread and futures price depended on the relationship among 
market responses to exogenous variable changes and 3P^ . Take 
g p 
proposition 2 for example from chapter four, both x 
A and increased if 1 + T^L ^ . Let A = -2.00 and P^ = 
The spread can be either positive or negative (see chap­
ter three) but logs are defined only for positive values. All 
A were increased to positive values by adding +10 to each. 
This constant was then subtracted out after deriving the A 
estimate equation. 
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25.00, it then follows that the estimated response 3P^ - 3-703. 
The situation of proposition 2 then reveals that if a new 
set of coordinates (A', P^') are greater than the original 
set (AJP|.) after some exogenous change in Pj^  (transformation 
service cost), then the relationship of hedged to unhedged 
P P 
responses should be such that T^L > 2.703 T^L. In essence 
this exercise illustrates a structural relationship that must 
exist for certain price movements to have occurred given 
some particular exogenous variable change. The same procedure 
can be applied to any of the propositions that were related 
to 9?^. 
The original estimates of equation 6.2 ignored the time 
series. Since this data is a time series, the possibility 
of autocorrelation should be considered. Table 6.1 reveals 
that there exist a large positive autocorrelation as is 
evident by the Durbin-Watson test. A correction for first-
order autocorrelation was completed in Table 6.1. Only the 
estimated values of the parameters were desired in equation 
6.2, hence correlated errors are not troublesome since these 
parameter estimates of 6.2 are unbiased. 
Attempts to further explain the variability of the path 
of market equilibrium of Figure 6.1 were completed as derived 
in Table 6.2. Two additional variables appeared to be signifi­
cantly related to A. Define; 
Table 6.2. The path of market equilibrium for t=6 before and 
after correction for positive autocorrelation 
Independent Variables^ 
Function Dependent Intercept Coeff. 1 Coeff. 2 
Double-log A%t) -3.2289 +2.5708 - .0633 
n=H9 (7.1315)^ (-4.1768) 
Double—log [A'(t ) J—rA'(t ) J_23— .0095 
n=48 r = .7239 
Double—log [A'( t ) J—rA'( t ) j ^3 — . Ol6l 
n=48 r = .7239 
Coeff. 1 = 
Coeff. 2 = Vol(t) , 
Coeff. 3 = PfCt)., 
Coeff. 4 = [Pf(t)j - rPf(t)^._l], 
Coeff. 5 = [Vol(t).- rVol(t)j_^], 
Coeff. 6 = [PT(t)j rP^(t )j.-l]. 
^t test are immediately below each coefficient estimate and 
and .05 level of significance was used. 
= [A(t)^ + 10]. 
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Independent Variables^ 
Coef.f.. 3 C.oe.ff. 4 . Coeff. 5 Coeff. 6 R D.W. 
- .7621 — — — — — — — .7644 .5504 
(-2.1813) 
+1.7511 +.0008 -1.0493 .6722 1.3425 
(4.8860) (.0586) (-2.9944) 
— — — +1.7612 -1.0506 .6722 1.3446 
(5.6663) (-3.0376) 
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Vol(t). = volume traded in live beef futures for that 
J 
contract t months from maturity and the jth 
observation in the time series, 
P^(t)j = average monthly price of Chicago choice slaught 
steers for the Jth observation in the times 
series. 
A double-log function again proved to be an acceptable 
functional form as presented with equation 6.4. Equation 6.4 
was corrected for first-order autocorrelation since the 
correlation coefficient for errors was positive (e.g., r = 
.7239). As shown in Table 6.2, the Log Vol. variable became 
Log(A + 10) = -3.2287 + 2.5708LogP^ - .0633Log Vol. -
.7621LogP^ (6.4) 
insignificant after this correction for autocorrelation. 
Removing this variable and reestimatlng 6.4 and then again 
correcting for autocorrelation gave the alternative form in 
equation 6.5. 
A(t)j = 
10] '72"! 
^.016 
e 
-  1 0  ( 6 . 5 )  
The path of market equilibrium of Figure 6.1 now is expressed 
where the price spread of time J for futures contracts t 
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months (six months) from maturity are significantly related 
to the futures price and cash stock price of time j and also 
related to the previous futures price, cash price, and the 
price spread of the last time period j-1. Throughout the 
earlier chapters the role of expectations was emphasized. 
For many commodities the influence of cashprice P^(e.g., 
~ Px(O)j) ori expectations is great. Hence the significance 
of in explaining A movements is probably Indicative of the 
influence of in formulizing price expectations. Equation 
6.5 is still incomplete if the intent is to completely 
explain the variability of A. At the present stage of trading 
in the live beef futures much needed data is not yet published. 
Classification of hedging and speculative activities are not 
yet available. In the absence of this information, equations 
such as 6.5 must suffice to shed light on the price-making 
activities. 
Intersection of TT and FF 
Any attempt to carry the discussion of TT and FF beyond 
the theoretical stage of analysis was completely aborted. 
Estimate of each equilibrium locus shown in Figure 6.1 would 
contribute to the total understanding of the interrelationship 
between the futures and cash market. Without sufficient 
information on contract trading composition, any estimates 
of TT and FF would be questionable. Some discussion of trad­
ing composition will be Included later in this chapter. 
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Pricing Activities Over All Contracts 
Price movements over the life of futures contracts must 
be evaluated. The last section briefly established relation­
ships given a constant t (time from contract maturity). The 
procedure now consists of observing pricing phenomena as t 
varies. Specific interests are with the variability of prices, 
trend or seasonality of prices, and prices in last days of 
a trading period. This analysis may give insights regarding 
any statistically significant evidence of structure (anything 
but randomness) in the movements of beef futures prices. 
Variance of futures prices 
Futures prices vary over the life of trading contracts 
as is evident below. Observing P^(t)j as t varies revealed 
that in the trading period from January, 1966, through December, 
1969, there existed a systematic trend in the variability of 
futures prices. The variance of futures price and time from 
contract maturity were inversely related, i.e., as contracts 
approached maturity there existed a significant increase in 
the variance of futures price, see Appendix D.2. The first 
set of equations in Table 6.3 establishes this fact for live 
beef futures prices. Of these the double-log form gave the 
most desirable results. Hence the estimated variance of 
futures prices (for all contracts) is related to the contract 
life as in equation 6.6. 
Table 6.3. Estimates for the Variance of P„, the Variance of (P„ - P^), and the 
Mean of (P^ - P^) over the futures contract life 
Function Depend. Intercept Coeff, t test R D.W. n 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log" 
Linear^ 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log^ 
Var(Pf) 
Var(Pp 
Var(pi) 
3. 
1. 
1. 
1478 
1649 
2075 
-.1713 
-.0714 
-.2812 
-5. 
-5. 
-7. 
0183 
8364 
3621 
.8846 
.9108 
.9411 
1.2646 
1.3282 
2.3698 
9 
9 
9 
Var(Prn-P-) 
Var(pi-pl) 
Var(pi-pi) 
1. 1661 
2353 
2476 
+.2330 
+.1086 
+.3729 
3. 
2. 
2. 
0169 
804l 
3012 
.7518 
.7273 
.6563 
2.4620 
2.7995 
2.2476 
9 
9 
9 
Mean(Prp-P^) 
Mean(P^-P^) 
Mean(p^-pp 
-1. 
-1. 
1353 
1525 
4344 
+.3178 
+.2880 
+1.2105 
7. 
4. 
8. 
6302 
5214 
3021 
.9448 
.8631 
.9528 
0.8510 
0.8012 
1.7641 
9 
9 
9 
^Variance of cash price are 
^Best estimate according to 
defined where: Var(P^) = 
Var(P^) ^ 
the combined results from 
4.821 for Chicago, 
4.6112 for 7 markets combined. 
the t test, R, and D.W. 
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LogVar(P^(t)) = 1.2075 - .28l2Log t 
or 
Var(P^(t)) = 3.345 t"'28l2 (6.6) 
This significant relationship is important to both the 
hedger and speculator discussed in the micro framework of 
earlier chapters. All futures positions established at t > 0 
must be terminated at or near the time of contract maturity. 
This increase in price variance may be advantageous to the 
speculator since price differences are his key to gains (or 
losses). His gains (or losses) should be indicative of his 
ability to determine such movements. In contrast, the same 
divergency of prices at or near the date of contract maturity 
may not be so advantageous to the hedger. Large variances 
in futures prices may be a deterient to greater hedging par­
ticipation to the extent that futures trading introduces a 
new risk element (e.g., risk from undesired futures price 
movements). In essence the larger the range of prices that 
may occur, the greater the probability of some price occurring 
that is undesirable for the hedger. These hedgers 
may not be willing to accept this added risk. Equation 6.6 
alone may suggest that the live beef futures as presently 
functioning is a good speculative market, but may not be as 
desirable for hedgers. 
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Table 6.3 further reveals that even with this change in 
pricing variance, at no time within the brief history of live 
beef futures has the variance of futures prices exceeded the 
variance of fed cattle prices at either Chicago or 7 markets 
combined. The futures market for fed cattle (over the contract 
life) has been a less volatile market than the cash market in 
terms of price movements. 
With reference to Figure 6.1 the variance of is 
interpreted where those points about the trend line of the 
lower graph tend to become disperse as futures contracts 
mature. 
Futures as a forward price 
The same set of futures prices used above may also be 
evaluated in light of their ability to add to the interpreta­
tion (and derivation) of forthcoming fed cattle prices. Each 
P^(t) is derived through the aggregate effect of all decision 
as was theoretically shown through the price discovery and 
equilibrium chapter. Hence to some extent P|.(t) is the 
resultant for all present sources of market information and 
expectations. Given that P^(t) is a summary response of all 
trading information, does it provide any reliable information 
about forthcoming cash prices at maturity? In essence, what 
has been the historical relationship of futures prices (t > 0) 
to the final cash price (t=0) after product transformation is 
completed? 
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In retrospect the price difference between the fed 
cattle price (P^(t=0) at maturity and the futures price (P^ 
(t>0)) at some date prior to maturity can be calculated, i.e., 
i? 
the difference = [P^(t=0) - P^(t>0)]. The mean difference 
over the time series from January, 1966, to December, 1969, is 
calculated for each 0<t^9 in Appendix D.2. Simple regressions 
of these means against the variable t are derived in Table 6.3. 
The double-log function proved most useful primarily because 
of of its failure to Indicate autocorrelation. Equation 6.7 
indicates that those prices for distance beef futures tend to 
Mean(P - F ) = 
^ 4.235 (6.7) 
underestimate the forthcoming cash price on the average overall 
contracts (e.g., equation 6.7 is always positive). The mean 
difference showed a significant positive relationship to t>0, 
hence the more distance the futures the poorer the futures 
price is as a forward pricing indicator. 
The variances of these price differences have been 
calculated and related to the contract life in Table 6.3. 
Results expressed through equation 6.8 establishes that the 
variance of price differences is greatly increased with those 
more distance contracts. This is also indicative of the poor 
reliability of distance futures as a forward indicator. 
The brief historical movements of futures prices for 
all contracts combined (see pricing scheme in Appendix D.l) 
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Var(P^ - P^) = 1.1661 + .2330t (6.8) 
suggest that the futures price and final cash price are similar 
only in the nearer futures. Even though the represents a 
good summary of available information at some point t>0, in 
retrospect the reliability of this price as a cash price 
indicator decreases significantly the more distant the futures 
contract. 
This discussion relates to the last chapter where a 
theoretical construct suggested criteria for evaluating 
futures for forward pricing. It was required that the spread 
at least satisfy the conditions for industrial equilibrium. 
The spread must at least reflect the cost of transformation. 
In the absence of accurate measurements of transformation cost, 
the above procedure serves as an alternative test of the 
usefulness of forward pricing through futures. The cash price 
of transformed goods should at least reflect the initial input 
price plus all transforming cost. Therefore a test for the 
difference of this price and futures as calculated in equation 
6.7 serves as a proxy analysis to the last chapter. In 
essence, a test of the relationship CP^(t>0) - P^(t>0)] and 
[P^(t=0) - P^(t>0)] may be construed to give similar con­
clusions; although, the latter may be more restrictive than 
the first. 
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Price trends within each contract 
The existence of a price trend for each live beef 
futures contract as suggested In Figure 6.1 would present 
significant Implications to all traders Involved In both 
markets. Specifically, there are always those viable groups 
of traders ready to exploit any significant trend pattern 
within a contract life. An upward seasonal (or trend) Implies 
that adherence to a long position In futures would be profit­
able on the average and the reverse holds for a downward 
seasonal. If hedgers are net short and are shifting risk to 
speculators, there ought to be an upward seasonal of futures 
prices if speculators are receiving compensation for risk 
acceptance. 
Taking the complete set of deflated futures prices for 
each live beef futures contract and relating this to the 
dummy variable t (time from maturity) produced significant 
trend or seasonal results in three of the six futures 
contracts. Each of these significant relationships revealed 
a negative seasonal effect, i.e., futures prices tended to 
decrease as the contract maturity date neaied. The complete 
regression relationships are derived in Appendix D.3- After 
testing for alternative functional forms, the linear relation­
ship proved to be a satisfactory representation of any trend. 
These relationships are expressed in 6.9. 
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Feb. P (t) = 18.4740 + .l629t* 
Apr. P^(t) = 18.2860 + .l603t* 
June P^Ct) = 18.8900 + .0776t 
Aug. P^(t) = 19.6970 - .0323t 
Oct. P^(t) = 19.9450 - .0519t 
Dec. P^(t) = 19.0960 + .0871t* 
( 6 . 9 )  
The hypothetical line of Figure 6.1 is somewhat indica­
tive of the relationship for February, April and December con­
tracts. This Information suggests that on the average short 
hedgers experience advantageous futures price movements in 
these contracts. Whereas long speculators trading on the pre­
mise of rising prices experience negative returns. No season­
al effects were evident for June, August and October contracts. 
These observations must be evaluated in light of the total 
variability of each set of prices. The trend relationship 
accounted for a small portion of total price variability in 
all contracts as is shown with the small coefficient of 
determination. Hence, trends that appear advantageous to the 
short hedger may not be so when the high degree of variability 
of is considered. Likewise, what at first may appear to 
be undesirable to the long speculator may change given con­
siderations of high price variability. 
Nevertheless, the existence of any detectable trend at 
all implies that some traders can make a positive return. 
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The present Inability to empirically identify the trading 
composition of live beef futures prevents identification of 
benefits accruing to various market participants [42, p. l4]. 
Calculations in Appendix D.3 established that some 
degree of positive autocorrelation existed over the complete 
set of prices in each futures contract. Hence there may be a 
tendency toward some degree of continuity in price movements. 
A first order autoregressive scheme was sufficient to correct 
for autocorrelation. The test for autocorrelation after this 
correction is shown in Appendix D.4. In all corrected 
equations the Durbin-Watson statistic was above the D. 
W., level revealing positive autocorrelation. This implies 
that live beef futures prices within each contract does have 
some month-to-month price relationship rather than complete 
randomness. 
A test of significance for trends in equations of 
Appendix D.4 still substantiates that February, April and 
December are the only contracts with significant trends. Again 
the linear estimates appear to be a satisfactory functional 
form. One change is noted in that all trends showed negative 
seasonal movements after this correction, yet trends in June, 
August and October futures prices were still insignificant. 
Interpretation of price movements must be conditioned 
in that live beef futures is still in an infant stage of de­
velopment. Hence, the above findings of some degree of non-
randomness within the pricing structure over each contract 
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life may change significantly as new information becomes 
available. 
Last trading days 
Movements of futures and cash prices exist as a result 
of trading pressures expressed via loci TT and FF. These 
interactions over each contract produced the trends and varia­
bility of all prices. Positions established and expressed 
through FF must be terminated on or before the last trading 
days of each contract life. Any open interest not previously 
terminated must be terminated within the last 20 trading days 
of each contract as illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
It has been theoretically established that the cash price 
of transformed goods and the futures price must be equal in 
these last trading days (see chapter three). As t approaches 
zero the cash and futures are the same (e.g., llm[Pm(0) -
t-^ 0  ^
P^(0)] =0). This hypothesized relationship is tested for the 
live beef futures. 
Data for the difference at t=0 is in Appendix D.5. The 
mean, variance, and test for the difference in fed cattle 
and beef futures prices at t=0 are shown in Table 6.4. Each 
contract mean difference was either above or below zero. Yet 
testing for the hypothesis that this mean is not significantly 
different from zero revealed that such hypothesis could be 
rejected only for October futures, i.e., the mean difference 
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in October futures prices wan significantly above zero at the 
.05 level. Data supported the theoretical 11m t-^-O for the 
remaining five contracts. Futures prices In the last trading 
days of October futures during 1968 was completely out of line 
with all previous prices. Hence this unusual period tended 
to raise the mean difference for October futures above the 
significant level. Some difference would be expected due to 
trading costs, lags In Information received, lack of trading 
experience, lack of trading participation by both hedgers and 
speculators and other market Imperfections. But for five of 
the six contracts the theoretical limits were empirically 
validated. Live beef futures have been functioning properly 
in the last twenty trading days of these contracts. 
Interpretation of these findings are directly applicable 
to Figure 6.1. Within the segment denoted as Last 20 Trading 
Days, the cash and futures prices are similar. No further 
product transformation is required at this point. A set 
of equilibrium loci exist for this time similar to those 
shown in the upper graph. But all intersections of FF and TT 
should be at or near the horizontal axis where A=0 since the 
cash and futures prices come together at this time. It is 
noted that the fed cattle price and feeder steer price at t=0 
are the same, i.e., P^(t=0) = P^(t=0) since requires no 
further transformation. 
Table 6.^1. Test for price difference in the last trading days of each contract, 
H : lim[P^(t) - P-(t)] = 0 
^ t^O ^ I 
FEB^ APR JUNE AUG OCT DEC TOTAL 
MEAN + .0367 + .1783 - .0408 + .0342 + .5200 - .2092 
S.D. .5342 .6873 .4336 .5217 .5957 . 4894 
VAR. .2854 . 4724 .  1880 .2722 .3546 .2395 
n 12 12 12 12 12 12 
VAR/n .0238 .0394 .0157 .0227 .0296 .0200 
fvAR/n .1543 .1985 .1253 .1507 .  1718 
t test + .2378 + .8982 - .3256 + .2269 +3.0267^ +1.4795 
^See Appendix D.5 for data. 
^Signficant at the .05 level. 
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Contract Trading and Composition 
In the last two sections price movements were evaluated 
with reference to Figure 6.1. Although not a measurement of 
prices, the trading levels and market compositions contribute 
to the total framework. As emphasized in prior discussion, 
the lack of composition data prevents obtaining an accurate 
estimate of the interrelationship between the cash and futures 
markets. Trading levels and composition will be briefly 
discussed below. 
Trading volume and open Interest 
Appendix D.6 establishes the live beef futures rate of 
growth over the brief history of trading. In terms of volume 
of contracts traded from 1965 through 1969, live beef futures 
has been a fairly active market relative to the history of 
trading in livestock contracts. Trading levels over each 
contract within the 1965-69 period revealed that the mean 
trading levels of February, June, and December contracts 
were the largest with February contracts having the highest 
mean volume and open interest levels. Although trading parti­
cipation did vary among contracts, each did appear to have 
sufficient participation to assure some degree of liquidity 
over the contract life. This participation is essential for 
the existence of a liquid market, i.e., there must always be 
sufficient trading interest (subjective level) to assure 
continuous ease of buying and selling. 
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All futures contracts are similar in that trading levels 
begin at some point n months from maturity and increase up to 
a period prior to the maturity data after which time offsetting 
positions are taken. Trends in the volumes and open Interest 
levels have been estimates for the six live beef futures con­
tracts. Numerous functional forms were tried, but in most 
cases the exponential relationship best expressed the trading 
trends. Most contract trading levels became inactive in periods 
exceeding ten months from maturity. These levels continued to 
Increase up .to t = l. The linear, exponential, and double-log 
forms are calculated In Appendices D.7 and D.9 and the 
exponential set of equations are derived in 6.10 and 6.11. 
It is noted that a linear open Interest trend for June con­
tracts was favored over the exponential. All other contracts 
were best expressed by the exponential relationship. 
Feb. Vol(t) = 350e -.2571t 
April Vol(t) = 325e -.2727t 
June Vol(t) = 325e~' -.l820t 
Aug. Vol(t) = 3l4e "'2193t 
Oct. Vol(t) = 3l4e"'2890t 
Dec. VÔl(t) = 248e""1955t (6.10) 
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Feb. ori.(t) = 6003e"'2G24t 
April oTl . ( t )  =  4 l l 6e" '2^19 t  
June 0:1.(t) = 4l69e-'l884t See Appendix D.9 for 
-.3124t linear estimate. 
Aug. 0.1.(t) = 6634e 
Oct. oTl.Ct) = 6770e 
Dec. oTl.Ct) = 5886e"'2531t 
"'3^9Gt (6.11) 
Both series of trading level indicators (volume and open 
interest) showed some nonrandom movement, thus suggesting that 
there exist some systematic degree of participation by all 
traders combined over each contract life. A trend in trading 
levels would be expected since contracts must be purchased 
and sold within a specified period. Again it is essential that 
the classification of traders be known for a complete under­
standing and explanation of any observed trend. Past data 
does not reveal the degree to which contracted positions were 
speculative or hedges. 
The initial estimates (including those of 6.10 and 
6.11) did not give a statistically valid test of trend since 
all equations had a degree of autocorrelation. All equations 
were corrected for a first-order autocorrelation in Appendix 
D.8 and D.IO. In each case the exponential relationship was 
still chosen. Autocorrelation may indicate a lagged relation­
ship among past.dependent variables, yet it is suspected that 
much autocorrelation in volume trading is due to omissionof 
variables. 
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Market composition 
In this final section a brief discussion of the market 
composition follows. Market composition data for all contracts 
combined for the months from June, 1968, through February, 
1969, are shown in Table 6.5. This data is from unpublished 
sources and its reliability or accuracy is not validated. 
Table 6.5 is best used to emphasize the type of information 
eventually needed to quantify that theoretical framework for 
market and industrial equilibriums previously presented. 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 set forth the percentage distribution 
of open Interest according to trader classification. On the 
average larger traders accounted for a greater percent of 
short than for long positions with 59.6 and 42.7 percents, 
respectively. Large speculative positions were more prevalent 
on the long side while hedgers were the predominate large short 
traders. Larger short commitments tended to vary more than 
did the large long. Yet the variance of long speculative 
positions exceeded that of short hedgers. Finally, in both 
long and short commitments a substantial share of positions 
were not classified according to intent of trade. 
The distribution of hedge and speculative positions on 
both sides of the market is indicative of some balance in 
trading activities, i.e., this preliminary data suggest that 
this futures is an active hedging market, As new and more 
accurate data become available this observation may be 
Table 6.5. Percentage distribution of trader composition 
of total futures open contracts on the last 
trading day of the months specified^ 
DE™RlSoN 6/68 7/68 8/68 9/68 10/68 
LONG 
a. LARGE 
TRADERS 43.04 41.37 44.60 42.05 37-78 
Speculators 
long 64.21 69.57 45.46 44.66 41.92 
Hedging long 35 .79  30.43 54.54 55.34 58.08 
b. SMALL 
TRADERS 56.96 58.63 55.40 57.95 62.22 
TOTAL (a. + b.) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
SHORT 
c. LARGE 
TRADERS 69.96 70.34 64.98 67-35 60.76 
Speculators 
long 38.68 18.85 43.07 19.90 14.96 
Hedging 
short 61.32 81.15 56.93 80.10 85.04 
d. SMALL 
TRADERS 30.04 29.66 35.02 32.55 39.2 4 
TOTAL (c. +d.) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
TOTAL OPEN 
CONTRACTS 9,966 10,678 10,737 12,035 13,037 
^Unpublished data provided by the Commodity Exchange 
Authority, Chicago. 
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1 1 / 6 8  1 2 / 6 8  1 / 6 9  2 / 6 9  
4 2 . 6 1  
4 6 . 1 5  
5 3 . 8 5  
5 7 . 3 9  
100.00 
5 9 . 3 1  
16.72 
8 3 . 2 8  
4 0 . 6 9  
100.00 
1 4 , 2 5 0  
43.51 
52.12 
47.88 
56.49 
100.00 
50.02 
21.99 
78.01 
49.98 
100.00 
15,303 
4 0 . 5 7  
54.89 
45.11 
59.43 
100.00 
47.07 
21.94 
78.06 
52.93 
100.00 
18,354 
4 9 . 1 4  
71.63 
28.17 
50.86 
100.00 
4 6 . 3 7  
29.06 
70.94 
53.63 
100.00 
18,708 
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Table 6.6. Mean and standard deviation of futures trading 
composition 
Trader 
Large Long Traders^ 
Large Short Traders^ 
Long Speculators^ 
Short Hedgers^ 
Mean Standard Deviation 
42.74% 3.098% 
5 9 . 5 7 %  9 . 5 9 8 %  
54.53% 11.369% 
74.98% 9.885% 
^Expressed as a percentage of open contracts. 
^Expressed as a percentage of open contracts by long large 
traders. 
^Expressed as a percentage of open contracts by short large 
traders. 
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invalidated. One continual problem with such data has been 
the interpretation of what a hedge position is by those 
establishing the commitment. 
Throughout past chapters the theory relating cash and 
futures markets exist given the premise that each contract 
trading composition was identified. The relationships among 
Tjj (short hedgers), (long hedgers), and (net speculative) 
were essential to price discovery, market equilibrium, and 
industrial equilibrium. Hence once the Information similar 
in format to that of Table 6.5 is known, much of the previous 
theory could be made operational. The theoretical format has 
been established, but the structural parameters were not 
estimated. 
Some preliminary attempts to relate this short interval 
of data to futures prices have been completed in Appendix D.ll. 
Pour functional forms relating to long speculative and 
short hedging positions were completed. In each case futures 
prices were significantly related to the long speculative 
market but not to the short hedging market. This may partially 
be representative of the relative degree of sensitivity to 
price movement between speculators and hedgers. Again such 
interpretations of data must not be weighted heavily due to 
the lack of information and questionable accuracy. 
Within the confounds of this chapter attempts have been 
made to illustrate how and where the futures theory relates 
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directly to observed pricing and trading phenomena. Yet no 
attempt to completely quantify (make operational) this 
theoretical system was intended. Although, the fact that 
nonrandom activities do exist has added some information 
that may be useable in procedures for ultimately specifying 
the theoretical system. Figure 6.1 has provided a graphical 
summary of the types of activities occurring in a futures 
market. The theoretical concepts illustrated in Figure 6.1 
could be made operational once all information is recorded in 
sufficient detail. One approach would be to estimate the 
relationships of equilibrium via structural equations for TT 
and PP. Some function for deriving expectations must be 
included. In essence, a system of simultaneous equations could 
be derived for each period t. Such a system may have variable 
parameters over a futures contract life (as t varies). 
A simultaneous equation system would provide results for 
interpreting the responses of both the cash and futures 
prices to changes within either market. The primary intent 
of this method would be to explain vargarities of both 
markets. Most existing cash market models such as a beef 
sector model have not included the effects of futures trading. 
The concept of futures trading has become an integral part of 
market planning for many commodities, hence the effect of 
futures trading should be included in many existing forecasting 
and explanatory models. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The theory of futures trading in commodities not yet 
marketable has been lacking in substance and content as was 
emphasized in the introduction. A basic understanding of the 
organization and operation of such markets needed more theo­
retical scrutiny. Obtaining information on the past perform­
ance and characteristics of trading in such commodities was 
essential. Understanding the prevailing market structure as 
it relates to futures trading was necessary for the development 
of a theoretical construct representative of such markets. 
Within the realm of the above statements, this theoretical 
presentation has filled some missing gaps in the existing 
economic theory of trading in commodities that are in some 
stage of product transformation. Specifically, tradings in 
live beef futures have been evaluated. 
The subject content of futures trading was such that a 
logical division in the nature of the theoretical framework 
was immediately evident. At one extreme there exist the 
individual decision maker faced with a new marketing tool 
(e.g., the futures market) at his disposal. At the other 
extreme, there exist a new market (futures market) interacting 
with an established market to perform some aggregate economic 
function. The concept of "micro" denoted a theoretical 
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framework for the utilization of this marketing tool. Whereas, 
"macro" denoted the theoretical framework for analyzing and 
interpreting the relationship between these two inseparable 
markets (e.g., the cash and futures markets for live beef). 
Although live beef futures has been the focal point, much of 
the derived theory is directly applicable to trading activities 
for other commodities. Hence much of the discussion was 
intended to provide a jnore inclusive theoretical framework 
indicative of the structure of the many different futures 
contracts. 
Micro Synopsis 
A set of price expectations,a probability distribution 
for thes.i prices and a preference function for risk aversion 
have provic.ed the essential elements for the generalized 
futures model developed in the micro framework. Within this 
framework optimal futures and cash market commitments were 
established for producers and marketing agencies. For the 
primary producer buying feeder cattle, the optimal cash 
market position was derived simultaneously with the optimal 
futures commitment. Processors, dealers, and other marketing 
agencies can utilize futures as hedges against contracted or 
anticipated purchases of live animals. The ratio of futures 
to cash position could be a) less than one (less than 100 
percent hedging), b) equal to one (100 percent hedging), or 
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c) greater than one (hedging and speculation). In addition, 
it was shown that cash market participants can be pure 
speculators when their expectations warrant such commitments. 
Within the range of these commitments it was established 
that rigid hedging policies were not necessarily consistent 
with optimization. Implementing 100 percent hedging policy 
was shown to yield lower expected incomes and higher risk in 
many situations. Lack of necessary capital investments may 
result in loss of utility. Specifically, inadequate trans­
formation services prevent obtaining those optimal cash and 
futures positions as dictated by the theory. Through the 
procedures of the micro framework some attempt has been 
completed to supplement the existing economic theory of 
uncertainty as it relates to the utilization of futures 
markets as a decision tool. Although some additions to 
existing theory have been made, there are further consider­
ations that were not explored. The optimal level of x was 
established, yet x may take many different forms. Feeder 
cattle can be purchased at many weight ranges each requiring 
different transformation periods. Optimal timing of futures 
commitments was ignored. For example, an optimal futures 
commitment was derived; yet for beef futures there exist six 
possible contracts which could be used. Hence the existing 
micro theory needs modification to compensate for the varying 
nature of both inputs and contracts. Further no attempt to 
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empirically utilize the theoi-y was Intended. But au more 
information about the individual's decision making activities 
is available, efforts to partially quantify such theory may 
be useful. 
Costs of Inputs were assumed given for the market parti­
cipants who have cash positions Inperlod t. Without instan­
taneous product transformation, cost may be uncertain. The 
theory of long hedging could have been applied directly to 
the uncertainties of input prices for the participants making 
cash market sales commitments (e.g., the beef feeder). Hedges 
in both the Input and output markets require two distinct 
futures markets. The processor (for example) can hedge 
Inputs through live beef futures, yet outputs must be hedged 
through a futures market for beef carcasses. A beef feeder 
who completely hedges both his Inputs and outputs and has 
expectations of zero gain or loss in the futures market could 
be compared to a feedlot operator feeding cattle on contract. 
Both sell a service at a fixed price. Both give up the possi­
bility of higher Income to avoid risk. 
The theory was largely limited to discussion of decision 
making in the cash and futures markets. However, a decision 
maker could establish many of the hedging positions through 
forward contracting outside of an organized market. A 
producer could sell forward directly to a buyer, thus establish­
ing both the selling and buying prices between two decision 
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makers. If both futures markets and forward contracting are 
feasible, then a firm must decide which alternative to utilize. 
Most futures markets are characterized by ease of transactions, 
high liquidity, and security [7]. Forward contracting may not 
provide these essential elements for successful hedging; hence 
direct forward commitments may introduce new risks through an 
effort to minimize price risks. On the other hand, through 
forward contracting the decision makers can specify terms 
most advantageous to the two participating parties; but 
futures must be traded in specified and rigidly enforced con­
tracts. Such futures contracts are designed to meet a broad 
spectrum of trading needs; hence it may not be the optimal 
contract for any one decision maker. The micro framework has 
not provided a formal decision criteria for evaluating these 
two hedging alternatives. The similarities and differences of 
the two have been discussed but some extreme assumptions would 
be required to compare them in the model presented [115]. 
The model extended considerably the analysis of the rela­
tion between market output decisions and futures positions. 
Hedging and speculation were given precise meanings and 
economically related to the behavior of both buyers and sellers 
of a commodity traded on a futures market. The implications 
of the micro model for aggregate market determination of price, 
output, and profits of buyers and sellers followed directly 
from this framework. 
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Macro Synopsis 
InterpretLtion of the futures market and its rela­
tionship to commodities in the process of transformation 
(e.g., commodities that are not yet marketable) necessitated 
the use of both simple mathematical concepts and geometry. 
Through the use of these elementary tools a format was estab­
lished for presenting a theory which showed the Intrarelatlon-
ship and interrelationship between futures trading and the 
cash market at the aggregate level. Specifically, the equili­
brium relationships were shown, a method for explaining price 
discovery was explored, and finally the implications and 
effects from changes within the system were discussed. 
At the outset it was shown that three basic equilibrium 
components must be satisfied if a general macro (used in the 
sense of two aggre&aLe markets) model was to be specified. 
Specifically, the input transformation market must be in 
equilibrium. Net long and net short futures commitments must 
always be equal. Finally, the theory of transformation as 
applied to the problem via transformation services must be 
reflected in the difference between the futures price and the 
initial input price. Similarities among all commodities 
traded on the futures exchange exist, but one unique difference 
between storable and nonstorables was the fact that futures 
trading in nonstorables cannot extend beyond the date of 
maturity for the commodity. Whereas, the theory of storage 
I8l 
and futures trading was pertinent to storable goods after 
commodity maturity. In essence the equilibrium theory was 
developed for commodities that were not yet marketable. 
Emphasis was not on the difference in storable versus non-
storable, rather emphasis was on how to specify a more general 
theory that may be indicative to many situations. 
Implicit functional forms were postulated for each rela­
tionship. Through'these postulates it was shown that the 
interaction between the input-transformation equilibrium and 
the futures market equilibrium was sufficient for price 
discovery in both the cash and futures markets. The equilib­
rium price coordinates (market equilibrim) was geometrically 
derived at that point of intersection between futures and 
cash market equilibrium locus. Therefore, changes within 
either implicit functional form was sufficient for explaining 
price movements. Only a few of the shifts resulting in new 
prices were considered; nevertheless, the methodology was 
directly applicable to any additional components that may 
be postulated. 
Market equilibrium was sufficient for explaining price 
discovery, yet it was not sufficient for explaining additional 
entries and exits within the futures market. The concept of 
industrial equilibrium must be considered. Within the present 
construct. Industrial equilibrium exist with the situation 
where the futures-cash price spread just reflected the cost 
182 
of transformation through a defined .«elationship. Given a 
market equilibrium with a futures- cash price spread either 
above or below that spread satisfying the transformation 
relationship, then the incentive for entry or exit is present. 
Finally at that point where market equilibrium and the trans­
formation relationship coincide,an industrial equilibrium 
point was established. Through this procedure a method for 
theoretically looking at the prevailing market structure as 
it relates to the live beef futures market .was presented. 
Through theoretical abstraction the futures market for 
live beef and the cash markets have been related. Yet many 
problems arise with such procedures. Foremost among these 
was the problem of simplicity versus realism. Any effort to 
aggregate and simplify causes reduction in realism. 
Yet the complexities of most economic systems are such that 
in the absence of simplification few conclusions can be derived. 
Of example, the aggregate transformation function was assumed 
to be linear homogeneous. Initial inputs and transformation 
services were the only components of the function. Lack of 
realism was increased since both the function and its com­
ponents were aggregated. Yet such simplifications were neces­
sary for deriving the desired framework. 
A series of propositions were discussed, each relating to 
some aspect of the theoretical framework developed. Inter­
pretations of these propositions established the 
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structural relationship that must theoretically exist for a 
particular pricing response to occur. The basic 
limitation of such procedures, and in fact comparative statics 
in general, is that such price response are considered with 
numerous other factors held fixed. Hence each proposition 
gave insights into the pricing mechanism through the futures-
cash relationship, yet applicability beyond a comparative 
static framework was limited. 
The complete macro framework was derived without directly 
mentioning the role of consumption. Consumer behavior is a 
vital link in the market place and any changes in such behav­
iors will affect all prices and commitments. At the time 
input decisions are made, the final demand for the transformed 
product is unknown. This is primarily why price uncertainties 
exist and why futures trading serves an economic function. 
Consumer behavior is implicit to both the "micro" and "macro" 
models. Price expectations reflect consumer behavior. Expec­
tations for most situations are unobserved variables, yet 
many expectationàlfunctions may be specified. With the 
development of a more sophisiticated model it may be desir­
able to specify some expectational relationship, thus showing 
the direct influence of consumer behavior. The next synopsis 
will elaborate on this point. 
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Empirical Synopsis 
The final chapter was Intended to basically provide a 
review of existing trading activities for live beef futures 
and to suggest what information is needed to further quantify 
the theoretical framework. The complete framework was summar­
ized through Figure 6.1 where prices were derived and then 
related to the total contract life. Specifically, at each 
period t>0 the interaction of all elements of the model gave 
equilibrium prices. Empirical evidence established that some 
nonrandom movements of these prices existed. There exists a 
trend in the variability of prices as contracts mature. Some 
contracts showed a significant negative trend in futures 
prices. In many relationships a first order autocorrelation 
was evident. Each of these observations suggest some nonran-
domness in futures prices over the contract life. 
Many variables were tested for their influence on trad­
ing activities. Present cash prices of transformed goods 
were significant In explaining movements in the price spread. 
The influence of consumer behavior is reflected through this 
variable. This further suggests that expectations about 
forthcoming cash prices are Influenced by present final 
product prices and hence the present consumers' demand. There­
fore any expectation model should include lagged variables 
representative of consumer behavior. 
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The roZe of market trading composition was emphasized 
throughout the analysis. Yet lack of data prevented adequate 
treatment of this factor. The format for needed data has 
been specified and appropriate suggestions made. 
In the final analysis it follows that tradings in live 
beef futures like that of all commodities with corresponding 
futures contracts can be explained through a theoretical model 
once the appropriate postulates are made. Useful observations 
and insights can be gained from such procedures. Yet such 
models often ignore practical problems that may in fact negate 
theoretical conclusions. For example, the specification of 
the contract for live beef futures has not been discussed. 
The present theory assumes a satisfactory specification for 
all interested participants. Any deviation from this assump­
tion would greatly alter all conclusions. Assumptions regard­
ing the flow of informatic.'i and the distribution of knowledge 
are sometimes unrealistic. For example, a lack of understand­
ing of the economic usefulness of futures markets often negates 
what theory would suggest as a prevailing situation. 
As trading in live beef futures continues and as informa­
tion sources are increased, it may be desirable to apply the 
present framework for price discovery, forecasting, and policy 
decisions. The methodology has been completed and preliminary 
empirical suggestions made. 
186 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Allen, R. G. D. Mathematical economics. 2nd ed. New York, 
New York, Macmillan Company. 1966. 
2. Bakken, Henry H. Adaptation of future trading to live 
cattle. Unpublished mimeographed paper presented at; study 
conference on live cattle futures trading, Chicago Mer­
cantile Exchange, Chicago, Illinois, Sept. 1966. Madison, 
Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin, Department of Agricul­
ture. ca. 1966. 
3. Balighj, Helmy H. and Richartz, Leon E. Vertical market 
structures. Boston, Massachusetts, Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 
1967. 
4. Barten, A, P. Estimating demand equations. Econometrica 
36: 213-251. 1968. 
5. Basmann, R. L. A generalized classical method of linear 
estimation of coefficients in a structural equation. 
Econometrica 25: 77-83. 1957-
6. Bentz, R. P. Speculation in basis. 8th Agricultural 
industries Forum. Chicago, Illinois, Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. 1966. 
7. Blau, Gerda. Some aspects of the theory of futures trad­
ing. Review of Economics Studies 7: 1-30. 1944-45. 
8. Breimyer, Harold P. Demand and prices for meat factors 
influencing their historical development. United States 
Department of Agricultural Technical Bulletin 1253. 1961 
9. Brennan, M. J. The supply of storage. American Economic 
Review 48: 50-72. 1958. 
10. Brown, William G. and Heady, Earl. Economic instability 
and choices involving income and risk in livestock and 
poultry production. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station 
Research Bulletin 431. 1955. 
11. Carpenter, G. Alvin. Future trading in beef cattle. 
Associate Giannini Foundation University of California 48: 
10-11, 28-29. 1965. 
187 
12. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Yearbooks 1967. Chicago, 
Illinois J Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 1967. 
13. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Yearbook 1 9 6 8 .  Chicago, 
Illinois, Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 1 9 6 8 .  
14. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Yearbook I969. Chicago, 
Illinois, Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 1969. 
15. Chu, Keng. Principles of Econometrics. Scranton, 
Pennsylvania, International Textbook Company. I968. 
1 6 .  Clarkson, G. P. and Simon, N. A. Stimulation of econ­
omic systems. American Economic Review 50: 920-932. 
i960. 
1 7 .  Cootner, Paul H. Common elements in futures markets for 
commodities and bonds. American Economic Review 51: 
173-183. 1961. 
1 8 .  Cootner, Paul H. The random character of stock market 
prices. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. 1964. 
1 9 .  Cootner, Paul H. Returns to speculators: Telser versus 
Keynes. Journal of Political Economy 68: 396-404. I960. 
20. Craddock, William Joh. Autocorrelated errors in single 
equation least squares regression. The University of 
Manitoba Agriculture and Home Economics Department 
Technical Journal No. 9- 1968. 
21. Craddock, William John. The effect of grain price on the 
profitability of livestock production - an econometric 
simulation. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Ames, Iowa, 
Library, Iowa State University of Science and Technology. 
1 9 6 6 .  
22. Crom, Richard J. Marketing aids for the cattle feeder. 
U.S. Department of Agricultural Marketing Service Research 
Report 819. 1969. 
2 3 .  Crom, Richard J. and Maki, Wilbur R. Adjusting dynamic 
models to improve their predictive ability. Journal of 
Farm Economics 47: 963-972. I965. 
24. Crom, Richard J. and Maki, Wilbur R. A dynamic model of 
a simulated livestock-meat economy. Agricultural Economic 
Research 17: 73-83. I965. 
188 
25. Daniels, H. E. Autocorrelation between first differences 
of mid ranges. Econometrica 34: 215-219. 1966. 
26. Darcovichj William and Heady, Earl 0. Application of 
expectation models to livestock and crop prices and 
products. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research 
Bulletin 438. 1956. 
27. Dewey, Donald. Modern capital theory. New York, New York, 
Columbia University Press. 1965-
2 8 .  Doll, John P., Rhodes, James V. and West, Jerry G. 
Economics of agricultural production markets and policy. 
Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1968. 
2 9 .  Dow, J. R. Theoretical account of the futures market. 
Review of Economic Studies 7: 185-195. 1940. 
3 0 .  Draper, N. R. and Smith, H. Applied regression analysis. 
New York, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1968. 
3 1 .  Einzig, Paul. A dynamic theory of forward exchange. New 
York, New York, Macmillan Company. I 9 6 I .  
3 2 .  Elder, William A. Risk uncertainty and futures trading 
implication for hedging decisions of beef cattle feeders. 
St. Paul, Minnesota, Department of Agriculture Economics, 
University of Minnesota. 1969. 
33. Elrich, R. L. Cash futures price relationship for live 
beef futures. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
51: 26-40. 1969. 
34. Elrich, R. L. Futures trading direct marketing and effi­
ciency of the cattle marketing system. University of 
Wyoming Agricultural Experiment Station Research Journal 
9. 1967. 
35. Elrich, R. L. The impact of government programs on wheat 
futures markets. Pood Research Institute Studies 6: 
jll-327. 1966. 
3 6 .  Ensminger, M. E. Beef cattle science. Danville, Illinois, 
The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc. I 9 6 8 .  
37. Farrell, M. J. Profitable speculation. Economica 33 : 
183-193. 1966. 
189 
38. FarrlsJ John H. Livestock futures, a marketing tool for 
producers. Michigan State University Department of 
Agricultural Economics Research Report 89. 1968. 
39. Peldstein, M. S. On the measurement ofrisk aversion. 
Southern Economic Journal 35: 58-69. 1968. 
40. Peldstein, M. S. Uncertainty and forward exchange 
speculation. Review of Economics and Statistics 50: 
182-192. 1968. 
41. Ferguson, C. E. Microeconomic theory. Homewood, Illinois, 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1966. 
42. Food Research Institute Studies. Proceedings of a sym­
posium on price effects of speculation in organized 
commodity markets: Supplement to Volume 7, 1967. 
Stanford, California, Author. 1967. 
43. Prevert, Peter. A theoretical model of the forward exchange. 
International Economic Review 3: 153-167, 307-326. 1967. 
44. Putrell, Gene and Skadberg, J. N. The futures market in 
live beef cattle. Iowa State University of Science and 
Technology Cooperative Extension Research Bulletin M-1021. 
1966. 
45. Gold, Gerald. Modern commodity future trading. New York, 
New York, Commodity Research Bureau, Inc. I96I. 
46. Gorden, William. The stock mai'ket indicators. Palisades 
Park, New Jersey, Investor's Press, Inc. 1968. 
47. Gray, Roger W. The attack upon the potato futures market 
in United States. Food Research Institute Studies 4: 
99-121. 1964. 
48. Gray, Roger W. The characteristic bias in some thin 
futures markets. Food Research Institute Studies 1: 
296-312. i960. 
49. Gray, Roger W. The search for a risk premium. Journal of 
Political Economy 69: 250-260. 1961. 
50. Gray, Roger W. Seasonal pattern of wheat futures price 
under the loan program. Food Research Institute Studies 
3 :  2 3 - 3 4 .  1962. 
190 
Gray, Roger W. The relationship among three futures 
markets. Food Research Institute Studies 2: 21-32. 196].. 
Green, W. A. J. Uncertainty and the expectations hypo­
thesis. Review of Economic Studies 3^: 387-398. 1967. 
Harris, Everette B. Futures for the cattleman — from 
chance to choice. Unpublished paper presented at Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, Chicago, Illinois, Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. 1967. 
Hart, A. G. Risk, uncertainty, and the unprofltablllty of 
compounding probabilities. In Lange, Mclntyre, and Yntena. 
P., eds. Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econo­
metrics. Pp. 110-118. Chicago, Illinois University of 
Chicago Press. 1942. 
Hawtrey, R. G. Theory of the forward market. Review of 
Economic Studies J: 202-205- 19^0. 
Heady, Earl, Hildreth, R. J. and Dean, Gerald W. 
Uncertainty, expectation and Investment decisions for a 
sample of Central Iowa farmers. Iowa State University of 
Science and Technology Agricultural Experiment Station 
Research Bulletin 447. 1957. 
Heifner, Richard G. The gains from basing grain storage 
decisions on cash-futures spreads. Journal of Farm 
Economics 48: l490-l495. 1966. 
Henderson, James and Quandt, Richard. Mlcroeconomlc 
theory - a mathematical approach. New York, New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1958. 
Hieronymus, T. A. New concepts in futures trading, 
Chicago Mercanltle Exchange Livestock and Meat Futures 
Study Conference. Chicago, Illinois, Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. 1966. 
Hieronymus, T. A. Uses of grain futures markets in the 
farm business. University of Illinois Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin 6 9 6 .  1 9 6 3 .  
Hoffman, G. Wright. Future trading. Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press. 1932. 
Hoffman, G. Wright. Future trading upon commodity markets 
In the U.S. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 1932. 
64 
65 
66 
67 
6 8  
69, 
70, 
71. 
72. 
,3. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
191 
Hoffman J G. Wright. Grain prices and the futures market. 
U.S. Department of Agricultural Technical Bulletin 747. 
1941. 
Horowitz, J. The price-ouster under risk. Western 
Economics Journal 7: 129-136. 1969. 
Houthakker, H. S. Can speculators forecast prices? Review 
of Economics 39: 143-151. 1957. 
Houthakker, H. S. The scope and limits of futures trad­
ing. In Baran, Scitewsky, and Shaw, Edward, eds. The 
Allocation of Economic Resources. Pp. 134-159. Stanford, 
California, Stanford University Press. 1959. 
Irwin, Harold S. Evaluation of futures trading. Madison, 
Wisconsin, Mimir Publishers, Inc. 1954. 
Irwin, Harold S. Risk assumptions in trading on exchanges. 
American Economic Review 27: 267-278. 1937. 
Johnston, J. Econometric methods. New York, New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1963. 
Johnson, L. L. Price instability, hedging and tiade 
volume in the coffee market. Journal of Political 
Economy 45: 319-321. 1957. 
Johnson, L. L. The theory of hedging and speculation in 
commodity futures. Review of Economic Studies 27: 139-
151. I960. 
Jones, Claude L. Theory of hedging on the beef futures 
market. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 50: 
1760-66. 1968. 
Kaldor, N. Speculation and economic stability. Review 
of Economic Studies 7: 1-27. 1939. 
Kaldor, N. Theory of the forward markets. Review of 
Economic Studies J: 197. 1940. 
Keltner, Chester W. How to make money in commodities. 
Kansas City, iviissouri, Keltner Statistical Service. I960. 
Kirtley, M. G. Users of livestock futures market. Univer­
sity of Illinois Agricultural Economic Review Report 94. 
1968. 
192 
Koopmann, Tjalllng C. Three essays on the state of econ­
omic science. New York, New York, McGraw-Hill Company. 
Inc. 1957. 
Kuenner, Robert E. The theory of general economic 
equilibrium. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press. 1963. 
Langemeier, L. and Thompson, R. G. Demand, supply, and 
price relationships for the beef sector, post World War 
II period. Journal of Farm Economics 49: 169-I83. 1967. 
Larson, Arnold B. Estimation of hedging and speculation 
position in futures markets. Pood Research Institute 
Studies 2: 203-212. I96I. 
Larson, Arnold B. Measurement of a random process in 
future prices. Food Research Institute Studies 1: 
313-324. 1960. 
Lawrence, Michael. Playboy plays the commodities market. 
Playboy Magazine 14: 117-130. 1967. 
Logan, Samuel H. A conceptual framework for analyzing 
economics of vertical integration. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 51: 834-848. 1969. 
Logan, Samuel H. and Bullock, Bruce J. Speculation in 
commodity futures: an application of statistical decision 
theory. Unpublished paper presented for clearance to the 
Agricultural Economic Research, U.S. Department of Agri­
culture, Washington D. C. January, 1970. 
McKinnon, Ronald. Futures market, buffer stocks, and in­
come stability for primary producers. Journal of Politi­
cal Economics 75: 844-861. 1967. 
Maki, Wilbur R. and Crom, Richard. Evaluation of alterna­
tive market organizations in a simulated livestock-meat 
economy. Iowa State University of Science and Technology 
Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station Research 
Bulletin 541. 1966. 
Mills, E. S. Uncertainty and price theory. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 73: II6-I3O. 1959. 
Nadiri, M. I. and Rasen, S. Interrelated factor demand 
functions. The American Economic Review 59: 457-471. 
1969. 
193 
89. Nelson, R. R. Uncertainty, prediction and competitive 
equilibrium. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75: 
4 1 - 6 2 .  1 9 6 1 .  
90. Officer, R. R. and Anderson, J. R. Risk, uncertainty 
and farm management decisions. Review of Marketing and 
Agricultural Economics 36: 3-19. 1968. 
9 1 .  Oi, W. V. The desirability of price instability under 
perfect competition. ' Econometrica 29: 58-64. I 9 6 1 .  
9 2 .  Oi, W. V. Rejoinder. Econometrica 21: 248. 1963-
93. Oppenheimer, Col. H. L. How to analyze live beef futures 
price movement. In Jiler, Harry, ed. 1965 Commodity Year­
book. Pp. 19-29. New York, New York, Commodity Research 
Bureau, Inc. I 9 6 5 .  
94. Orcutt, G. H, Simulation of economic systems. American 
Economic Review 5O: 893-907. 1 9 6 O .  
95. Parker, George B. Price making influence in the Chicago 
cattle futures market. In Jiler, Harry, ed. 1969 
Commodity Yearbook. Pp. 25-34. New York, New York, 
Commodity,Research Bureau, Inc. 1969. 
9 6 .  Paul, Allen B. and Wesson, William. Pricing feedlot 
services through cattle futures. Agricultural Economics 
Research 19: 33-45* 1967. 
97. Paul, Allen P. arid Wesson, William. Short-run supply of 
services — the case'of soybean processing. Journal of 
•Farm Economics 48: 935-951.- 1966. 
9 8 .  Phillips, John. An economic evaluation of contract 
marketing. Review of Marketing and Agriculture 3 6 :  
1 5 5 - 1 6 4 .  1 9 6 9 .  
99. Poole, W. Speculative prices as random walk. The South­
ern Economic Jo-rnal 33: 468-478. 1 9 6 7 .  
100. Powers, M. J. Effects of contract provisions on the 
success of futures cpntract. Journal of Farm Economics 
49: 228. 1967. 
101. Preston, M. H. and Yamey, B. S. Inter-temporal price 
relationships with forward markets. Economica 27 : 
355-367. i960. 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
194 
Radner, R. Competitive equilibrium under uncertainty. 
Econometrica 36: 31-58. 1968. 
Roy, A. D. Safety first and the holding of assets. 
Econometrica 20: 431-449. 1952. 
Saltzman, S. An econometric model of a firm. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 49: 332-342. 1967. 
Sisam, Charles H. and Atchison, William. Analytic geometry 
3rd ed. New York, New York, Henry Holt and Company. 19 55. 
Skadberg, Marvin and Putrell, Gene. An economic appraisal 
of future trading in livestock. Journal of Farm Economics 
48: 1485-1489. 1966. 
Stein, Jerome. The simultaneous determination of spot and 
future prices. American Economic Review 51: 1012-1025. 
1961. 
Steward, B. An analysis of speculative trading in grain 
futures. U.S. Department of Agricultural Technical 
Bulletin 1001. 1949. 
Suits', D. B. Forecasting and analysis with an econome­
tric model. .American Economic Review 52: 104-132. 1962. 
Summers, R. A. A peek at the trade-off relationship 
between expected return and risk. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 8 I :  437-456. 1 9 6 7 .  
Swanson, E. R. Sources of profits and decision making in 
cattle feeding. Journal of Farm Economics 4i: 640-
644. 1959. 
Telser, Lester. Future trading and the storage of cotton 
and wheat. Journal of Political Economy 65: 223-255-
1958. 
Telser, Lester. A theory of speculation relating profita­
bility and stability. Review of Economics and Statistics 
41: 295-302. 1959. 
Telser, Lester. Returns to speculators: Telser versus 
Keynes. Journal of Political Economics 68: 404. I960. 
Telser, Lestei-. Safety first and hedging. Review of 
Economic Studies 23 : I-I6. 1955-56. 
195 
116. Telser, Lester. The supply of stocks: cotton and 
wheat. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Chicago, Illinois, 
Library, University of Chicago. 1956. 
117. Tisdell, Clement Allan. The theory of price uncertainty, 
production, and profits. Princeton, New Jersey, Prince­
ton University Press. 1968. 
1 1 8 .  Tisdell, Clement Allan. Uncertainty, instability, 
expected profit. Econometrica 31: 243-247. 1963. 
1 1 9 .  Tobin, James. Liquidity preference as behavior toward 
risk. Review of Economic Studies 6j: 65-86. 1958. 
120. Turner, Michael S. An evaluation of future trading in 
beef cattle. Western Livestock Outlook Conference. 
Los Angeles, California, July 1965. 
121. Upchurch, M. L. Margins speculation and prices in grains 
futures markets. Washington, D.C., Economic Research 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. I967. 
122. United States Agricultural Marketing Service. Livestock 
and meat statistics, 1968. U.S. Department of Agricul­
tural Statistical Bulletin 333. 1969. 
1 2 3 .  Vance, L. L. Grain market forces in the light of 
inverse carrying charges. Journal of Farm Economics 
18: 1036-1946. 
124. Walder, Stanley C. Analysis and use of cattle futures 
contracts. Unpublished paper presented at Cattle Feeders 
Seminar, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
February 1967. Stillwater, Oklahoma, Oklahoma State 
University. 1967. 
125. Wallis, Kenneth F. Some recent developments in applied 
econometrics. Journal of Economic Literature 7: 
771-796. 1969. 
1 2 6 .  Weymor, F. Helmut. The dynamics of the world cocoa 
market. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. 1 9 6 8 .  
127. Weymor, F. Helmut. The supply of storage revisited. 
American Economic Review 5 6 :  1226-1234. 1 9 6 6 .  
1 2 8 .  Wilson, W. A. and Tracey, J, I. Analytic geometry. 
3rd ed. Boston, Massachusetts, D. C. Heath and Company 
1949. 
196 
129. Working, Holbrook. Futures markets under renewed 
attack. Food Research Institute Studies 4: 13-24. 1963. 
130. Working, Holbrook. Futures trading and hedging. Ameri­
can Economic Review 43: 314-343. 1953. 
131. Working, Holbrook. Hedging reconsidered. Journal of 
Farm Economics 35: 544-571. 1953-
132. Working, Holbrook. New concepts concerning futures mar­
kets and prices. American Economic Review 52: 431-59. 
1962. 
133. Working, Holbrook. New ideals and methods for price 
research. Journal of Farm Economics 38: 1427-1436. 
1956. 
13^. Working, Holbrook, Price effects on futures trading. 
Food Research Institute Studies 1: 3-31. I96O. 
135. Working, Holbrook. Quotation on commodity futures as 
price forecasts. Econometrica 10: 39-52. 1942. 
136. Working, Holbrook. Speculations on hedging markets. 
Food Research Institute Studies 1: 185-220. I960. 
137. Working, Holbrook. A theory of anticipating prices. 
American Economic Review Proceedings 48: 188-199. 
1958. 
138. Working, Holbrook. The theory of price storage. 
American Economic Review 39: 1245-1262. 1949. 
139. Working, Holbrook. Theory of the inverse carrying 
charge in futures market. Journal of Farm Economics 
30: 1-28. 1948. 
140. Working, Holbrook. Whose markets? Evidence on some 
aspects of futures trading. Journal of Marketing 19 : 
1-11. 1954. 
141. Yamey, B. S. An investigation of hedging on organized 
produce exchange. Manchester School of Economics and 
Social Studies 19: 305-319. 1951. 
197 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The author wishes to express appreciation and gratitude 
to Dr. Lehman B. Fletcher for his continual guidance, 
suggestions, and encouragement during the course of these 
graduate studies. Dr. J. Marvin Skadberg and other committee 
members have also provided invaluable suggestions for which 
the author expresses sincere appreciation. Gratitude is 
expressed to the U.S.D.A. for their financial assistance 
without which this research would have been impossible. 
The author wishes to acknowledge a special note of 
gratitude to his wife, Geraldine, for her continual moral and 
physical support during this period of difficult but very 
enjoyable part of our lives. 
198 
APPENDIX A. SIMPLIFICATION AND PLOTTING OF ISO-VARIANCES 
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The iso-varlance curve follows from the general form of 
an analytic geometry equation such as shown in (1). 
(1) Ax^ + BxXp + CXp^ + Dx + EXp + G = 0 
The general equation can then be shown to yield one form of 
a conic section, i.e., any plane section of a right circular 
cone is an ellipse, parabala, hyperbola, or a limiting form 
of one of these curves. In fact the iso-variance function 
utilized throughout the text must be shown to be an ellipse. 
The above general form can be expressed as the specific 
risk function of equation 2.5 and 2.5 in the text, hence 
giving (2). 
(2) OP x^ - 2pG OP X XP + OP XP = Var (TT) 
where 
A = cr^p= \Var[P(t~n) - P(t)] = Var[P(t-n) | P(t)], 
B  =  - 2  
C = Op = Var[P(t-n) - F(t)] = Var[P(t-n) | P(t)], 
D = E = 0, 
G = - Var (IT). 
Prior to reducing equation (2) to the standard form 
(removing the x Xp term) it is desirable to determine the 
2 type of conic section. If this section is such that B 
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4AC<0 then it forms an ellipse [128, p. 132]. Taking the 
definition from (2) it follows that the above restriction 
exists as long as the correction between cash and futures 
is not perfect. This follows in (3). 
( 3 )  _  ^,2 ,2 
then 
p2 <1. 
The objective now is to solve (2) for x and x^. This 
can be done if the cross product term is removed. The process 
of rotationof the axes effects the removal of the x Xp term 
from the equation of the second degree if the proper angle 
is chosen. Using the rotation formulas of (4) and (5) and 
the substituting into(2) the coefficients for the cross pro­
duct x' X P can be determined as in (6). 
(4) X = x' cos 0 - x'p sin 0 
(5) Xp = x' sin 0 + x'p cos 0 
(6) B' = -A sin 20 + B cos 20 + C sin 20 
The X' x'p term will vanish if B' = 0. Then (7) follows 
directly. 
(7) tan 20 = sin 20 2pa 
cos 20 = —g—E— 2 
- Op 
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Cos 20 can be determined directly by the use of the formula 
2 2 2 
a =3 + Y as in Figure A.l since cos 20 = y/a. 
a y/ 
3 = 
y/20 
Y= (Cp -Op) 
Figure A.l 
Solving for oi, the cos 2 8 relationship is expressed as in (8) 
(8) cos 20= 
/ 
['P - °p3 Y 
[Op]^ + + 2a^o^ [2p^ - 1] 
a 
Both cos and sin must be known for solutions to (4) and 
(5) to be determined. Hence using the half-angle formulas 
of trigonometry, these angles can be derived. 
(9) ;in 0 3 = /1 - cos 20 = 
y (10) cos 0=/ 1 + cos 20 = 
["P - "p] 
2n2 , ^ 2 21 
0p]2+[0p]^+20p0p[2p - 1] 
((^F " ^ 
y(a2)2+(o2)2+2o2o2(2p2 _ i) 
1 
2 
1 
2 
The values from (9) and (10) are substituted into (4) 
and (5) and these solutions are then substituted into the 
risk function (2). This procedure removes the cross product 
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term from the iso-variance equation. Solving the new riiik 
function for x'p given each possible x' can follow after the 
appropriate level of Var is assumed. 
This procedure can be shown with the following hypothetl-
2 P 
cal example'. Let = 4l, = 3^, and p = .321, then the iso-
variance exist as illustrated in (11). The iso-variance 
level of 25 was 
(11) Var (n) = 4l - 24 x Xp + 3^ x^ = 25 
chosen so the above pedagogical example would present a 
simplified solution. The tan 20 of (7) and the cos 20 can be 
calculated. 
(12) tan 20 = - 24 
7 
(13) cos 20 = - 7 
25 
Using the trigometric formulas (9) and (10) gives the desired 
values. 
( l4 ) sin 0 = 4 
5 
(3 5) cos 0 = 3_ 
5 
Hence (4) and (5) follow in (l6) and (17). 
(16) X = i*' " 
(17) Xp = 
203 
Substituting (l6) and (17) back into (11) yields the desired 
relationship where the cross product is removed. 
(18) 25x'2 + 50x2 = 25 
(19) x'2 + 2x'p = 1 
C 
Prom (18) it follows that an ellipse of semi.axes 1 and 2 
exist for x' and x'^ respectively. 
iso-variance 
Figure A.2. Ellipse 
For those pairs (x', x'^) the alternative combinations of 
futures (xp) and cash positions (x) can be determined by sub­
stituting back into (4) and (5) given the present set of 
assumed parameters. Of course these values will change as 
such parameters change, but for the ellipse to exist the 
coefficients in (l8) must always be of the same sign and 
never equal zero [128]. 
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APPENDIX B: CONCAVITY AND THE ISO-VARIANCES 
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A sufficient condition for the concave downward function 
can be determined. 
2 2 2 ? 
CD' Var(n), = x - 2x x^ pa^Op 
(2) d Var(ïï)j = Vxdx + VXpdXp = 0 
Then the slope at any point on the iso-variance curve is 
determined as in (3)-
(3) dx. 
dx 
Vx 
vZ 
- XpPOpCp] < 
> 0 
[XpGp - XpOpOp] 
For the risk function to be concave downward the deriva­
tive of (3) must be negative within some limits of x and Xp. 
Taking this derivative the sufficient restraint follows. 
P = -1 
dx 
(5) dVx 
dx 
dx^ 
dXr 
(VXp) 
Vx„ dVx 
^ "di 
Vx 
dx 
< 0 
'"p'sr 'VF 
(6) dVx 2 ^^p 
dx ~ dx P^p^P 
Utilizing results from (3), (5), and (6) and substituting 
into (4) leads to the conclusion shown in (7)-
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(7) d^x. -[1 -p ] 
dx r 2 n2 
[XpOp - XpCpOp] 
_ 2 2 
pOpOp 
For (7) to always be negative it follows that the relationship 
2 
within the brackets must be positive since both (1 -p ) and 
2 2 [XpOp - xpopop] are never negative. Therefore this yields 
( 8 ) .  
(8) XpOpOp - xopOp — F > 0 
^ ^ dx 
(9) Xp ^ X dxp 
dx 
Given the specifications that both risk and correlation are 
positive, then the evaluation of (9) reveals that a) dXp ^ g 
dx 
where Vx < 0 and VXj, > 0 and b) ^ ^ here Vx > 0 and ! 
dx 
define the concave section. The Initial risk function follows 
directly from (9) given these limits. 
(10) X, >-'"p - , 
(Vp - POpGp) 
(11) x^al - X Xp pOpOp > -(x^a? _ x x, pffpOp) 
(12) x^cr^ . 2x XpPOpOp + > 0 
These procedures establish the fact that the iso-variances 
must have a concave segment. 
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APPENDIX G: MATRIX SOLUTIONS FOR INTERTEMPORAL PRICE 
DISCOVERY 
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Appendices C.l through C.4 were derived from the market 
equilibrium equations 3.8 end 3-10. Equation 3.8 was written 
slightly different so that all relationships can be expressed 
as functions of A and P^. 
XCP^, a) G(L*) = TyCP^, P^, e) + T^^A.P^iG) (3.8) 
X(Pf - A, a) G(L*) = TyfP^ _ A, P^^ e) + T^fA, P^, e) 
(3.8') 
where A = [P^ - P^] or P^ = [P^ -A] 
TH(A, P^J e) = PLCP^J e) + Pg(Pf, b) (3.10) 
Math Appendix C.l. 
Change in Transformation Service Cost. 
fx Px A P* fx 
[T^ - X ^G] [TJ - T * + X ^G] 
r " 
9P^ 
+ Pg"] [T^] 9A 
II 
P P P P P P 
|M^| - TyCTy* - X ^G] + + Pgf] [T^ - + X ^G] 
= +[(-) -  (+)] +  [(-) +  (-)] [(+) -  (-) + (+)] 
=  ( + ) ( - )  +  ( — ) ( + )  =  ( — )  +  ( - )  ~  ( — )  <  0  
1^1.ll = - [TyL + T%L][TA] - [-TyL][T^ - + X^^G] 
= - [(-) + (-)](+) - (+)(+) = (-)(-) - (+) 
= (+) - (+) ~ 0 
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I'^1.2 I = [Tu* - X^xg][-T^L] _ [pPf + F^fJCT^L + T^L] 
[(-) - (+)] (+) - [(-) + (-)][(-) + (-)] 
(-)(+) - (-)(-) = (-) - (+) = (-) < 0 
iM 
9P 
L 
|M. 
^ 0 ana If-
1 ' ^ 
IM 1.2 
iM. 
> 0 
Math Appendix C.2. 
Change in Expectations 
[T^x _ G(L*)][Ty - T^x + x^xg] 
-[F^f + pff] 
aP. 
Ae 
-[T^ + T^] 
Ty(Pf - A, P[, e) + T%(A, e) = X(P^ - A, a) G(L*) 
T%(A, P?, e) = F^CPf., e) + F^(P^, b) 
L'^f- sr"f' 
iMgl = [TyX - G]T^ + [P[f + Pgf][TA - T^x + X^x G] < 0 
= (-)(+) +  (-)(+) = ( - ) 
|M 2.1 -[T* + T®3[T^] - [P® - T®][T^ - fx + X^x G] 5 0 
- [ ( + ) ( + ) ]  -  [ ( - )  -  C + ) ] ( + )  =  ( - )  -  ( - ) ( + )  
= [(-) + (+)] ^  0 
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iMg gl = [T^x - G][F® - '1'^] - [F^f + F^fJCTe +Tg] > 0 
=  ( - ) ( - )  -  ( - ) ( + )  =  ( + )  +  ( + )  -  ( + )  
96 
iM 2 . 1 1  
Mn I I 0 and II 
1^2.2 1 
i M^ I 
< 0 
Math Appendix C.3 
Change In Speculative Interest 
-[F^f + P[f] 
H 
[T^x _ G(L*)][T^ - T^x +X^XG(L*)] 
u 
3 
3 b 
3A 
,b 
0 
V. J 
|M^| = -[Fgf + FL^][TH - G(L*)] - T^CT^x - X^x G(L*)] 
-[(-) + (-) ] ( + ) -( + )[(-) - ( + )] = ( + ) - (~) - ("*•) 
I "3.1 
1*3.21 
. 9P J 
Pg[Tg - T^x + X^x G] > 0 since Fg > 0 
-[T^x _ x^x G(L*)] Fg > 0 
U û 
M 
3^ 
M. 
3b I >0 and 3b 
Ik = I 3 ' 2 I > 
M, 
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Math Appendix C.4, 
Changing in Input Supplies 
[TyX _ G][T^ - + X^x G(L*)] 
-[F^f + P^f] T 
H 
r ^ 
8P. 
9a 
M 
9a 
r ^ 
0 
M^j = [T^ T^x _ Ty X^x G(L*)]+[F^f + + X^XG(L*)] 
=  [ ( + )  ( - )  -  ( + ) ]  +  [ ( - )  ( + ) ]  
=  ( - )  +  ( - )  +  ( - )  =  ( - )  
|M 4.1 = X^ Ty > 0 since X^ > 0 
|M 4.2 = -[pPf + Pqf] [X*] (-1) = X&[pff + pPf] < 0 
9 A — 
3a 
M 4.2 
M, 
> 0 and 
9a 
M 4.1 
M, 
< 0 
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APPENDIX D; EMPIRICAL REFERENCE FOR LIVE BEEP FUTURES 
TRADING ACTIVITIES 
Appendix D.l. A scheme for selecting that futures contract with maturity date nearest 
to that of the maturity of the transformed Input 
Date for Near Futures^ Months before X(t) is Mature^ 
Final Output _ , , 
T(X) Contract ^=2 23^56 7 89 
JAN FEB JAN DEC NOV OCT SEPT AUG JULY JUNE MAY 
FEB FEB FEB JAN DEC NOV OCT SEPT AUG JULY JUNE 
MAR APR MAR FEB JAN DEC NOV OCT SEPT AUG JULY 
APR APR APR MAR FEB JAN DEC NOV OCT SEPT AUG 
MAY JUNE MAY APR MAR FEB JAN DEC NOV OCT SEPT 
JUNE JUNE JUNE MAY APR MAR FEB JAN DEC NOV OCT 
JULY AUG JULY JUNE MAY APR MAR FEB JAN DEC NOV 
AUG AUG AUG JULY JUNE MAY APR MAR FEB JAN DEC 
SEPT OCT SEPT AUG JULY JUNE MAY APR MAR FEB JAN 
OCT OCT OCT SEPT AUG JULY JUNE MAY APR MAR FEB 
NOV DEC NOV OCT SEPT AUG JULY JUNE MAY APR MAR 
DEC DEC DEC NOV OCT SEPT AUG JULY JUNE MAY APR 
^This column indicates those months of maturity for some product that has just 
completed a transformation process. 
^Six futures contracts exist, hence that contract maturing nearest to that maturity 
date for the product is chosen. For example, livestock mature in Jan., hence futures 
tradings will be in February contracts. 
"^t is the months from maturity of the futures contract. If feeders are placed on a 
feedlot and require six months for feeding and if such Inputs X(6) mature in January, 
then any futures hedging will be in February contracts with positions established in 
August. See the first line above for this example. 
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Appendix D.2. The variance of futures prices, the variance of 
cash-futures price difference, and the mean 
difference in relationship to months fmm con­
tract maturity for all contracts combined 
Var(P^)& Var(PT-Pf)b Mean(P^-P^) Time to 
Maturity 
3.16000 1.31000 0.24000 1.00000 
3.20000 2.85000 0.33000 2.00000 
2. 32000 1.08000 1.28000 3.00000 
2.11000 1.66000 1.69000 4.00000 
2.09000 2.25000 2.06000 5.00000 
2.09000 2.44000 2.31000 6.00000 
2.03000 2 .70000 2.47OÛO 7.00000 
1.92000 3.01000 2.54000 8.00000 
1.70000 3.68000 2.60000 9.00000 
^Variance for each t is calculated over monthly futures price 
data from 1965 through 1969, reference [12], [13], [l4]. 
^See reference [122] for data sources for P^(0). 
Appendix D.3- Estimate and test for futures price trend over the life of each 
live beef futures contract 
Function Depend.^ Intercept Coeff. t test R D.W.^ n 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Feb 
Feb 
Feb 
18. 
2. 
2. 
47^0 
9168 
9102 
+ 
+ 
+ 
.1629 
.0083 
.0354 
4 
4 
3 
.1445 
.1757 
.7120 
.5530 
.5558 
.5110 
.5502 
.5564 
.5761 
41 
41 
41 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Apr 
Apr 
Apr 
18. 
2. 
2 . 
2860 
9054 
9092 
+ 
+ 
+ 
.1603 
.0024 
.0291 
3 
3 
2 
.4309 
.4380 
.5136 
.4636 
.4644 
.3579 
. 4610 
. 4561 
.4069 
45 
45 
45 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Jun 
Jun 
Jun !; 
18. 
2. 
2. 
8900 
9380 
9523 
+ 
+ 
+ 
.0776 
.0039 
.0051 
1 
1 
.3270 
.2613 
.3716 
.2053 
.1956 
.0587 
.4605 
.4427 
.4297 
42 
42 
42 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Aug 
Aug 
Aug î; 
19. 
2 . 
2. 
6970 
9794 
9892 
.0323 
.0018 
.0129 
— .5573 
.5867 
.9857 
.0879 
. 0924 
.1540 
.5365 
.5310 
.5704 
42 
42 
42 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Oct 
Oct 
Oct % 19. 2. 2 9450 9930 9949 .0519 .2895 .0119 -1 .9209 . 0010 .9576 . 1459 .1583 .1516 .5745 .5683 .5712 41 4l 41 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Dec 
Dec 
Dec ÎÎ 
19. 
2 
2 
0960 
9494 
9376 
+ 
+ 
4-
.0871 
.0043 
.0237 
1 
1 
2 
.9164 
.8694 
.3404 
.2835 
.2772 
.3397 
. 4413 
.4431 
.4199 
44 
44 
44 
1 
^ All prices were deflated by using the Dow Jones Futures Index starling with January, 
1966, through December, I969. 
^ D. W. below approximately 1.44 indicates positive autocorrelation. 
Appendix D.4. Estimate and test for futures price 
trend over the life of each live beef 
futures contract after the correction 
for a positive first order autocorrela-r 
tion in the errors 
Function Depend. Intercept Coeff. t ,test 
Linear Feb P. 5 .1923 + , , 1064 3. 4535 
Exponential Feb pi .8173 + . .0053 3. ,4ll4 
Double-log Feb .8462 + . 0201 2. ,9443 
Linear Apr Pf 4 .3661 + . 0811 2. 6666 
Exponential Apr Pf .6707 + . 0042 2. ,6960 
Double-log Apr .5991 f * 0148 2. 2587 
Linear Jun Pf 4 .4307 + . 0496 1. 2189 
Exponential J un Pf .6547 + r. 0024 1. 1506 
Double-log Jun .7367 0054 • 6508 
Linear Aug Pf 5 .2170 + . 0383 8952 
Exponential Aug Pf .7876 + . 0021 , 9115 
Double-log Aug .8465 + , 0060 6801 
Linear Oct Pf 5 .6908 + . 0135 2862 
Exponential Oct Pf .8487 + . 0005 1983 
Double-log Oct .8530 + . 0015 1639 
Linear Dec Pf H .2115 + . 1298 3. 8938 
Exponential Dec Pf .6533 + . 0066 3. 9325 
Double-log Dec 4 .6179 + • 0297 4. 4439 
^Sample variance before and after the correction 
for autocorrelation. 
^l6b 
Sample Variance®" 
(before) (after) 
.4888 1 .5832 40 .6199 .2769 
.4842 1 .5726 40 .0016 .0007 
.4310 1 .4983 40 .0017 .0008 
.3805 1, .5177 44 .9932 .3374 
.3841 1, 5097 44 .0027 .0009 
.3291 1, .4792 44 .0030 .0009 
.1956 1. 7840 4l 1.3633 .5305 
. 1812 1, 7675 41 .0037 .0014 
.1037 1. 7542 4l .0039 .0014 
.1419 1. 7836 4l 1.3563 .8013 
.1444 1. 7816 4l .0037 .0015 
.1083 1. 7643 4l .0036 .0015 
.0464 1. 7804 40 1.2117 .5487 
.0322 1. 7971 40 .0031 .0014 
.0264 1. 7961 40 .ÙO32 .0014 
.5196 1. 6478 43 .9330 .3363 
.5233 1. 6496 43 .0024 .0009 
.5702 1. 7304 43 .0023 .0008 
Appendix D.5. Data for the last trading days in each contract of live beef futures^ 
FEBRUARY^ APRIL JUNE AUGUST OCTOBER DECEMBER 
'-0. 55000^ 0. 77000 0. 37999 -0. 59999 -0. 50000 -0 .64999 
1966 -0. 58000 0. 95001 -0. 09999 -0. 43001 -0. 30000 -0 .70000 
1 < 0. 20001 0. 70000 0. 14999 0. 01999 0 . 06001 -0 .39000 
r-0. 43001 -0 . 45000 0. 06999 -0 . 70001 0 . 78000 0 .71999 
1967 -0. 31999 -0 . 48000 -0 . 75000 -0 . 43001 0 . 25000 0 .36000 
1 I-O. 47000 -1. 37001 -0. 55000 0 . 10001 0. 75000 0 .0 
r °-97000 0. 75000 0. 14999 0. 20000 1, 62000 0 .23000 
1968 0. 38000 0. 65001 0. 02000 0 . 20001 1. 22000 0 .03001 
^ 0. 61000 0. 45000 0 . 02000 0 . 34999 0 . 72000 -0 .87000 
r 0" 64999 -0. 18001 0. 72000 0. 18001 0 . 59999 -0 .70001 
1969 0. 20000 0 20000 0. 09999 1. 20001 0. 66000 -0 .25000 
^-0. 22000 0. 14999 -0. 70000 0. 31999 0. 38000 -0 .29001 
^Data Source: Livestock and Meat Statistics, reference [122]. 
^Difference = [fed cattle price in Chicago for choice.(1100 to 1250 lbs.) steers--
live beef futures price], 
^All prices are recorded as the week ending price for the last three weeks of each 
contract trading period. 
Appendix D.6. Monthly trading of live beef futures contracts 
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
Year^ Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June 
1964 
1965 1,081 I ,943 3,012 3 ,760 6,059 9.114 
1966 15,327 12 ,680 15,402 11 ,306 7,510 12,262 
1967 32,357 27 ,584 22,596 20 ,175 27,056 25,497 
1968 25,961 31 ,906 21,080 25 ,507 15,812 16,920 
1969 35,316 46 ,633 109,477 
^Reference [l4]. 
^This data was for all contracts combined. But the average 
mid-month (15th of month) volume and open interest varied 
among contracts, where the mean levels were as calculated: 
Contracts Vol. O.I. 
FEB 172 2428 
APR 143 1876 
J UN 183 2268 
AUG 146 1937 
OCT 126 1669 
DEC 163 2236 
219 
July Aug.. , , . Sept. Oct, Nov. Dec, Total 
191 1,386 1,577 
4 ,964 5 ,185 2, 866 3, 786 3 ,126 14 ,397 59 ,291 
10 ,405 20 ,636 12, 557 16, 810 19 ,009 17 ,242 170 ,798 
21 ,544 21 
0
0
 o
n
 0
0
 
31, 691 27, 067 20 ,362 21 ,999 299 ,787 
17 ,586 16 ,575 10, 838 18, 861 20 ,004 32 .058 253 ,108 
Appendix D.7. Estimate and test for futures volume tradin^ trend over the life 
of each live beef futures contract 
Function Depend. Intercept Coeff. t test R D.W. n 
Linear Feb Vol. 346.7100 -29. 2944 -2. 6978 . 3966 1. 2418 41 
Exponential Feb Vol. 5.8602 .2571 -4. 1054 .5493 9437 41 
Double-log Feb Vol. 6.0478 - 1, .0775 
-3. 6100 .5004 ,8926 41 
Linear Apr Vol. 261.2800 -19, .7277 -3. 2192 .4407 1. ,0208 45 
Exponential Apr Vol. 5.7829 - .2721 -4. 2434 .5433 .8204 45 
Double-log Apr Vol. 5.8090 - 1 .0425 -3. 4053 . 4609 .7880 45 
Linear Jun Vol. 317.3200 -23 .4790 -3. 7334 .5083 1 .0248 42 
Exponential Jun Vol. 5.7845 — .1820 -3. 6437 .4992 .7595 42 
Double-log Jun Vol. 5.8176 - .6966 -3. 0676 .4364 .7635 42 
Linear Aug Vol. 288.7300 -24 .6802 -4, .0240 .5368 1 .3722 42 
Exponential Aug Vol. 5.7504 - .2193 -4, .8313 .6071 1 .0475 42 
Double-log Aug Vol. 5.7634 — .8247 -3 .8630 .5212 1 .0835 42 
Linear Oct Vol. 236.0800 -19 .3190 -3 .0105 .4342 1 .0762 41 
Exponential Oct Vol. 5.7049 - .2890 -4 . 6028 .5933 1 . 4018 41 
Double-log Oct Vol. 5.6620 - 1 .0407 -3 .5563 .4949 1 .3132 41 
Linear Dec Vol. 262.2200 -16 .4863 -1 .8744 .2778 .9736 44 
Exponential Dec Vol. 5.5139 — .1955 -3 .0173 . 4221 .9784 44 
Double-log Dec Vol. 5.4380 - .6915 -2 .2839 .3324 .9311 44 
Appendix D.8. Estimate and test for futures volume trend 
over the life of each live beef futures 
contract after correction for autocorrelation 
Function Depend. Intercept Coeff. t test 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Feb 
Feb 
Feb 
Vol. 
Vol. 
Vol. 
210. 
2, 
2, 
2700 
.6797 
.5857 
-25 .3519 
.2104 
.8426 
-2. 
-3. 
-3. 
.0496 
2768 
,0271 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Apr 
Apr 
Apr 
Vol. 
Vol. 
Vol. 
139. 
2. 
2. 
,1100 
4375 
3363 
-19 
- 1 
.9147 
.2789 
.0427 
-3. 
-4. 
-3. 
,1819 
6053 
9603 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Jun 
Jun 
Jun 
Vol. 
Vol. 
Vol. 
167. 
2. 
2. 
,0000 
3245 
3261 
-23 .5903 
. 2140 
.7780 
-3. 
-4. 
-4. 
6988 
8638 
1886 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Aug 
Aug 
Aug 
Vol. 
Vol. 
Vol. 
183. 
3. 
3. 
6100 
0 5 5 4  
0 9 9 9  
-20 .5027 
.2190 
.7454 
-3. 
-4. 
-3. 
0724 
7474 
6349 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Oct 
Oct 
Oct 
Vol. 
Vol. 
Vol. 
122. 
4. 
3. 
1000 
0576 
7492 
-17 
- 1, 
.0613 
.3042 
0629 
-2. 
-4. 
-3. 
3709 
2107 
3516 
Linear 
Exponential 
Double-log 
Dec 
Dec 
Dec 
Vol. 
Vol. 
Vol. 
109. 
2. 
2. 
2600 
5540 
3775 
- 9. . 2411 
,1145 
.3479 
-1. 
-1. 
9782 
7595 
2520 
221b 
R D.W. Sample Variance 
(before) (after) 
.3155 1. 8013 47,280 44,547 
.4694 2. 1798 1.5726 1.1867 
.4408 2. 1524 1.6881 1.1867 
.4407 2. 2003 17,086 13,079 
.5793 2. 4118 1.8786 1.2344 
.5214 2. 2710 2.0992 1.3584 
.5096 2. 2289 15,746 11,946 
.6145 2. 4743 .9942 .5769 
.5570 2. 2707 1.0702 .6388 
. 4414 1. 9755 15,164 13,768 
.6052 2. 1797 . 8304 .6277 
.5030 2. 0856 .9577 .7387 
.3590 2. 2920 15,685 12,667 
.5604 2. 0582 1.5010 1.4014 
.4777 2. 0520 1.7492 1.5808 
.1510 2 . 1619 34,889 25,854 
.2649 2. 6260 1.8936 1.2290 
.1919 2. 6138 2.0495 1.2762 
Appendix D.9. Estimate and test for Open Interest trend iver the life of each 
live beef futures contract 
Function Depend 
• 
Intercept Coeff. t test R D.W. n 
Linear Feb 0. I. 4863.0000 -407.5570 -4. 1735 .5556 .2552 41 
Exponential Feb 0. I. 8.7109 - 0.2624 -4. ,6090 .5938 .5108 41 
Double-log Feb 0. I. 8.8370 - 1.0587 
-3. ,8108 .5209 .5115 41 
Linear Apr 0. I. 3380.0000 -251.6370 -3. ,7558 . 4970 .2104 45 
Exponential Apr 0. I. 8.3207 .2419 -3. 9026 .5114 .2737 45 
Double-log Apr 0. I. 8.3132 .9056 -3. 0770 . 4248 .3145 45 
Linear Jun 0. I. 4100.1000 -319.1244 -4, .7324 .5991 .2938 42 
Exponential J un 0. I. 8.3445 .1884 -3 .5372 .4881 . 4520 42 
Double-log Jun 0. I. 8.3520 .7036 -2 .8976 . 4165 .5053 42 
Linear Aug 0. I. 3905.1000 -340.2045 -5 .9957 .6880 . 2615 42 
Exponential Aug 0. I. 8.8098 .3124 -6 .4137 .7120 .5552 42 
Double-log Aug 0. I. 8.7804 - 1.1441 -4 .6865 .5954 .6238 42 
Linear Oct 0. I. 3593.4000 -338.6896 -5 .9554 .6901 .3071 41 
Exponential Oct 0. I. 8.8254 .3496 -8 .5728 .8083 . 4812 41 
Double-log Oct 0. ,I. 8.8005 - 1.2767 -5 .8493 .6836 .5437 4l 
Linear Dec 0. , I. 4266.7000 -337.1569 -4 .5081 .5710 .2375 44 
Exponential Dec 0, ,1. 8.6846 .2531 -4 .9588 .6077 .3849 44 
Double-log Dec 0, .1. 8.7313 .9863 -4 .0205 .5272 . 4066 44 
Appendix D.IO, Estimate and test for Open Interest trend over the life of each live 
beef futures contract after correction for autocorrelation 
Function Depend 
• 
Intercept Coeff. t test R D .W. Sample Variance (before) (after) 
Linear Feb 0. I. 645. 2100 -354 .5803 -6. 6517 .7335 1. 6049 3,832,800 907,440 
Exponential Feb 0. I. 2. 3338 - .3024 -6, .9453 .7479 2 . 3013 1.2992 .5576 
Double-log Feb 0. I. 2. 3674 - 1 .1952 -6, .1242 .7447 2 . 1007 1.4623 .6367 
Linear Apr 0. I. 424. 6100 -253 .1235 -7 .9815 .7763 1. 7149 2,042,300 402,830 
Exponential Apr 0. I. 1. 2720 — .3352 -10 .9825 .8612 1. 5816 1.7482 .3633 
Double-log Apr 0. I. 1. 4571 - 1 . 2844 -8 .7879 .8048 1. 3048 1.9401 .4892 
Linear J un 0. I. 653. 7500 -317 .4859 -8 .3967 . 8024 1. 5907 1,810,400 485,500 
Exponential Jun 0. I. 2. 0784 - .2728 -8 .2213 .7963 2. 0265 1.1299 .3532 
Double-log Jun 0,. I. 2. 2946 — .9658 -6 .3282 .7118 1. 7947 1.2260 .4670 
Linear Aug 0. I. 539. 4900 1 uo
 
0
 
.1941 -11 .1524 .8725 1. 5170 1,297,700 320,150 
Exponential Aug 0. I. 2. 6028 - . 3664 -10 .1543 .8518 1. 6694 .9564 . 4049 
Double-log Aug 0. I. 2. 8816 — 1 .2930 -7 .3230 .7569 1. 5550 1.2523 .6155 
Linear Oct 0, I. 503. 4200 -260 .3800 -7 .5245 .7736 1. 1230 1,231,900 315,790 
Exponential Oct 0. I. 2. 1921 - .3826 -12 .0192 .8898 1. 3482 .6333 .2535 
Double-log Oct 0. I. 2. ,1921 — .3826 -12 .0192 .8898 1. ,3482 .9730 .2535 
Linear Dec 0. ,1. 492, , 2200 -257 .4607 -6 .3945 .7066 1. 2270 2,522,500 524,590 
Exponential Dec 0. ,1. 1. 7205 - .2412 -6 .8541 .7307 2 , .0041 1.1752 .3808 
Double-log Dec 0. ,1. 1. . 8135 .9016 -5 .6894 .6642 1, .8207 1.3545 .4533 
Appendix D.ll. Estimate and test for a relationship between the futures price in 
contracts 6 months from maturity and the futures trading composition 
Function^ Depend. Intercept Coeff. 1 t test Coeff. 2 t test R D.W. 
Linear Pf 22.5600 + .0591 4 .7512 +.0101 .7069 .8893 1 .3029 
Semi-log Pf 9.7893 +3.3236 4 .9834 +.8172 . 8504 .8975 1 .4669 
Exponential Pf 3.128% + .0022 4 .7865 +.0004 .8907 .8907 1 .2969 
Double-log Pf 2.6473 + .1248 5 .0428 +.0312 .8996 .8996 1 . 46l4 
Linear Pf 23.4230 + .0571 4 .8895 +.0000 .8795 .8795 .9233 
Linear ff 26.9070 .0000 . 0000 -.0049 .0657 .0657 1 .1359 
^Trading composition consist of the percentage of open commitments classified as 
large long speculative (coefficient 1) and the percentage- classified as large 
short hedges (coefficient 2). 
^The functional forms are defined as: 
Linear [speculation] + [hedging] + v 
Semi-log Log[speculation] + [hedging] + v 
Exponential Log P^ = [speculation] + «g [hedging] + v 
Double-log Pf " o'o '*1 Log[8peculatlon] + Log[hedglng] + v. 
